Complete current affairs 2017 (1)

AINUDIN KIBZAI Currents Affairs
CSS/PCS-2016-17 CURRENT AFFAIRS
Contents
1. Pak-India relations (Kashmir and LoC)
2. Pak-Russia Relations
3. Pak-China Relations
4. Pak-US-Afghan Relations
5. National Action Plan
6. SAARC and Its Future
7. Failed Turkish Coup And A Lesson For Pakistan
8. PANAMA Leaks
9. SYRIA – A New Battle-Ground For Cold War
10. BREXIT
11. Maritime Politics
12. Pak-China-Russia --- The New Block
13. FATA Reforms
14. Honor-Killings In Pakistan
15. Cyber-Crime bill
16. ISIS – A Threat To The World Peace

AINUDIN KIBZAI 1- Pak-India Relations (Kashmir and LoC)
Indo-Pak Relations: A brief ‘History’
Nadeem F. Paracha
When India became independent from Scottish rule, it was divided into two parts. Muslim-
majority areas became Pakistan. But for quite some time there were as many Muslims in the
Indian territory as there were in Pakistan; until the Indian government banned beef and the
Pakistani government debarred vegetarians. That settled things.
The Maharaja of the Muslim-majority region of Kashmir, Adinath Chandan Currynath, decided
to preserve the state of Kashmir as an independent entity, so he decided to neither join India nor
Pakistan.
Instead, he decided to join Ireland.
Pakistan sent peaceful Pakhtun tribesmen to talk to the Kashmiri government to persuade it to
join Pakistan.
It’s amazing that such a meeting even took place because the tribesmen only spoke Pashto and
the Maharaja spoke Hindi, Kashmiri and a bit of Thai.
The Indian government saw Pakistan’s action as an incursion and sent troops to Kashmir.
The result of the first war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir was Pakistan controlling
37pc of the area while India controlled 63pc. The Kashmiris controlled 0pc. Zilch. Nil. Zip.
Zippo.
The Maharaja decided to word a protest in Thai — so much so that at one point even Thailand
began claiming sovereignty over Kashmir.
Three more wars were fought between Pakistan and India. One was in 1965 AD, when fighting
broke out in the Rann of Kach, a sparingly inhabited area along the Pak-India border.
The Scottish colonialists had called this area Leg of Lamb.
Fighting spread from the Leg of Lamb to Kashmir to the Punjab and then all the way to
Kingston, Jamaica.
Then Pakistani and Indian troops crossed the partition line between the two countries called the
Line of Control (LoC) or Laal Patti. Both launched air assaults on each other’s heads. Pigeons
were used for this purpose.
After threats of intervention by Thailand, Pakistan and India agreed to an UN-sponsored cease-
fire and withdrew their pigeons from the sky.

Indian Prime Minister, Shri Lal Bahadur Single Paslee Shastri, and President Field Air Water
Marshal Kublai Khan of Pakistan, met in Bangkok in January 1966.
But Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated once again when in 1971 BC civil war erupted in
Pakistan, pitting the beef-munching West Pakistanis against the fish-eating East Pakistanis who
were demanding greater autonomy and more gravy.
Bengal nationalists were being backed by the Indians, so when Pakistan attacked Indian airfields
(and Thai restaurants) in Kashmir, India attacked both East and West Pakistan (after it could not
figure out where on earth North and South Pakistan were).
Under pressure from the US, the USSR and Rajesh Khanna, a UN ceasefire was arranged in mid-
December.
Many believed it was a Zino-Zoroastrian conspiracy plotted by a diabolic Soviet agent, Malala
Petrov, with whose DNA, Polish agent, Malala Yousafzai, will be spawned 25 years later to
discredit pious men.
Zulfikar Ali Toto emerged as the new leader of Pakistan. And he got kind of overexcited about
it.
Anyway, tensions between India and Pakistan were eased by the historic Mexican Accord of
1974 and after Pakistan recognised Bangladesh (and Thai food) in 1974.
In 1987, threat of yet another war between the two countries began looming when India (now
called the Republic of Indira) accused Pakistan of funding a Buddhist insurgency in Indian
Punjab.
To defuse the tension, Pakistan’s greatest leader ever and forever, General Saladin 2.2, indulged
in some ‘cricket diplomacy’ by sending Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi — son of Indira
Gandhi, daughter of Jawarlal Nehru, grandson of Mogambo — a gift of some of the finest
crickets found in the bushes of Islamabad.
Rajiv reciprocated the gesture by sending General Saladin 2.2 — who was a ferocious beef-eater
and fast-bowling enthusiast — a video of cows roaming aimlessly on the streets of Delhi.
Tensions between the two countries remained defused throughout the 1990s even when both the
poverty-stricken countries tested their nuclear devices in 1998.
Pakistani prime minster, Al-Nawaz Bin Saud, invited his Indian counterpart, Utter Bihari
Bajpayee, to visit Lahore for breakfast.
But the peace initiative turned out to be brief. In 1999, Pakistan and India went to war again.

This one was called the Kargil War (aka Star Wars: The Force Awakens). A ceasefire was
agreed upon due to pressure from the United States, Britain and especially Somalian sea pirates
who threatened to ban the smuggling of illegal rhino tusks into both India and Pakistan.
The world suddenly came to realise the possibility of two poverty-stricken nuclear nations going
to war: Eeeeeek … ! Scandinavian countries suggested to the UN that both India and Pakistan be
shifted to the North Pole. Even Mars. Somalia approved.
But the nature of Indo-Pak relations has changed ever since the 9/11 episode in which the CIA
agents staged a devastating attack on the Twin Towers in New York and blamed it on a couple of
pious men learning to fly.
Experts suggest that India does not pose a threat to Pakistan anymore, nor does Pakistan pose a
threat to India. However, many believe India poses a threat to itself and Pakistan poses a threat to
itself as well.
Anyway, Nobel-Prize winning Pakistani dentist and talk show host, Dr Daantist, believes that
those preaching peace between India and Pakistan are trying to sell-out the Kashmir cause and
dissuade Pakistani fast bowlers from eating beef. Somalia approved.
Meanwhile, perturbed by the peace processes; the dangerous anti-India musings of Aamir Khan;
and Naxalite sympathies of authors such as Reena Roy, India elected a pious man, Narendra
Mojo Modi, as India’s new Prime Minister.
He reprimanded the former Indian PM, Om Puri, for accepting boring peace overtures of the
Pakistanis and not being paranoid enough.
He promised his generals at least three more wars against Pakistan, two against China, and one
each against Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Rwanda.
To demonstrate this, he arrested a dangerous Pakistani spy (a pigeon) and handed it over to the
head of the Indian intelligence agency (a parrot).

Pak-Indo Relations: An Overview
Nadeem F. Paracha
India and Pakistan have had a long and complicated history with each other. When British India
became independent, it was divided into two parts.
Areas consisting of more than 75 per cent Muslims were to become Pakistan. But, for quite a
while, there were as many Muslims in the Indian Territory than there were in Pakistan – until the
Indian government banned beef and the Pakistani government debarred vegetarians.
The Maharaja of the Muslim-majority region of Kashmir, Curry Singh Dogra, decided to
preserve the state of Kashmir as an independent state, so he decided to join neither India nor
Pakistan.
Instead, he decided to join a local polo club that also held invigorating bingo nights every
weekend.
Pakistan sent tribal lashkars to talk to the Kashmiri government to persuade it (at gunpoint) to
join Pakistan.
It’s remarkable that such a meeting even took place because the lashkar men spoke Pashtu and
the Maharaja spoke Hindi, Kashmiri and a bit of Japanese.
The Indian government saw Pakistan's action as a sign of an invasion and sent troops to the state
of Kashmir. The result of the first war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir was Pakistan
controlling 37 per cent of the area, while India controlled 63 per cent of the territory. The
Kashmiris controlled none. 0 per cent. Zilch.
The Maharaja protested, but to no avail. He decided to word his protest in Japanese – so much so
that at one point even Japan began claiming sovereignty over Kashmir.
Three more wars occurred between Pakistan and India.
One of the wars was in 1965, when fighting broke out in the Rann of Kach, a sparsely inhabited
region along the Pakistan–India border. The British had called this area Leg of Lamb.
Fighting spread from Leg of Lamb to Kashmir to Punjab and then all the way to Honolulu in
Hawaii. And in September, Pakistani and Indian troops crossed the partition line between the two
countries and launched air assaults on each other's heads. Pigeons were used for this purpose.
After threats of intervention by Japan, Pakistan and India agreed to an UN-sponsored ceasefire
and withdrew their pigeons and crows from the sky and mice on the ground.

Indian Prime Minister Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Shri Shri Bang Bang and President Field Air
Water Marshal Kublai Khan of Pakistan met at a Russian Vodka bar in Tashkent in the former
Soviet Union in January 1966.
Both men after enjoying a drink or two and a game of ludo, signed an agreement pledging
continued negotiations and respect for the ceasefire conditions. After the ‘Tashkent Declaration’
(also called the Vodka Hustle) another period of relative peace ensued.
However, Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated once again when civil war erupted in Pakistan,
pitting the beef-munching West Pakistanis against the fish-eating East Pakistanis who were
demanding greater autonomy and more gravy.
The fighting forced 10 million East Pakistani Bengalis to flee to India, mostly on handmade
gliders made from baby shark fins.
The Bengalis were being backed by the Indians, so when Pakistan attacked Indian airfields (and
Japanese restaurants) in Kashmir, India attacked both East and West Pakistan (after it could not
figure out where on earth North and South Pakistan were).
India occupied East Pakistan which declared its independence as the United Fish-Loving
Republic of Bangladesh, on Dec. 6, 1971.
Under great pressure from the US, USSR and Dilip Kumar, a UN ceasefire was arranged in mid-
December, mainly due to the conspiracies of Ziono-Zoroastrian agents operating within
Pakistan’s glorious, enterprising, fit, super-duper, very muscular polity.
Chairman Zulfi Phutto emerged as the new leader of Pakistan, and Mujibur Rahman Machli as
prime minister of Bangladesh.
Tensions between India and Pakistan were alleviated by the historic Bogotá Accord of 1972 and
after Pakistan recognised Bangladesh (and fish masala) in 1974.
In the early 1980s, threat of yet another war between the two poverty-stricken countries began
looming again when India (now called the Republic of Indira Gandhi) accused Pakistan of
funding the Buddhist insurgency in Indian Punjab.
To defuse the tension, Pakistan’s greatest leader ever, ever, ever and ever forever after ever,
General Zia Bin Qasim Saladin Salu, indulged in some ‘cricket diplomacy’ by sending Indian
prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi – son of Indira Gandhi, daughter of Jawarlal Nehru grandson of
Mogambo – a gift of some of the finest crickets found in the bushes of Rann of Kach.
Rajiv reciprocated the gesture by sending Zia – a well-known beef lover – a video of fat cows
roaming aimlessly on the streets of Mumbai.

Cricket diplomacy.
Tensions between the two countries remained defused throughout the 1990s even when both the
skinny, poverty-stricken countries tested their respective nuclear bombs in 1998.
In fact, Pakistani prime minster, Al-Nawaz Bin Sharif, actually invited his Indian counterpart,
Utter Bihari Vajpayee, to visit Lahore for lunch.
Utter Bihari accepted the invitation but Pakistan’s greatest ever, ever, ever and ever forever after
ever political party in the whole wide world (and imaginary caliphate), the Jamat-i-Jamat (JIJ),
criticised Nawaz for giving up beef.
But the Nawaz-led peace initiative turned out to be short-lived. In July 1999, Pakistan and India
went to war again. This one was called the Kargil War.
First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and occupied
strategic locations, such as tree tops and the insides of mail boxes.
The next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration (with the help of a Japanese spy
embedded within the Pakistan forces). India then began mobilising its forces.
The final stage involved major battles between Indian and Pakistani forces.
A ceasefire was agreed due to international pressure from United States, Britain and especially
Tanzania who threatened to ban the smuggling of illegal elephant tusks into both India and
Pakistan. Both the forces also agreed to pull back their armies behind the Line of Control (also
called ‘Control Ki Lakeer’).
Pakistan soon sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. US President and renowned
saxophonist, Bill Groovy Clinton, refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces
from the Indian side of the Line of Control.
Talking on phone to the Pakistani prime mister, he said: “I am sorry, Nawaz, but we will not be
able to intervene unless you ask your forces to withdraw back to the Control ki Lakeer.”
Unfairly, it was Pakistan that was criticised by other countries (especially Somalia) for
instigating the war.
The world suddenly came alive to the possibility of two poverty-stricken nuclear nations going to
war with their nuclear weapons. Scandinavian countries even suggested to the UN that both India
and Pakistan be shifted to the North Pole. Tanzania agreed.
The nature of the Indo-Pak relations has somewhat changed ever since the 9/11 episode in which
CIA agents staged a devastating attack on the the Twin Towers in New York and blamed it on a
couple of pious Arabs preaching peace.

Many believe India does not pose a threat to Pakistan and vice versa, but whereas this has left
some Indian generals feeling kind of bored and all, some Pakistanis think this is yet another CIA
conspiracy.
They think those preaching peace between India and Pakistan are trying to sell-out the Kashmir
cause and should be labeled as traitors. Tanzania agrees.
However, perturbed by the boredom being felt by Indian generals and politicians, the large
Indian polity elected a pious Hindu, Narendra Mo’Selfle, as India’s new Prime Minister. He
castigated the former Indian PM, Bishan Singh Bedi, for accepting boring peace overtures of the
Pakistanis and not being paranoid enough.
He promised his generals at least three more wars against Pakistan, at least two against China,
and at least one each against Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Mongolia. To demonstrate his resolve
he arrested a dangerous Pakistani spy (a pigeon) and handed it over to the head of the Indian
intelligence agency (a parrot).

Modi Escalates Drive to 'Isolate' Pakistan at BRICS Summit
By: The Express Tribune
Modi’s escalated his diplomatic drive to isolate Pakistan at the BRICS summit which was
attended by Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa among others.
Tension between the nuclear-armed neighbours has escalated since a Sept. 18 attack on an army
base in held Kashmir, near the disputed frontier with Pakistan, killed 19 Indian soldiers in the
worst such assault in 14 years.
India later said it had carried out retaliatory “surgical strikes” across the de facto border that
inflicted significant casualties.
Modi, Putin set to sign energy deals ahead of BRICS
Pakistan denied any role in the attack on the Uri army base, and said the Indian operation had not
even happened, dismissing it as typical cross-border firing. “In our own region, terrorism poses
a grave threat to peace, security and development,” Modi said in his remarks to BRICS leaders
who met at a resort hotel in the western state of Goa.
Modi’s posturing overshadowed the gathering of leaders of a group originally set up to boost
economic cooperation. It followed a productive bilateral summit with President Vladimir Putin
of Russia on Saturday that yielded billions of dollars in defence and energy deals.
The BRICS leaders had donned brightly coloured sleeveless jackets, of a style made popular by
India’s first post-independence leader Jawaharlal Nehru, for an informal dinner on Saturday
evening.
They were due later on Sunday to hold an outreach session with leaders from a little-known
group of countries from the Bay of Bengal region whose key attribute, from India’s point of
view, is that Pakistan is not a member.
Lack of strategic restraint
Modi’s hard line against Pakistan marks a departure from India’s tradition of strategic restraint,
and New Delhi has won expressions of support from both the West and Russia over the army
base attack. Yet China, a longstanding ally of Pakistan that plans to build a $46 billion export
corridor, has shown public restraint.
Modi and President Xi Jinping also held a bilateral meeting on Saturday and the accounts of their
conversation emerging from both sides pointed to key differences of opinion. In one remark
reported by the state Xinhua news agency, Xi said that China and India should “support each
other in participating in regional affairs and enhance cooperation within multilateral
frameworks”.

India’s Modi hosts BRICS leaders as bloc beset by economic woes
The dispatch went on to refer to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC). This grouping includes Pakistan, which was to have hosted a summit in November
that collapsed after India and other members pulled out.
The final BRICS summit declaration was expected to repeat earlier condemnations of “terrorism
in all its forms”, say diplomats and analysts, but avoid levelling blame over tensions between
India and Pakistan.
Modi misleading BRICS countries: Sartaj Aziz
Sartaj Aziz responded to Modi’s uncalled for criticism, saying the Indian PM was misleading the
BRICS countries.
“Modi is misleading his BRICS and BIMSTEC colleagues. The Indian leadership is desperately
trying to hide its brutalities in the Indian-occupied Kashmir, an internationally recognized
dispute on the UNSC agenda,” a Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement quoted him as saying.
Against Indian PM’s remarks that Pakistan sponsors terrorism, the adviser said: “Pakistan joins
all the members of BRICS and BIMSTEC in condemning terrorism and reaffirms its full
commitment to fight the menace of terrorism without discrimination, including against the Indian
state-sponsored terrorism on Pakistani soil.”
Aziz recalled the human rights violations committed at the hands of Indian occupying forces in
Kashmir valley and called for implementation of UNSC resolution on the region.
“The people of Indian-occupied Kashmir are being subjected to genocide by India for demanding
their fundamental right to self-determination, as promised to the Kashmiris in the relevant UN
Security Council resolutions,” he said.

One Step Further: It's Time for SAARC to Expel Pakistan
by: Akhilesh Pillalamarri
Amid increased tensions between India and Pakistan after an attack on Indian troops in Uri,
Kashmir, earlier this month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has vowed to isolate
Pakistan internationally. One way this has manifested itself already is a decision by India to not
attend this year’s summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a
regional organization in the subcontinent.
Subsequent to the decision of the Indian government, the SAARC summit, which supposed to be
held in November in Pakistan, quickly fell apart. Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Bhutan all pulled
out of the summit as well, with Bangladesh citing continuous interference by Pakistan in its
internal affairs. This is somewhat of a diplomatic and geopolitical victory for India. It will likely
speed up the integration and growth of South Asia under Indian leadership, but unfortunately, the
region’s second largest country, Pakistan, will increasingly miss out on this.
SAARC has so far been fairly ineffective, failing to enhance regional integration and cooperation
to any level nearing that of the neighboring Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
South Asia is the least interconnected region in the world. This is largely due to Pakistan’s
behavior. For example, it refuses to let Indian trucks pass through it overland en route to
Afghanistan, putting a damper on regional transportation and interconnectivity.
Moreover, it is unlikely that Pakistan will change its behavior anytime soon. Isolation and
sanctions have been attempted before, but have had little impact on Pakistan’s long-term
behavior. Pakistan has always been able to leverage its strategic location and ties with other
countries to get through hard times before, emerging with largely the same tactics as before. Two
years ago, I argued that for SAARC to work, India and Pakistan must resolve their differences.
As this seems unlikely, it is time for the other member states of SAARC to proceed with the
“small SAARC” option.
This is a SAARC without Pakistan.
“Small SAARC” would have close-knit economic integration and free trade, transportation
interconnectivity, and perhaps one day open borders and a common currency. For a country to
join this enhanced SAARC, such as Pakistan in the future, it would have to accept these basic
elements of the organization. Other than Pakistan, all the other countries in the region want more
integration, so it is likely that without Pakistan to oppose this, things would proceed at a steady
pace. Integrating Afghanistan without Pakistan to provide a land corridor to the rest of South
Asia would be difficult, but could be overcome by using a route through Iran, possibly involving
Iran more in South Asian affairs. It is not inconceivable that SAARC would one day include
Iran, but the organization has to remain geographically defined if it is to have any meaning.

According to the current SAARC charter, this is no mechanism for removing a nation. The
charter merely states that decisions would be taken on the basis of unanimity. Therefore, several
other options are possible. Pakistan, for instance, can be persuaded to withdraw of its own
accord. The other states could unanimously agree to suspend Pakistan under certain
interpretations of the charter. Or the other states could simply form a new organization to replace
SAARC, which would make the old charter superfluous. In any case, a move toward greater
integration in South Asia would probably involve writing a new charter.
It is clear that Pakistan is no longer amenable to SAARC and its goals and that, given the
circumstances, it is an obstruction to closer integration for the other states of South Asia. This is
unfortunate since many people in Pakistan, especially businessmen and pro-business politicians
such as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, seem to favor closer economic ties with India.
Unfortunately, the Pakistani security establishment won’t have it. Therefore, it is time for
Pakistan and SAARC to part ways. Pakistan should leave of its own volition or it should be
expelled.

Pak-India Relations — Is There a way Forward?
By: Talat Masood
Once again, expectations were raised and quickly dashed when it became clear that there was no
likelihood of a meeting between Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session. Not that there were any high expectations of the
one-off meeting had it been pulled off. It wouldn’t have achieved much apart from improving the
atmospherics for a while. But even that would have been a blessing considering the present state
of tension and volatility on the Line of Control (LoC) that seems to have become the norm ever
since the BJP came into power. In all probability, both countries, in their respective addresses to
the UNGA, will be running through the usual laundry list of complaints against each other and
trading barbs before world leaders — a sight that, regrettably, has been a regular feature over the
years with few exceptions.
The hard truth is that the two countries are caught in a test of wills, promoting opposing visions
of how relations can be normalised. For Pakistan, it is the resolution of the Kashmir dispute,
whereas India accords high priority to terrorism and is unwilling to engage on other issues. All
this is layered with emotions and ego, and is oblivious to the reality that the way India-Pakistan
relations are managed at the present will determine the security dynamics and landscape of South
Asia in the years to come.
It is important for leaders of both countries to appreciate that pursuing a policy of undermining
each other has not paid off in the past and is unlikely to be rewarding in the future. Borders have
shrunk and despite sophisticated measures to insulate neighbours, such a policy seemingly does
not work. What is needed is respecting the security of other countries. Only then will it be
possible to ensure the security of your own. Tragically, both India and Pakistan are supporting
each other’s dissident forces. India, of late, has been harbouring Baloch separatists and
supporting the TTP. There are also reliable reports that India is meddling in Karachi and other
hot spots in Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan is accused of looking the other way when operatives of
the Lashkar-e-Taiba try to sneak across the border. Pakistan should give up its policy of
supporting non-state actors, which only serves to weaken its international standing and
credibility. The establishment probably thinks that there is little incentive to suppress Pakistani
activities when India remains intransigent. One could argue that support for militant
organisations has a dangerous and corrosive influence on society and is against international
norms. As a consequence, a majority of countries feel more inclined to share India’s viewpoint.
What, then, will bring a shift in the policies of the two countries, or do their leaders believe that
the existing approach best serves their national goals? If this is the case, then Pakistan should
consider whether its current policy has brought the Kashmir dispute any closer to resolution?
Similarly, has India’s policy facilitated resolution of conflicts? In fact, discontent in Kashmir is
widespread and it is only through brutal suppression that India is maintaining a facade of peace.

One is justified in asking what India has gained by not allowing the Pakistani delegation from
meeting the Hurriyat leaders. Does it feel sufficiently confident that it can handle the chronic
problem of Kashmir unilaterally, without Pakistan’s ‘meddling’? Is it not better that Pakistan
engages openly with leaders who are known to be moderate and accommodating? It is more of
false pride than anything else which has led the Indian leadership to feel that it can resolve the
Kashmir problem unilaterally. There is an impression that India feels it has reached an
international standing by virtue of its geo-strategic and political importance and that now it can
dictate terms, like the US does, or it can replicate the Israeli model of dealing with the
Palestinians when it comes to dealing with Kashmir.
India is aware that its aspirations for economic development could be affected if tensions with
Pakistan rise to a level that leads to a serious conflict. It will try to pressure Islamabad by
rejecting formal engagement and maligning Pakistan at international forums, but will refrain
from crossing the threshold. Currently, it is not interested in trade with Pakistan, which is a
minuscule two per cent of its global volume, although potential for increasing it does exist if
normal market forces are allowed to operate freely. Islamabad’s reluctance to grant MFN status
to India is an additional impediment to normalising trade.
The civil-military imbalance being skewed in favour of the latter gives another reason to India
for ignoring Nawaz Sharif’s efforts at improving relations. The establishment insists that
relations with India are contingent on its willingness to discuss the future of Kashmir. By
pursuing a hard line towards Pakistan, India further strengthens the role of the military. It is not
surprising that the BJP being in power in India suits the military in Pakistan, enabling it to justify
its policies. This, in turn, boosts the power of the hardliners in India and gives them the driving
seat. Both have their strong views and it is difficult to visualise if there would be any meeting of
minds and values any time soon. The resulting dynamic only perpetuates antagonism between
the two countries.
The only real way forward is to actively cultivate the idea among Indians that Pakistan is less of
a problem and has the potential to be a partner in South Asia — but for that to happen, Pakistan
must continue its efforts to put its house in order with greater zeal. Moreover, the establishments
in both countries must finally understand that their job is to build peace, not to perpetuate endless
conflict that leads nowhere except towards a downward spiral. The two countries need to put
their irreconcilable differences on the shelf and get to work on what they can agree upon and
wait to resolve them later at an opportune moment. Otherwise, Pakistan as the junior partner will
be condemned to live in the past and the senior one will find it hard to realise its ambitious goals.

AINUDIN KIBZAI 2. Pak-Russia Relations
Rekindled Pak-Russia relations
By Yasir Masood
During the Cold War epoch, divergent priorities and self-interests, the Indo-Russian partnership
and geo-political realities could not allow a breathing space for Pak-Russia relations to grow and
strengthen. The geopolitical scalar did not change after the USSR’s collapse either. It is only
now, after a quarter of a century, that Moscow is looking to reinvigorate bilateral relations.
Moreover, traditional Indo-Russian military exclusivity, which has a history of bilateral
cooperation, has been under strain for a while — due to strong Indo-US defence ties — and
cracks are opening up, indicating that new opportunities for defence cooperation between
Pakistan and Russia are in ferment.
Taking advantage of India’s blossoming economy still remains a priority for Russia’s foreign
policy. But lately, it has also been seeking diversification in its foreign policy options and is
looking for improved multidimensional ties with Pakistan.
The Russian renaissance in global political affairs, with a strategic motif of balancing of force in
the Putin era, has been shaping new contours in international politics that could provide a
favourable environment for improving Russia’s overall relations with Pakistan.
A Russian-Pakistani rapprochement started with a milestone military cooperation pact when the
Russian defence minister, after 45 years, paid an official visit to Pakistan in December 2014.
Another landmark was achieved with a $2 billion inter-governmental deal between the two
countries for the construction of a gas pipeline from Lahore to Karachi in October 2015. In the
same year, Moscow agreed to sell four Mi-35M helicopters to Pakistan and welcomed Islamabad
when it joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This year, already, Russian Army
Commander-in-Chief Oleg Salyukov has announced the first-ever “mutual special drills in
mountainous terrain” and Khawaja Asif, Pakistan’s defence minister, visited Moscow to enhance
further cooperation.
These recent engagements between Russia and Pakistan amid changing geo-political and geo-
strategic milieu along with evolving inter-regional economic prospects and emerging threats to
regional stability, have steered both countries to define a new era of friendship.
A structured mechanism between the two countries could provide a framework to collaborate in
the areas of defence, trade, investment, science, technology, agriculture, education and culture.
In contemporary times, Russian actions have underscored the hardcore realities of the region, for
instance, combating illicit drug trafficking in Afghanistan, improving relations with Pakistan
while realising its geo-strategic importance, and preventing the emergence of the IS threat and
the overflow of the Taliban insurgency from Afghanistan to the Central Asian Republics (CAR)
and to its own territories.

Both countries also believe that transnational mega projects, including the CPEC and the Central
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, are paving the way for regional integration. Russian
strategists have rightly realised that Pakistan’s importance cannot be ignored in Pan-Eurasian
integration and its geo-strategic location also has a pivotal role to play in the revival of the Silk
Route, as well as in Eurasian Union integration. On the surface, no major obstacles restrict both
countries from expanding their multifaceted relations, but certain factors can slow down their
pace of growth. Pakistan and Russia are getting closer at a time when global politics is under
transformation, moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar one. Amid the US/Nato partial
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Indian tilt towards the US and the West and Russia’s rise,
Pakistan and Russia have the opportunity to translate their engagements into tangible positive
outcomes for both countries.
Recent upward trajectories in their political, economic and security ties at bilateral and
multilateral levels are a manifestation of foreign policy directives, which mean that both
countries are ready to cooperate with each other, forgetting the bitterness of the past. Defence
and economic relations seem to be their immediate priority. Pakistan’s full membership of the
SCO would provide new avenues for security and economic cooperation with Russia, China and
CARs. The SCO can also facilitate Pakistan and India to work through their longstanding issues
and move forward for economic cooperation and regional connectivity. Pakistan and Russia have
limited cultural exchange at the moment and there are opportunities for people of both countries
to interact with each other. This is a key impediment in creating an understanding of cultures,
traditions and values. Language barriers between the two communities play a significant role in
restricting cultural exchange programmes. However, one way to get over this hurdle could be to
provide incentives to students to learn the Russian language in Pakistan, as well as Urdu in
Russia.
Besides the interactions among government officials and parliamentarians, people-to-people
contacts centering around the academia, and media exchange programmes can work to catalyse
improved relations. It is difficult to predict whether these rekindled relations between Pakistan
and Russia will go a long way or not. For longstanding relations, one paramount consideration
for both sides is to comprehend emerging realities in the region and accordingly coordinate and
cooperate for a prosperous future.

Pak-Russia Relations: Certain Realities
By: Dr. Qaisar Rashid
Pakistan has finally decided to undo the act of Liaquat Ali Khan who, in 1949, as the Prime
Minister (PM) of Pakistan, turned down the request of the then USSR to visit it; instead, he
visited the US in May 1950. The former USSR must have been annoyed at this. Fuel to the fire
was added when Pakistan joined the anti-USSR western alliance rooted in antagonism towards
the communist ideology, which was upheld and sponsored by the former USSR. This was how
the annoyance of the former USSR with Pakistan was turned into animosity and the same
reflected in the events leading up to the 1971 crisis, which witnessed Pakistan getting divided
into two halves. With hindsight, Pakistan’s reliance on the US for military and financial aid since
1947 attributed to Pakistan’s joining the anti-USSR camp, chaired by the US. Pakistan became a
prisoner to its needs sprouted from insecurity — enforced by India — by denying Pakistan even
the rightful share of assets consequent to partition.
It was the famous Atlantic Charter — a joint declaration signed and released on August 14, 1941
by Franklin Roosevelt, the US president, and Sir Winston Churchill, the PM of the UK,
following their meeting during the Second World War, expressing their post-war aims — that
offered a glimmer of hope to colonial subjects (including those populating British colonies) to
exercise the right of self-determination (i.e. the rights of all peoples to choose their own
government and which may be by opting for decolonisation), as enshrined in point three of the
charter. During the war, subjects from the Indian subcontinent fought alongside the British army
against the Nazi regime of Germany and did not hesitate to risk or lay down their lives for their
colonial commanders but did not revolt. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941
brought the US into the war theatre from where the US emerged as the victor of the war by
creating a humanitarian crisis in Japan, whereas the former USSR, which also bore the onslaught
of the Nazi army, remained one of the beneficiaries of the triumph. This point placed the former
USSR at least one notch below on the ladder of global significance vis-à-vis the US.
Consequently, it was quite natural with Pakistan to join the victor club preferably and hurriedly,
since Pakistan was beset by severe economic and military inadequacies since 1947.
The hostile embrace between Pakistan and the former USSR took place in Afghanistan from
1979 to 1991 and this time it ended in the dismemberment of the former USSR into several small
states. The score was settled. Communist ideology was defeated. From the rubble emerged the
Russian Federation carrying the cargo of legacy and the burden of the lament of the former
USSR, besides the resolve to reform its own system. The Russian Federation, the core of which
is Russia, can still be called the reduced, if not deflated, version of the former USSR.
The Russia of today is grappled with two major issues on the foreign policy front: first, how to
support the allies (such as the regime of al-Assad of Syria) of the former USSR and second how
to cope with the needs of the modern age predicating on economic realities (instead of

ideological veracities including Islamic ideology) more than ever. Russia has been trying to
balance these two incongruent aspects. Regionally, Russia has been successful in mending fences
with China. Russia is in need of China owing to China’s economic prosperity whereas China
needs Russia’s help (in terms of supplying energy resources and distributing transport networks
for the movement of goods to and fro from Europe) to develop its western half. The other leg of
China’s need-based paradigm is to touch the warm waters of the Arabian sea, the same warm
waters the former USSR is said to have aspired to reach after stepping into Afghanistan in 1979,
even if the term ‘invasion’ is avoided to elucidate the act.
Russia has also mollified Pakistan. Immediately after 1991, Russia started extending the hand of
friendship to Pakistan to which Pakistan remained sceptical. In the meantime, Russia also tried to
associate itself with the west but failed. On the other hand, since 1991, the US has also started
bringing India closer to its fold. Post-9/11 developments offered both the US and India wider
space to figure out ways of working together in a range of fields from nuclear energy harnessing
to space exploration. In the post-9/11 era, circumstances called developments have also brought
Pakistan nearer to Russia in reciprocal reconciliatory terms on both bilateral and multilateral
fronts including sharing the platform of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in July
2015. In short, in Asia, the priority of Russia seems to be economic cooperation and not military
invasion. Russia is looking towards the East. The word hegemony is not being bandied about.
Interestingly, the post-Cold War realignment was slow and shallow but the post-9/11
realignments are quick and sturdy between the regional countries of Asia. More interestingly
still, Pakistan was not happy with the former USSR but now Pakistan seems to be happy with the
modified but condensed version of the same called Russia. The appalling episode of 9/11 must
have offered sufficient space to Russia to yearn for revival.
Pakistan must be asked how it views its former nemesis, the former USSR, which now embodies
Russia, to destroy the Islamic militant monster it has created and which is now Pakistan’s biggest
existential threat. Pakistan is soon going to offer a land route to Russia to let its goods have
access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea or Russia may achieve that target through China. If
amity and reconciliation are the ultimate destiny of a crisis, who will justify the lives lost on both
sides of the border in a struggle to subdue the other in the name of ideology?

Russia seeks out new win-win relationship with Pakistan
By: Shah Rukh Hashmi
Russia appears to be taking steps to deepen its relationship with Pakistan. The commander-in-
chief of the Russian Army, Oleg Salyukov, recently announced that Russian ground forces
would hold their first-ever military drills with Pakistan during 2016, in what is being billed as
“special drills in mountainous terrain.” Prior to this, Russia had waved its embargo on arms
supplies to Pakistan in June 2014 and signed a bilateral defense cooperation agreement with
Pakistan in November 2014.
Arguably, these latest moves were only designed to strengthen military-to-military relations
between Russia and Pakistan and put things in order for establishing stronger ties in the future.
That is why it was no surprise to see a defense deal for Russia to send Mi-35 Hind E helicopters
to Pakistan. However, there was also Pakistan’s invitation to President Putin for the inauguration
of a pipeline worth more than $2 billion that would extend from Karachi to Lahore. Furthermore,
Islamabad is looking for a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union to nurture
strong cooperation in commerce and trade.
Common interests between Russia and Pakistan
Interests are the permanent bonds between states that determine whether their mutual affairs are
to be considered as those of an enemy or friend. This well-proven statement is once again
appearing to be the truth in light of the recent embryonic bonhomie between the Kremlin and
Islamabad. The recent surge in bilateral relations is an outcome of one main factor – the United
States – and several other areas of interests between the two.
More or less for a decade, India’s tilt towards the United States and the latter’s withering alliance
with Pakistan was critical for ties between Moscow and Islamabad. Although officially
nonaligned, India remained a close partner with the Soviet Union and continued to manage this
strategic partnership with Russia in the post-Cold War era as well. However, New Delhi’s recent
embrace of Washington encouraged Moscow to reconsider its links with South Asia.

In the past, despite having a huge asymmetry of size and capacity vis-à-vis Russia, Pakistan had
adversarial relations towards the Kremlin for almost the entire Cold War period. There were
short spans of time when Moscow welcomed Islamabad’s pursuit of friendship and cooperation;
however, events like the U-2 spy plane incident and Pakistan’s role as frontline state in the
Soviet Union’s 1979 war in Afghanistan, led to eventual eviction of the Soviets in 1989.
Among the most critical factors was Pakistan’s membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) and The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), although Islamabad
joined these organizations solely because of its own complementary interests. However, Pakistan
participated in an alliance with the U.S., while pursuing divergent interests.
One of the pioneering international relations realists, Hans J. Morgenthau, describes the lack of
identity of interests in the U.S.-Pakistan alliance relationship in the following way: “The alliance
between the U.S. and Pakistan is one of many contemporary instances of an alliance serving
complementary interests. For Washington it serves the primary purpose of expanding the scope
of the policy of containment; for Islamabad it serves primarily the purpose of increasing her
political, military and economic potential vis-a-vis her neighbors.”
There is a long saga that explains how and why Pakistan from joined these South Asia security
pacts. In the wake of security and survival relations, the newly emerged state of Pakistan was
consumed by the fear of aggression from its eastern neighbor. There were several factors that
supported this argument in Pakistan’s security corridors and led policymakers to pursue possible
as well as available options to mitigate this insecurity and improve defense capabilities.
These fears were fueled by Indian aggression against Kashmir, Hyderabad and Jona Garh (all
three states which were to be part of either India or Pakistan on settled and agreed upon criteria,
mainly the consent of the majority of the population of the state). India forcefully integrated
Hyderabad and Jona Garh into Indian territory; yet, Kashmir became a disputed territory
between India and Pakistan. Kashmir remains an unfinished item on the agenda and a bone of

contention between the two nuclear neighbors. This was the scenario that constituted Pakistan’s
insecurity and uncertainty about survival.
The former prime minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Bogra, who is believed to be one of the
architects of the security policy to join alliances with the U.S., explains the primary reason for
joining anti-Communism alliances: “Our main and only purpose was to safeguard the safety and
security of Pakistan and we needed support from like-minded and peace-loving nations. We have
never made any secret of the fact that we apprehended a threat to our security from India.”
Pakistan had provided the United States with intelligence sharing and air bases and joined the
containment policy as the second-largest non-Communist state of Asia, but its strategic concerns
about India were not focused on by its partners.
Afghanistan and the Islamic insurgency
Afghanistan once viewed Pakistan as the Soviet adversary, but now it needs both Pakistan and
Russia for the stability and development of its own nation and region. Russia’s foremost
periphery in the Central Asia comprises the former Soviet states, which are directly affected by
the instability in Afghanistan. Disorder in Kabul has direct consequences for this periphery and
results in a surge in terrorism in Russia as well.
Pakistan, with the endorsement of China, has a greater role to play in the peace process in
Afghanistan. Thus, stability there is another area of common interest between Russia and
Pakistan.
Once the U.S. will have finished its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Kremlin will consider
Pakistan as an essential partner for stability in the region, especially in Afghanistan. With
backing from Beijing and support from Washington, Islamabad already plays an active role in
peace negotiations with the Taliban. Thus, Russia seeks Pakistan as a significant partner to
maintain peace and order in the post-Soviet territories of Central Asia, the so-called “backyard of
Russia.” From the Pakistani point of view, relying on the United States for more than six decades
produced nothing more than a delusionary friendship that lacks mutual trust and jeopardizes
Pakistan’s security.

Changing realities give birth to new partnerships
The changing realities of international politics negate the Cold War mentality and allow new
partnerships and venues of cooperation to emerge. As far as the interests of Russia and Pakistan
coincide, they must enhance mutual cooperation in areas of interest to find more common ground
for the future. Relations between the two should not be based on the frustrations and
disappointments from their respective partners, India and the U.S., whose alliance is aimed at
another state, China.
Central Asia offers a mutual area of interest for Russia and Pakistan, where instability and
Islamic insurgency are concerns for both. Pakistan has a decade-long expertise in fighting
religious militant groups, as does Russia, which also suffers from religious extremism. Mutual
collaboration and exchange of experts would strengthen both sides to nip this evil of extremism
in the bud and pave the way for regional development.

What's Behind Russia's Rapprochement With Pakistan?
By: Dmitriy Frolovskiy
A Russian-Pakistani renaissance started in 2014 when the Kremlin removed its arms embargo against
Islamabad. In 2015, Moscow agreed to sell four Mi-35M helicopters to Pakistan and welcomed
Islamabad to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This year already, Russian Army
Commander-in-Chief Oleg Salyukov has announced the first-ever “mutual special drills in
mountainous terrain,” and Khawaja Asif, defense minister of Pakistan, visited Moscow to further
discuss enhancing cooperation.
Both nations additionally agreed on a construction project to transfer liquefied natural gas (LNG)
from Karachi to Lahore. The pipeline could potentially supply 30 percent of the Pakistani population
and assist in resolving the country’s ravaging energy crisis, as well as extol Russia’s influence.
The current rapprochement has taken many by surprise, as it might impinge upon Moscow and New
Delhi’s cooperation in the long-term. However, Russia is still willing to proceed. What stands behind
the Kremlin’s motives?
Russia still reveres its strategic and lengthy partnership with India and remains its largest arm
supplier over the past three years. Both nations also are experiencing blossoming economic relations,
with Narendra Modi and Vladimir Putin looking for a bright future together.
Russian-Indian relations might seem flourishing on the outside; inside, however, they have
experienced a downward trend.
The Kremlin has grown cautious lately about India’s augmenting defense cooperation with the
United States and other Western nations. Selling weapon remains a tenet of Russia’s foreign policy
strategy and its soft power outreach; however, the country’s market share in India has been on a
gradual decline for the past several years. In contrast, the U.S.-India arms deals have topped a record
amount of $9 billion.
New Delhi is also planning to spend an additional $250 billion in the forthcoming decade for
strengthening its defense. Therefore, it is becoming evident to the Kremlin that the total share of the
Western nations and the United States, in particular, will increase amid the continuous erosion of
Russia’s current monopoly.
Russia remains one of the major contenders for a tendering procedure for building India’s fourth
aircraft carrier; however, Indian defense officials have already grown concerned about Russia’s
ethics after INS Vikramaditya’s three-fold cost increase and a five-year delay. Moreover, Moscow
agreed to participate in India’s “Make in India” national program, but this has only further revealed
its inability to live up to many of New Delhi’s expectations. In particular, difficulties are coming to

light during the Indo-Russian fifth generation fighter jet multibillion-dollar program, with Russia
currently failing to fulfill most of India’s indigenous production goals.
New Delhi’s growing dissatisfaction with the mutual partnership and the country’s quest for
diversification are perpetuating the shift. India needs improvements and is keen on trying other
suppliers; however, Moscow sees these moves as impinging on its current stance.
The Kremlin wants to slow down the impending downward trend, as well as leverage its influence
over New Delhi, by skillfully utilizing the “Pakistan card.” By engaging with Pakistan, Russia leaves
New Delhi with a hard choice: to honor its strategic commitment to Russia and make concessions or
to observe Russian-Pakistani rapprochement, which could potentially erode India’s military
advantage.
This maneuver comes in line with the Kremlin’s realpolitik strategy, which has become traditional
over the recent years. In 2010, Vladimir Putin famously said that “Russia is not maintaining military
cooperation with Pakistan as it takes into account the concerns of Indian partners.” Moscow was
sensitive to the India-Pakistan rivalry before; however, altering geopolitical realities goaded Russian
foreign policy into exploring new horizons.
Russian-Pakistani relations were far from harmonious during the previous decades. The Kremlin
supplied Pakistan with weapons in 1960s but both countries eventually faced a major split, as
Moscow selected New Delhi to be its strategic regional partner. Furthermore, Moscow and Islamabad
had a proxy conflict during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with Pakistan openly supporting the
mujahideen. The geopolitical vector did not change after the USSR’s collapse. It is only now, after a
quarter of a century, that Moscow is looking to rekindle bilateral relations.
The Kremlin has chosen its moment wisely. Islamabad has grown cautious lately about its alliance
with the United States, as it perceives a lack of reliability from the White House. In particular, the
recent U.S. refusal to subsidize Pakistan’s purchase of F-16 fighter jets may have pushed both
countries farther away from each other, with Russia potentially emerging as an alternative supplier.
Interestingly, though, Moscow is not ready to move full-speed ahead and is keen on maintaining its
distance while portraying other reasons for its recent engagements with Islamabad.
It is not a secret that Russia is extremely alarmed by the growth of ISIS and a possible collapse of
Afghanistan, to the extent that it is even ready to engage with the Taliban. By actively coordinating
with Pakistan, Moscow should be able to halt the radical jihadists’ future spillover to Central Asia.
Therefore, Russia is trying to portray its own security concerns as the raison d’être behind the
rapprochement.
Russia will not become a major Pakistani partner any time soon, and will remain closely connected to
India. Still, the Kremlin’s move delivers a strong message to the Modi administration. In effect, New
Delhi acknowledges Moscow’s security concerns but also understands that the Russia-Pakistani
partnership would continue to evolve proportionally to India’s cooperation with the West.

AINUDIN KIBZAI 3--Pak-China Relations (CPEC)
Pak-China Strategic and Economic Cooperation: Challenges & Opportunities
for the Region
The phenomenon of continuous swing in the global political dynamics besides a shift in power
among the major players of the world, the face of interstate relations keeps changing
respectively. Given the fact, it is important that our understanding of the world should also
evolve accordingly, and we are not stuck with a worldview that has no relevance to the evolving
realities of a world in transition.
Global politics is always characterized with three tendencies; namely, cooperation, competition,
and conflict. It is a continuous process where the state to state interactions through economic
cooperation, regional conflict, intrastate wars, power struggle between two belligerents, alliance
formation for countering common causes of security, pursuance of economic interests through
bilateral, regional and multilateral relations are on the move and further complicated by the
globalization of the world where every state at its best seeks the chances of maximizing its
national interests through various available means.
In the globalized world the rapidly emerging economy of China, which has put the position of
many states on a stake in a world where the competitive economies do not always guarantee
benefits, but also bring up many challenges and conflicts between the developed and developing
and between the rich and poor.
The recent visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Pakistan with a cooperation deal worth
US$46 billion, focusing on a broad spectrum of cooperation addressing the core issues like
energy, transport and infrastructural developments has a greater degree of impact on the lives of
people on both sides.
The relationship of the two countries is not limited to the economic cooperation, but a time-
tested relationship based on mutual trust, respect, regional cooperation, and assistance. Both
leaders rightly proclaimed the Pak-China relations as a deep-rooted tree.
The relations of both countries have evolved from being strong strategic cooperation towards
strategic partnership and bilateral commitment of cooperation in the fields of civil nuclear energy
under IAEA safeguards by Pakistan’s engagement with the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and
its firm commitments and efforts for en route into the global non-proliferation regime.
Pakistan is highly committed to the disarmament and non-proliferation efforts of the
international community under the IAEA, which is expressed by its firmly unilateral cessation of
nuclear testing and with highly sophisticated security mechanism for ensuring security and the
safety of the country’s strategic assets.
The Pakistan-China security interests are also professed to be firmly unified and the strategic
partnership between two countries has a mutual time-tested trust having a deep support of

political, institutional and popular sustain within the masses of both sides. Despite the unfriendly
relations of both countries with India, China encourages and appreciates Pakistan’s eagerness for
peaceful resolution of all of the outstanding issues with the neighboring countries just for the
sake of a peaceful, stable, cooperative and prosperous region.
Apart from the bilateral cooperation, both countries have greater role in the peace-building and
rehabilitation process of Afghanistan having realized the fact that peace and development in the
region are mostly connected with the stability and peace in Afghanistan. The new Afghan regime
under President Ghani is also desirous to use China’s increased role in bringing the Taliban to a
negotiation tables for a peaceful political solution that could bring an end to the country’s long
fought war against the Taliban.
Having said all this, China’s investment plans in Pakistan are envisioned by keeping in mind the
overall regional infrastructural developments. Therefore, through the initiative of China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) which include building a new road network along with a railway
line, an airport, dry ports, neighbouring countries like Afghanistan and India could also benefit
from this corridor by linking their countries with this network. Moreover, these plans also
include New Silk Road linking the region with Europe through Central Asia which will not only
benefit Pakistan and China but intends broader goals of regional peace, progress and prosperity
to the whole region.
CPEC And the Growing Indian Frustration: An Analysis

By now it is widely known that the CPEC is a collection of projects. It primarily aims at
achieving strong trade links between China and Pakistan. This 46 billion dollars project will
allow Pak-China relations to enter a new phase with added economic and strategic dimensions to
it. All this development is closely monitored in Delhi with great unease. They have made no
effort to conceal their unease and have openly voiced their displeasure by condemning the CPEC
project.
However, both China and Pakistan are fully dedicated to turn CPEC into reality against all odds.
This is naturally an alarming situation for India which is finding it hard to curb its frustration
anymore. As is evident from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at a conference, in which
he resolutely disapproved the initiative of China-Pakistan economic corridor. In very vivid terms
he warned that China should stop developing the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) or
be prepared to face dire consequences in Baluchistan.
The same rhetoric could be heard coming from Sushma Swaraj where she vehemently expressed
that India would not allow the route of economic corridor to be passed through Gilgit-Baltistan,
implying that the region is part of India and Pakistan first needs to seek India’s permission to
carry out any activity there.
Both these statements coming from high profile and in service political leadership, raises concern
for both Pakistan and China. The hurdles and challenges are bound to be there. But it will not be
an exaggeration to say that the biggest challenge does come from India. The statements by Indian
leadership do not leave any ambiguity that India is against the CPEC. Not only this but it is
employing different ways and means to pressurize Pakistan to behave on Delhi’s terms.
India is bent upon disallowing the passage of CPEC through Azad Kashmir. India considers
Azad Kashmir as “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir”, and it assumes that it has the natural right of
jurisdiction over whole of Kashmir. On the other hand, constructing the corridor through Azad
Kashmir means China considers it a part of Pakistan which comes in direct clash with India’s
stance on Kashmir.
At the same time India feels growingly alarmed at the possibility of China’s presence so close to
India. Once Gwadar port is functional, China not only gets three times reduction in the total
distance that would need to be covered by the Chinese trading ships but China will also get an
easy access into Indian Ocean, thereby undermining India’s supremacy and influence in the
region. Chinese expected naval edge over India is naturally causing unrest among the Indian
military and civil circles.
Not just that but one of the former ambassadors of India openly expressed that the CPEC is
having a sole nefarious agenda of containment of India. Hence is seen as a valid threat to Indian
security and sovereignty where both and China are seen to be working towards weakening
India’s position in the region.

Prime Minister Modi also expressed in his Independence Day speech that people in Baluchistan
have thanked him, implying that he is more closely integrated with people in Baluchistan. At the
same time his threat about “facing consequences” in Baluchistan, has made it clear that India is
involved in instigating the anti-state sentiments in the province. Furthermore, recently
Brahmdagh Bugti have been reported to seek asylum in India, to which he has received positive
response from the Indian government.
Baluchistan is the main site which holds the major concentration of the CPEC project. Hence
Baluchistan has been the prime target for Indian aggressive interventionist policy. The Indian
Spy Kalbuhsan Yadav was captured from Baluchistan, further reinforcing the validity of this
argument.
However it is a fact that Indian frustration against CPEC, China and Pakistan is only going to
grow further, along with the pressure from India against Pakistan. This will for sure add to the
tension in the region for which Pakistan needs to be well prepared all the time and be in a
position to counter it too.
Eventually India will have to realize that the CPEC is not just bringing dividends for Pakistan but
is integral for the socio-economic uplift of the whole region and beyond. Hence staying out of
the CPEC is not going to serve India any good and is not even advisable. The stronger economic
ties will be guaranteeing regional security and stability and ultimately benefit all the states in the
region. This is because of the pattern of interdependence that is created when countries get
engaged in the economic activity with each other such as trade. This also reduces the chances of
clash or war.
Hence instead of being frustrated by this mega project, India needs to see it from a much bigger
perspective where this may actually compliment India’s aspirations of becoming an economic
giant and ultimately emerge as a major power.
The Challenging CPEC: Can Gwadar and Chabahar Remain Friends?

The strategic game changer project,China Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC), is biggest ever
investment for both China and Pakistan that is poised to change the future course of history for
both countries. It aims to connect Gwadar port in the south western Pakistan to China’s
northwestern autonomous region of Xinjiang, via a network of highways, railways and pipelines
to transport oil, gas and other goods.
By and large, construction costs are estimated at $46 billion which is roughly 20% of Pakistan
annual GDP. Besides transport, the corridor will provide Pakistan with telecommunications and
energy infrastructure as well. The corridor will go a long way in making Pakistan a better-off and
powerful entity than it ever was.
Both countries hope that this project will transform Pakistan into regional and economic hub as
well as further boost the growing ties between Pakistan and China. Once built, the nearly 2,000-
mile-long corridor will shorten China’s route to the Middle East by about 7,500 miles.
The CPEC is of enormous strategic and economic significance to China, Pakistan and other
regional countries. For China the CPEC would reduce the travelling distance, for its huge
volumes of trade with the Gulf countries, from existing 13000 kilometers to mere 2500
kilometers. It will cut down the travelling time from the existing 45 days to only 10 days, and it
will also reduce the cost of freight by one third. Through CPEC, China will be able to trade with
South Asia, West Asia, the Middle East and North Africa through a much shorter route.
No wonder China is now a major investor in foreign markets. China has become the leading
country in terms of foreign direct investment in Pakistan during the last decade. Chinese national
economy today is the strongest in the world with its highest foreign exchange reserves. China
will make huge revenues because with the completion of CPEC, the Chinese shipments will be
able to reach the same destination just within 10 days period.
The project has also elevated Islamabad’s strategic partnership with the regional superpower.
CPEC is viewed as an economic lifeline for Pakistan. The government in Islamabad recognizes
the CPEC as the only opportunity left for Pakistan to develop itself economically and,
importantly, bring stability and progress in the country.
Another vital aspect is that Gwadar Port will eventually create a nexus between China, Pakistan
and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) with prospective revenues more than billions of dollars
every year for all the countries. Pakistan’s trade with Central Asian Republics would also
increase using CPEC since they will be connected with CPEC based on the Quadrilateral
Agreement for Traffic in Transit, which has already been signed by Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan.
After completion of CPEC, Pakistan’s national income will also increase since it will get
royalties or transit fee on huge volumes of Chinese and CARs exports and imports to and from
West Asia, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa through CPEC, being the shortest route.

Hence the importance of CPEC is such that it is being hailed as a “fate changer” by the Pakistan.
With Chinese investment pouring in, Pakistan is desperately looking to guarantee stability and
safety to ensure the timely completion of the project. But it is important to keep in mind that
challenges confronted by CPEC are still unsettled. It is facing both internal and external
obstructions which could derail this multifaceted project.
A lack of domestic consensus can hinder development in any part of the world, and CPEC is no
exception. When CPEC was initially introduced, every mainstream political party supported it.
However, the enthusiasm turned to deep concern when political parties from economically weak
provinces (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan) felt that their province’s reservations about
CPEC were not being addressed.
The debate between political parties became so intense that China felt it necessary to put out a
statement urging parties to overcome their differences. A spokesman from the Chinese embassy
in Islamabad said, “Relevant parties should strengthen their communication and coordination on
the matter.” So it is very essential that the plan ought to be kept above politics.
The security atmosphere inside Pakistan especially Baluchistan poses numerous difficulties for
CPEC. Starting from Kashgar, the project will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan and KPK, followed
by Baluchistan. For that matter, government has decided to install 10,000 army personnel under
the command of a major-general, whose primary objective will be to safeguard Chinese
engineers and guard the entire trade route. The deployment of army personnel has already begun.
This shows that the civilian and military leaderships – despite differences over foreign policy –
are on the same page when it comes to this strategically vital project.
Another major challenge is imposed by neighboring country India. While Pakistan is developing
Gwadar to become a nerve centre for regional trade along with development of necessary
infrastructure under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), India has openly stated on more
than one occasion that it would go to any length to sabotage this project.
According to an editorial published in Pakistan observer, apart from setting up a special cell of
RAW to plan and execute anti-CPEC activities, India is luring regional and world powers to join
hands to develop Chabahar as a counter-weight to Gwadar besides construction of rail and road
links through Iran to link India with Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan.
However, Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan Mehdi Honardoost, while speaking on Pakistan-Iran
relations at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad (ISSI), said, “Chabahar would not turn
out to be an enemy port to Gwadar but work as a ‘friend’ port.” He further said the recent
trilateral agreement between India, Iran, and Afghanistan on Chabhar port was “not finished”
and both China and Pakistan are welcome to join it.
Even though the Iranian Ambassador insists Chabahar would not become a rival port to Gwadar
even when it tries to bypass Pakistan to create a link between Central Asian countries and India,

Pakistan needs to stay vigilant to Indian plans to sabotage the CPEC project. The leadership of
the country has to get together and remove all internal obstacles faced by this project.
One important obstacle that needs to be given close consideration is the status of Gilgit-Baltistan.
It will pass through disputed region. Gilgit-Baltistan is the gateway to Pakistan from China, but
China cannot afford to invest billions of dollars on a road that passes through a disputed territory
claimed both by India and Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan is disputed, underdeveloped, lacks legal
status, and is not getting its fair share of CPEC attention, all of which could lead to numerous
problems.
To ensure that Pakistan does not suffer, the government must not only develop contingency
plans, it must also be more transparent about the deal itself. Questions have already been raised
about the proposed CPEC routes. Both Balochistan and KP’s political leadership have raised
concerns about the proposed routes and their impact on their local economies.
To guarantee CPEC translucent macroeconomic stability, economic policymakers, both at the
State Bank and outside, should be provided details about the expected inflows and outflows of
foreign currency, and the debt and equity components of the deal.
In the words of the Federal Minister Ahsan Iqbal who is managing the CPEC project: “If
Pakistan does not provide stability for CPEC, Chinese will not hesitate to find another route,
practically leaving Pakistan out of this mega economic and trade route.” All in all, CPEC will
face many hurdles, both domestically and from regional powers that may see it as a threat.
However, with a multi-billion dollar Chinese stake in the project, and Pakistan looking at it as a
lifeline for survival, optimism remains high in both countries.
The Port Politics: Gwadar and Chabahar
Both Gwadar and Chabahar ports have a unique geostrategic and geopolitical significance.
Economically and strategically both are vital choke-points which provide unrestricted access to
the Indian Ocean where about 100,000 ships and around 70 percent of the world’s petroleum

trade passes each year. The strategic significance of these ports is visibly clear from the fact that
these sea trade centers are located at the crossroads of international sea shipping and oil trade
routes while linking three regions that are: South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.
For India, Chabahar is the adjoining port to the Indian Ocean providing direct entrance to the
Middle East and Central Asia. Chabahar will provide India with an entry to Afghanistan.
Recently Iran, Afghanistan and India reached an agreement to give Indian supplies, heading for
Central Asia and Afghanistan, special treatment and decreased tariff at Chabahar.
For China, Gwadar with a considerable head start over Chabahar, could be a finishing point for
pipelines in its oil and gas supply chain from the Middle East and the Africa, allowing it to find a
way around the crowded nip point that is the passage of Hormuz. Gwadar also opens up the
projection for a pipeline corridor bringing oil and gas to China from the Middle East as an
exchange route to transport oil around the Indian Subcontinent and through the progressively
more disputed territorial waters of the South China Sea. The path will be economical, less risky
and give Beijing greater freedom of action to chase its control over the South China Sea.
Declaration of CPEC brought India yet again in an open conflict with Pakistan. In November
2013, Pakistan handed over the Gwadar Port to Chinese Overseas Ports Holding Company Ltd.
(COPHCL) for further expansion. This progress worried India and it started asking Iranian
officials to resume the construction of the Chabahar port. Chabahar is located at approximately
150 kilometers west from the Pakistani deep-sea port, Gwadar. In a way, chahbahar development
by India was a result of strategic rivalry of Gwadar.
Many in Pakistan view Chabahar as India’s answer to Pakistan’s development of the Gwadar
port, associating with China, which is something India should invest in by all means. India has
many strategic and political reasons to have partnership with Iran. India wants to counteract
China and the place it chose in Iran (Chahbahar) is just 106 miles away from Gwadar. No doubt
it is a strong effort to reduce the economic weight of Gwadar.
The imprisonment of Indian naval officer Kulbushan Yadev, along with a huge spy network
carrying out rebellious activities in Baluchistan and Karachi, specified some Indo-Iranian nexus.
Later, arrest of some Afghan spies in Baluchistan further uncovered Indo-Afghan alliance. Also,
droning of Mullah Mansur further brought such facts into the attention, which strengthened
assumption regarding Indo-Afghan-Iran nexus. In fact, this strategic competition represents the
intensity of Indian panic because of Pakistan China economic corridor. Certainly, Chabahar can
affect the timelines of CPEC, prohibiting reaping full benefits of the expected game changer.
Despite the strategic importance of Chabahar for India, there has been very little progress
observed for several reasons. First is Iran’s unresponsive support for the project. Although the
idea was first mooted in 2003, it was only in 2012 on the sidelines of the 16th Non-Aligned
Movement Summit in Tehran that Iran — then wobbled under sanctions for its nuclear activities
— approved to set up a joint working group to function the port project as part of the trilateral

agreement between Afghanistan, India and Iran on investment cooperation, business and
transportation. A chief factor behind Iran’s unwillingness to allow an Indian presence at
Chabahar was the opposition by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, which
reportedly uses the port to ship arms to Yemen and militant groups in the region.
Furthermore, given the existence of Gwadar next door, where China has pledged to invest $46
billion for CPEC, it is unclear whether the Chabahar route will produce enough trade to justify
the investment. In fact Iran, which has been playing hardball with India and demanding greater
Indian investment in Chabahar, itself plans to invest $4 billion to build a plant in Gwadar to
process 400,000 barrels of oil per day. Clearly, resolving the Chabahar challenge is vital to
securing India’s interests in Iran and beyond. Nevertheless, given the challenges noticeable in
this project, India is unlikely to succeed on its own.
Additionally, Gulf region is in a state of strategic instability and it is difficult to forecast viability
of Iran’s strategic route, including its relationship with India. Competitors such as China and
Pakistan could obstruct or otherwise trump India’s involvement in the project. Expectantly the
development of Gwadar will attract Kabul and Central Asian Republics more.
India wants to get back Karzai type government in Afghanistan which is only possible if
Islamabad’s control is reduced by upsetting the newly formed cooperative relationship between
the two Muslim countries. With the Torkham border tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
it seems its designs are somewhat succeeding. However, the Durand Line conflict between
Afghanistan and Pakistan is not new. The greater economic benefits that Afghanistan can reap
from Chabahar, it’s only a matter of time before Kabul will soften its stance on the issue.
In order to be triumphant, Pakistan should exercise effective leadership by employing its
administration, military and diplomacy to maximize the Gwadar port’s potential. If Pakistan
succeeds in this regional game, the Gwadar Port will guarantee connectivity to the world as well
as speedy movement of its workforce, goods and services. And, the CPEC will result in
qualitative improvement of Pakistan’s land connectivity related infrastructure.
Failing to achieve this goal will allow India and Iran to collect all the benefits. Pakistan must ask
China, to sign and announce high-status cooperation agreements and openly announce a strategic
military coalition to help each other achieve common interests, and also to help each other in
case of any violence. CPEC is the game changer and it’s destined to be successful.
Chabahar or Gwadar, Which one is Suitable for Afghanistan?
The Sea Politics is getting complex with an increase in world’s commercial activities. Now the
world is not only focusing on the militarily important places but it is also in the search of places
that will be productive from the business point of view in future. It is important to note that many

countries in Asia are so huge, that their access to the sea via their own land route for
international trade is very costly. They are searching for a shortest possible route for themselves.
Its example is the mighty China whose western part is several thousand kilometers away from its
seaports of the Eastern area.
Its nearest approach for its western part is from Gwadar port Baluchistan (Pakistan), so it has
decided to connect its mainland to Gwadar through a transport network which is commonly
termed as Pakistan-China Economic Corridor. India strongly retaliated and brought its all
resources to counter it. The recent statements against Pakistan by Indian Foreign Minister are in
fact representing the intensity of Indian pain because of this economic corridor.
Presently, India is taking all steps to reduce the value of this route. One of the initiatives taken is
to build a port in Gulf of Oman at Chabahar at Iranian land. India and Iran signed an agreement
to build this port in 2003, but this agreement was not feasible because of international sanction
on Iran by Western Countries. As soon as these sanctions are over, Iran’s good weather friend,
India is back to Iran and offered it to restart the 2003 agreement of building the said port. It is
important to note that India withdrew from Iran-Pakistan-India after Mumbai attack. It was
mainly done because of international pressure on India to pressurize it to roll back its nuclear
program. Mumbai attack provided a face-saving opportunity to India and it withdrew from this
agreement at once.
Why India went back to Iran to build this port? It is important to note this agreement has been
done after three subsequent events: a deal finalized between Iran and the West, Chinese
President visited Pakistan and signed $46 billion agreement with Pakistan (including Gwadar
Port building) and after Afghan President Visit to India. The finalization of deal between Iran
and the West provided an opportunity to India to resume its agreement with Iran to promote its
trade relations with Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics.
Gwadar port however, is under development by China to easily connect its western area with the
world. This port will also be beneficial to Afghanistan and Central Asian Countries. The
development of Gwadar by China is considered to be a part of String of Pearls strategy of the
country. On the other hand, India wants to counter China and the place it chose in Iran
On the other hand, India wants to counter China and the place it chose in Iran is just 106 miles
away from Gwadar. It is a strong attempt to reduce the economic importance of Gwadar. It can
be taken as an Indian retaliation to the agreements signed between Pakistan and China.
The establishment of Chabahar can influence value of Gwadar. The present structure of Chahbar
is not so well. The development of Gwadar will attract Kabul and Central Asian Republics more.
India wants to get back Karzai type regime’s influence in Afghanistan which is only possible if
Islamabad’s influence is reduced by disrupting the newly formed cooperative relationship
between the two Muslim countries. The present regime of Ashraf Ghani has changed policy and

decided to bring a durable peace in Afghanistan which is only possible if the violence of Taliban
is eradicated. Here only Pakistan can help Afghanistan, so Ghani regime changed its policy.
Which port Gwadar or Chabahar is suitable for Kabul? It is 1237 kilometers away from Gwadar
whereas the distance between Kabul and Chabahar is 1840 kilometers (driving distance). It
means Gwadar is more suitable for Kabul because it is more than 600 km nearer to it as
compared to Chabahar. Kahandar is situated almost in middle as it is 1338 km away from
Gawadar and 1346 km away from Chabahar. If we calculate distance between Herat (the nearest
city to Iran) and Gawadar, it is 1637 km away whereas it is 1358 km away from Chabahar.
Distance between Gwadar and all Afghan cities is less compared to Chabahar but law and order
situation along Pakistani route is not good. These routes will only be viable, if security is
provided along this route. The security condition in Pakistani province Baluchistan is not good
and a large part of all routes to Afghanistan is through these routes. It is important to note that
Indian is playing a large of game to destabilizing Pakistan in Baluchistan. Several reports have
clarified the involvement of RAW in it. According to a statement of Pakistan’s Minister of
Defense Khawaja Asif, Baluch insurgents are using Indian Passport.
Why India is supporting Baluch insurgents, its clear reasons is that because it want to save its
interests.
Moreover, India has invested heavily to build road to join Afghans cities with Chabahar. It wants
failure of Pakistan’s route to Afghanistan. If Pakistan’s route to Afghanistan will continue, it will
bring Afghanistan closer to Pakistan which will be not acceptable to India. India wants to play
some crucial role in Afghanistan and it wants to use Afghanistan as a proxy to hurt Pakistan.
According to an Indian Philosopher Kautaliya, immediate neighbor is enemy and neighbor’s
neighbor is a friend.
Today, the pattern of international relations has been changed. Now, India is working on the
strategy to have weak neighbors. India wants a complete hegemony in South Asia. All other
states, in South Asia, except Pakistan, are so weak that they have no ability to challenge India. It
is Pakistan, that is balancing India and if Pakistan breaks, India will capable to play its game
more easily. It can succeed only by searching fault lines and one of the hottest points is
Baluchistan which India is using very cleverly by sitting in Afghanistan. Its purpose is clear
here to hurt Pakistan any time it wishes in future.
A news report is showing that a special cell has been set up in RAW under the supervision of its
chief to ruin Pak-China economic corridor. According to this report $35 million has been
reserved for this purpose. It clearly indicates that India will do its best to hinder the construction
of silk route from Pakistan. Dr Iqtidar Karamat Cheema, a professor of International Relations at
University of Gloucestershire, United Kingdom wrote a comprehensive article on RAW
intervention in Pakistan and explained that Indian Prime Minister Modi declared to conduct an
operation in Pakistan territory.

He further explained that the three arrested militants of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan namely
Khurram Ishtiaq, Ghulam Mustafa and Shamim have disclosed that RAW has been funding
suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan and that the Indian intelligence agency has channeled 680
million rupees to promote instability in Pakistan. According to a report of Federation of
American Scientist, “35000 RAW agents has entered in Pakistan, with 12,000 working in Sindh,
10,000 in Punjab, 8,000 in KPK and 5000 in Baluchistan.” This is clearly showing how RAW is
operating inside Pakistan and it is at pain to destroy Pakistani peace.
Pakistan should convince Afghans that Gwadar route is suitable for them. It is an economic route
for Afghans with suitable logistic expenses but operationalization of this route is connected to
Peace in Baluchistan which is impossible in the presence of several thousand RAW agents.
Pakistan must first bring peace than focus on the construction of shortest possible route so that
Afghans can be benefitted from this route. Moreover, shortest possible route to Afghanistan will
be the shortest possible link Hydrocarbon rich CARs. If Pakistan succeeds to bring peace, its
economy will be revolutionized and it will emerge as a powerful country, which cannot be
acceptable for Modi government, but Pakistan cannot keep itself undeveloped for happiness of
Indian regime.

AINUDIN KIBZAI 4--Pak-US-Afghan Relations
In recent news, authorities have indefinitely shut down the Pak-Afghan border at Chaman after
Afghan demonstrators desecrated the Pakistan flag and pelted stones at the Friendship Gate. This
has come weeks after the incident at Torkham border, where cross-border firing over the
construction of a gate along the border led to the death of a Pakistani major.
The dynamics of Pak-Afghan relations are often seen shifting, dictated by leaders in power,
national security concerns, and foreign policy linkages. While many attribute fickle relations
between the two countries to their historical baggage, others cite Afghanistan’s swelling affair
with India as a reason for its disengagement and Pakistan’s growing mistrust. Although Ghani’s
appointment was seen by many as the calm after the storm that was Karzai, less than a year into
his tenure he is found blasting Pakistan on international forums over its alleged ‘undeclared’ and
covert war in Afghanistan.
With Karzai endorsing Modi’s statement on Balochistan, Pakistan’s civil-military repeatedly
deflecting blame on Afghan intelligence agencies following attacks on Pakistani soil, recurring
border skirmishes, and the shadow of the Durand line looming large on bilateral relations, many
are of the opinion that Pak-Afghan relations are headed for the worst.
What does this mean for regional security?
Blame game
While cultural, ethnic, economic, and religious ties are deep-seated between the two countries,
both have frequently been on a sour note with each other. Historically, this goes back to
Afghanistan questioning the validity of the Durand line after the decolonization of the British,
and making territorial claims so far as Balochistan, and the Pashtun areas of Pakistan.
Afghanistan refuses to recognize the Durand line still and sees Pakistan’s involvement in
destabilizing Afghanistan through its covert tactics as a means to weaken its claim on its rightful
territories.
Pakistan’s policy of supporting ethnic groups in Afghanistan during the Cold War, leading to the
emergence of the Mujahideen, and the consequent injection of the Taliban as a means to stabilize
Afghanistan whilst keeping it close, only deteriorated the political situation in the country and
bred more hatred for its neighbor. This resentment extends to the Afghan public, whereby anti-
Pakistan sentiments run as deep as pro-Indian romanticism.
As of now, Pakistan is invariably accused of breeding radical groups on Afghan soil, and
providing sanctuaries and support for terrorists. Mullah Mansour’s presence in Balochistan, and
the Afghan government’s claim that Mullah Omar died in a hospital in Karachi, along with
numerous other examples of Taliban leaders operating in Pakistan, adds to this narrative. In a
recent interview, Sartaj Aziz conceded to the presence of the Afghan Taliban leadership in
Pakistan and the provision of medical facilities to them. Additionally, he disclosed that Pakistan
has “some influence” on the Afghan Taliban, and that ridding the Haqqani network was a

process that needed time and could result in a backlash if not done right. However, Pakistan
rejects allegations regarding its involvement in the politics of Afghanistan, and sees it as
Afghanistan’s policy to use Pakistan as a scapegoat for its own political failures. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that Pakistan’s position has changed considerably following the APS attacks, where
its former lenient policies regarding militants took a turn towards a more aggressive answer to
the problem in terms of Zarb-e-Azab and the ongoing combing operations. The formulation of
the 20 point National Action Plan, executed by the civil-military leadership, is a step taken in the
right direction.
Pakistan too has accused Afghanistan of cross-border terrorism on various accounts. The recent
attack in Quetta stands as testimony of that where the civil-military leadership both charged
Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Service and Indian Research Analysis Wing for assisting
Jamaatul Ahrar, a splinter group of the Taliban, in carrying out the attack to derail CPEC. While
this statement was thrown around as a convenient way to conceal the failure of intelligence and
security agencies, it’s noteworthy that the existence of this narrative is grounded in a deep
historical mistrust between both countries where they are seen as facilitators of insurgency on
each others soil.
Friend of my enemy
With Pakistan still struggling to mend ties with Afghanistan, India is making deep inroads in the
political and economic sphere of the country through diplomatic gifts like the recently
inaugurated Friendship Dam, and a new Afghan parliament building. The Iran-India-Afghanistan
Chabahar nexus, with Pakistan far from the economic scene, is also making policy makers and
leaders anxious of the growing proximity of the two countries. Pakistan’s conundrum is this: an
unstable Afghanistan, and a strong Afghanistan closely aligned with India. Of the two, Pakistan
prefers the former. Geographically, Pakistan lies sandwiched between the two countries, and
with worsening relations between India and Pakistan over issues like Kashmir, the recent support
of Modi to Baloch insurgents, alongside Afghanistan’s territorial claims and accusatory fingers –
Pakistan is put between a rock and a hard place.
Pakistan acts as a natural trade route between Afghanistan and India. However, with the
completion of the Chabahar port, Pakistan could possibly lose its only leverage over Afghanistan
whereby it closes off borders and forces the government to talks and negotiations as in the case
of the Torkham border. A dissenting position to this is that Afghanistan relies heavily on
Pakistan for medical tourism, meat supply, and every day items, and would still have to maintain
ties with its neighbor despite dwindling relations. Furthermore, since Pakistan is geographically a
natural neighbor, a partner in counter-terrorism efforts, as well as a religious and cultural ally,
Afghanistan would continue its efforts to rescue bilateral relations with Pakistan mindful of its
long-term gains.

Survival
ISIS has gained traction in Afghanistan under its banner of ISIS-Khurasan, an ambitious project
to include Afghanistan and Pakistan in one province under ISIS rule. Added to this, the Taliban
continue to operate in both countries to destabilize the region. In a recent case, Kunduz fell into
militant hands once more as it did last year, before security forces took it back. If US forces are
to eventually withdraw from Afghanistan, which the US government keeps delaying, an unstable
Afghanistan could sow the seeds for a destabilized Pakistan owing to the porous borders both
countries share. However, recent efforts to control cross-border movement, and focus on border
management could possibly limit the movement of militants. This would also put an end to
habitual finger pointing by Afghanistan claiming that terrorists on its territory come from
Pakistan, and Pakistan accusing them of the same. This is a step taken in the right direction to
strengthen the internal security of both countries, bilateral relations, as well as bolster regional
stability. Both countries could also possibly escape the confines of viewing bilateral relations
through a security prism, and enable them to approach foreign policy through an economic and
cultural exchange; something that India seems to be doing successfully in Afghanistan.
Peace in Afghanistan is contingent on regional stability, with Pakistan at its core. Likewise, a
volatile Afghanistan threatens Pakistan’s internal security and it’s ability to revive its economy,
weak state structures, and subdue militant factions operating in the country. However, as
mentioned earlier, with relations with India on the decline, Pakistan is perceived as leaning
towards a policy of maintaining ties with the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network in an
Afghanistan closely tied to India. But Pakistan is treading on thin ice. What it sees as a zero-sum
game is in reality excluding it from regional economic ventures like the Chabahar agreement,
and making it difficult for its allies to stand by it as in the case of the US changing its tone to a
more aggressive one in discussing Pakistan’s policy of good and bad Taliban.
China’s growing interest in Afghanistan, possibly as a policy to restore the balance of power in
the region with regards to India and the US, could also prompt Beijing to pressurize Pakistan in
revisiting its Afghanistan policy. Though Pakistan has been relentless in this regard, cohesive
international pressure could lead it to take another look. While expecting radical change in this
policy would only lead to disappointment – India, Afghanistan and the United States would be
foolish to recoil from whatever partial collaborations they have with Pakistan pertaining to their
counterterrorism syndicate.
Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan and Implications for Regional Politics

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