Pears Report Collection: Insights from 20 years of energy and climate policy analysis

From 1997 to 2016
Reflections on two decades.
of energy and climate policy
The Pears Report
A collection of 75 articles from
ReNew magazine by Alan Pears AM

Pears Report Collection
The Alternative Technology Association (ATA)
© October 2016
The Alternative Technology Association (ATA) is a
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renewable energy, sustainable building and water
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Acknowledgements:
Thank you to Alan Pears for permission to present his
75 ReNew magazine columns in this collection, and
for contributing additional summary content for the
introduction.
Thank you to former Australian Greens leader and
senator Christine Milne for providing the foreword.
Thank you to the RMIT Sustainability Committee
Seedlings Fund for providing a grant to support the
production of this collection.
Thank you to the editorial team responsible for
bringing this collection together: Robyn Deed, Eva
Matthews, Jacinta Cleary and Stephen Whately.
Design: Calan Stanley, PrintTogether.

3
Foreword
IN 2015, at the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
Conference of the Parties, history was
made. Faced with accelerating global
warming and a rapidly closing window of
opportunity to address it, world leaders
agreed to constrain global warming to
less than 2°C and to pursue 1.5°C above
pre-industrial levels. They also agreed to
do it without compromising the ability of
people everywhere to access energy. The
world had chosen a future powered by
renewable energy.
As a result, questions about what the
end of the fossil fuel age looks like and
how to either drive or block the revolution
around how we generate and use energy,
has begun to occupy the minds of
politicians, policy makers, investors and
communities worldwide.
While some are inspired to rise to
the challenge and to embrace the
opportunities that existing technologies
provide, others are struggling to come
to terms with the magnitude and speed
of the systemic shift that is required.
At one end of the spectrum, some see
the potential in virtual power plants—
networks of batteries, solar panels and
energy-efficient buildings linked together
by remotely controlled software and data
systems—and, at the other, people still
cling to the old order of vested interests
echoing fossil fuel ‘base load’ across
the floors of parliaments and financial
institutions.
Anyone would think that this is a
new conundrum and an unanticipated,
wicked problem. It is not. For over 30
years, Alan Pears has been teasing out
the complexities and absurdities of
energy and climate policy in Australia.
His foresight and lateral thinking,
together with his practical experience,
has made him the ‘go to’ authority on
energy efficiency for the whole of my
parliamentary career, going back to 1989.
He has advised and assisted people of all
political persuasions, governments, policy
makers, researchers and non-government
organisations, with a generosity of time
and spirit and a degree of patience that
makes him a national treasure.
To have this detailed, accurate and
thoughtful collection of columns covering
such a wide range of energy and climate-
related issues over such a long period of
time is an invaluable resource. It helps
people make sense of a complicated area
of policy and provides an understanding
of exactly how Australia has ended up
with a ‘one step forward, two steps back’
policy outcome on climate and renewable
energy, and an even worse energy
efficiency result.
But Alan Pears doesn’t just document
by Christine Milne
o Former leader of the Australian
Greens (2012–15) and senator
for Tasmania; environmental and
community activist for 30 years,
Christine Milne.
Photo:KarenBrown
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“Alan Pears doesn’t just document what has
happened...he provides a platform for action by
insightful comment on what can still be done.”
what has happened. He provides analysis
and ideas as to how things could have
been done differently if the political will
had existed. More than that, he provides a
platform for action by insightful comment
on what can still be done.
In my lifetime, the most amazing
change has occurred and its evolution is
a constant theme in Alan’s columns. We
have gone from a time when you had little
control over how much energy you used
and no control over where it came from;
when you were forced to be a passive
recipient of power and petrol bills, and
subjected to the whims of government
or corporate rules and regulations. Now,
people are taking control. It is possible to
generate your own electricity from home
or work, and increasingly control your
own supply and demand, even to the
point of making a profit from it, powering
your car with it and reducing your costs
and emissions to zero via storage. The
vested interests of the fossil fuel age and
their government representatives have
not woken up to the fact that, while they
can still block, frustrate and delay this
revolution, they cannot stop it. The world
has passed them by. What a source of hope
for the planet!
The tragedy for our nation is the chaos
and scale of the disruption, stranded
assets and debt that is coming. Those who
are in power are so blinded by their cosy
relationships with, and income streams
from, fossil fuels and existing networks
that they fail to take advantage of the
imagination and jobs that the renewable
energy future and the climate challenge
generate. They should be embracing and
celebrating the projects and employment
that the Renewable Energy Target,
Australian Renewable Energy Agency,
Clean Energy Finance Corporation and the
Climate Change Authority have facilitated,
instead of trying to tear them down.
But all is not lost. I am optimistic that
our built environment, the amenity of
our homes and offices, the efficiency of
our transport systems, and our capacity
to bring down emissions by taking back
power—literally and metaphorically—
will continue to explode. But there is
one initiative that would make a huge
difference...
Alan Pears and I agree that a major
component of what is preventing the
Australian community from contributing
even more to a net-zero carbon society
is the National Electricity Market. It is
broken. After the two Senate inquiries
I ran, it is obvious that the market is
designed to favour fossil fuels, the
incumbent coal and gas generators and
the network providers at huge cost to
the climate and the community. My
dissenting reports argued for the inclusion
of an environmental objective requiring
the market to deliver on greenhouse gas
reduction, as well as reliable supply and
affordable cost.
What is fascinating from reading Alan
Pears’ work is to learn that, at the very
beginning—when the NEM was being
designed—an environmental objective was
proposed, but rejected. What a difference
that would have made to the energy
landscape in Australia today if that had
been adopted. What a difference it will
make when that change is made now. It’s up
to all of us to make it happen.
I hope, after reading these columns, you
will be inspired to become an even more
dedicated climate and energy activist. We
have no time to lose. We need rigorous
policy, inspiring advocacy and rapid
implementation to empower people, halt
climate change and save the planet. Alan
Pears has given us a great place to start.
He has provided the platform from which
we can all fly.
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ONE of the things that struck me when
I started working on ReNew was the
number of people who commented on the
Pears Report, on how important it was to
them, and how it was the first thing they’d
read each issue. Inspired by this, I wrote
in my first editorial that Alan Pears was
so good we’d included him twice (in his
report and an article on the carbon tax).
In a later issue we even got to include him
three times; it’s clear from our surveys
and general feedback that our readers love
Alan and they want more!
I see Alan’s columns and articles as
encapsulating everything ReNew is
about. They are passionate, practical and
analytical; they don’t take the easy way
out, with slogans or catch-cries, but rather
seek to tease out subtle but transformative
ways of looking at climate policy and, of
course, energy efficiency.
Two cases in point spring to mind for
me. One was Alan’s article on energy use
in cooking. This can be a contentious area,
as it is one of the lesser users of energy in
the home and we don’t necessarily want to
discourage cooking. Yet, it’s also clear that
we could be doing a lot better. Why waste
energy? The other is the notion of the
rebound effect, which Alan so carefully
analysed in a recent article, seeking to
shift the emphasis from the negative to
the possibility of positive flow-on effects.
It turns out the idea of flow-on effects
had appeared before, in one of Alan’s
columns back in 2010. As Alan’s analysis
in this collection shows, many of the
themes that Alan talks about in his
columns are ones that he raised before
others began talking about them, or
that he’s returned to again (and again!),
sometimes in frustration, sometimes
in appreciation when something does
change and sometimes in fascination at
how little has changed.
It’s a history of climate policy that shows
where we’ve been and, I would wager,
where we need to go—to that ‘clean energy
future’ that eludes us as we swing from
the ridiculous to the sublime and back
again.
Finally, this collection gives me a chance
to acknowledge how Alan has been such
a mentor to me personally and, not just
me, but all the ReNew editors before me.
Beyond the articles on which his name
appears, Alan’s thinking permeates so
much of the magazine. “Let’s check that
with Alan” is commonly heard in the
ReNew team as we tussle with a tricky
question about energy efficiency or
climate policy. His generosity in answering
all those questions, along with writing
articles and doing peer reviews, is one of
the highlights of this role.
Editor’s note by Robyn Deed
o ReNew magazine’s managing
editor Robyn Deed.
Photo:NickStephenson
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Introduction
I WROTE my first ReNew column on
energy policy in issue 59, back in 1997.
Seventy-five issues and 19 years later, we
are preparing this eBook as a resource
for those interested in the evolution of
Australian policy and activity in clean
energy and climate, as seen by a person
who has been actively involved. Over the
years, I have tried to provide progressive
insights into the gory detail of energy and
climate policy in Australia, while throwing
in some practical ideas and ‘blue sky
thinking’ to encourage people to think
creatively about our energy future.
It has been a rather bleak period, with
many false starts, blatant misuse of
political and financial power, ideological
agendas that ignored reality and
community preferences, painfully slow
progress and lots of mistakes. But it has
been an interesting journey, with many
lessons for people with an interest or
role in major policy areas. And we have
made some progress: indeed, we seem to
be on the threshold of the long-awaited
transformation of energy!
As I write this introduction, the gap
between policy and reality is wide. It is
a truly bizarre and dissonant time. But
fundamental change is playing out before
our eyes, as pervasive environmental,
social and economic changes occur, and
disruptive technologies and determined
people change entrenched industries.
We have experienced many surprises,
and we will see many more as Australia
haltingly moves into an exciting and
potentially socially, environmentally and
economically better energy future, despite
our leaders and energy supply industries—
some of whom are belatedly joining the
party.
I am cautiously optimistic about our
future—but I have been naively hopeful in
the past, so there are no guarantees that
I’m right!
I hope you enjoy this collection of
my columns and overview articles. This
eBook is searchable and there is a basic
index. You can choose how you approach
the material: you may enjoy reading
the overview articles or the columns in
sequence; perhaps follow themes that
emerge over time; or you may wish to read
about key events. However you wish to use
this resource, I hope you find it enjoyable,
enlightening and useful.
by Alan Pears
o Alan Pears AM has contributed
a regular column to ReNew
magazine since 1997.
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Energy efficiency
Urban planning
Energy data
Energy reform
Climate policy
Renewable energy
Energy policy
Sustainable energy future
Articles
Energy efficiency: the invisible and under-valued energy source 11
Building and energy policy: the push for effective regulation 14
Efficient appliances: Stars, schemes and standards 16
Energy market reform: a case study of power and delusion 17
Climate policy: from ‘spoilt child’ of Kyoto to grudging action,
then active blocking…and now? 20
Australian policy on renewables: politics and surprises 26
Australian energy policy: papers, politics and technology 29
The big picture: policy and sustainable energy 33
The Pears Report
75 articles as featured in ReNew magazine 35
How the fine print can help or hurt renewables - Issue 59 36
Renewables and Greenhouse policies - Issue 60 38
Mainstreaming renewable energy: what’s involved? - Issue 61 40
Will we have a fair and competitive electricity market? - Issue 62 42
Australia’s first real steps towards greenhouse response? - Issue 63 44
A sustainable energy future is in our hands - Issue 64 46
Harsh realities confront the electricity market and its
administrators - Issue 65 48
Time for GreenGas? - Issue 66 50
1998: a year of shifting sands - Issue 67 52
Two percent renewables target—fact or fabrication? - Issue 68 54
The GST and sustainable energy - Issue 69 56
Topics
How to search this ebook
The eight introductory articles each
look at a key topic. Each article
contains links to the relevant Pears
Reports on that topic.
Each Pears Report also has one or more
topic icons at the top left of the page.
Alternatively, browse through the
Pears Reports listed chronologically on
this contents page.
You can also search for keywords
via the find or search box in Adobe
Acrobat.
The back button on the top left of each
page takes you to the previous page.
Topics and themes over two decades
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The new barrier to sustainable energy - Issue 70 58
Two percent renewables target locked in—great news,
but how did we win? - Issue 71 60
Government finally gets serious about greenhouse? - Issue 72 62
Emissions from energy grow—time for consumer action - Issue 73 64
Renewable Energy (electricity) Bill 2000—a tough lesson - Issue 74 66
Flawed renewable energy bill finally falls over the line - Issue 75 68
Building energy efficiency codes for Australia - Issue 76 70
Let’s use RECs to drive renewables growth - Issue 77 72
Oil—an underlying cause of terrorism? - Issue 78 74
Renewable Energy Certificates - Issue 79 76
Politicians face crunch time on energy and greenhouse - Issue 80 78
Energy efficiency finally seen for its cost advantage - Issue 81 80
Keep talking energy efficiency - Issue 82 82
Carbon and energy markets - Issue 83 84
Good news and bad news - Issue 84 86
Will interests converge on a path forward? - Issue 85 88
Making ourselves look good, but at what price? - Issue 86 90
Equal opportunity needed for sustainabiliy research - Issue 87 92
A lot of hot air - Issue 88 94
Securing more of the same - Issue 89 96
Speak up for a green future - Issue 90 98
Energy efficiency
Urban planning
Energy data
Energy reform
Climate policy
Renewable energy
Energy policy
ArticlesTopics
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Government needs to lead, not follow - Issue 91 100
Energy-saving actions - Issue 92 102
Time to face facts - Issue 93 104
Report misses the mark - Issue 94 106
Whoops! - Issue 95 108
The nuclear distraction - Issue 96 110
The naked truth - Issue 97 112
No denying change is needed - Issue 98 114
Climate change realities - Issue 99 116
The good, bad and ugly - Issue 100 118
Trading and trade-offs - Issue 101 120
A promising future? - Issue 102 122
Ready to play ball? - Issue 103 124
Costs and benefits - Issue 104 126
What have we learnt? - Issue 105 128
Lost and found - Issue 106 130
Breakdown to breakthrough - Issue 107 132
More than lip service please - Issue 108 134
Sense of urgency required - Issue 109 136
Highs and lows - Issue 110 138
Lessons to be learnt - Issue 111 140
It’s all about big business - Issue 112 142
Energy efficiency
Urban planning
Energy data
Energy reform
Climate policy
Renewable energy
Energy policy
ArticlesTopics
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It should be a no-brainer - Issue 113 144
Call a spade a spade - Issue 114 146
Seriously perplexing - Issue 115 148
Missing the mark - Issue 116 150
Playing carbon politics - Issue 117 152
The great gas debate - Issue 118 154
Energy efficiency on the agenda - Issue 119 156
Energy efficiency ignored again - Issue 120 158
A fundamental technology shift - Issue 121 160
How blocking change can backfire - Issue 122 162
If I ran an electricity network… - Issue 123 164
Energy inefficiency - Issue 124 166
Poles and wires welfare - Issue 125 168
Desperately seeking policy - Issue 126 170
Peak demand and ‘enoughness’ - Issue 127 172
The war on renewable energy - Issue 128 174
Future global energy giants - Issue 129 176
The end, not beginning, of an era - Issue 130 178
Electricity industry potential - Issue 131 180
The policy bizarre - Issue 132 182
Changing states - Issue 133 184
About Alan Pears: the ‘determined clean energy and climate advocate’ 186
Energy efficiency
Urban planning
Energy data
Energy reform
Climate policy
Renewable energy
Energy policy
ArticlesTopics
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Energy efficiency: the invisible and
under-valued energy source
ENERGY efficiency has been frequently
mentioned in my columns. I should
declare my conviction that it underpins
all practical sustainable energy paths. In
issue 68 (1999), I was moved to express
my frustration at the lack of recognition
of the importance of strong energy
efficiency policy and the fragmentation of
the industry that delivers energy savings.
Yet, even at that time and despite this
lack of focus, energy efficiency was saving
Australians billions of dollars annually.
But government policy was weak,
and investment low (as also discussed
in issue 79, 2002). So we were missing
out on much bigger benefits. Indeed,
under energy market reform, successful
energy efficiency programs had been cut
as governments realised that a decline
in demand would reduce the sale price
of energy supply assets! Most people
struggled to imagine how much energy
they could save and just focused on more
supply. At the same time, the energy
efficiency industry was (and still is) very
diverse, so it was very difficult to mobilise
and coordinate.
One challenge for energy efficiency
policy (issue 77, 2001) is that, often,
changes in energy consumption occur
as accidental side-effects of policies
unrelated to energy. For example,
banning smoking in restaurants led to the
introduction of a lot of energy-wasteful
heated outdoor dining areas. But, on the
other hand, reducing speed limits on local
roads saved fuel. I suggested then that we
needed a ‘sustainability sieve’ for all policy
decisions, so that their energy impacts
could be addressed appropriately.
A major barrier to adoption of energy
efficiency policy has been the narrow and
conservative economic analysis used in
evaluating its benefits (issue 81, 2002).
This problem extends to widespread
failure to recognise the importance
of integrating energy efficiency with
renewable energy—and, more recently,
with storage and smart management—in
order to achieve the best outcomes. For
example (issue 85, 2003), how fast would
a normal (heavy and inefficient) car go
with the solar panel of a solar racing car on
its roof?
Over time, we have seen a series of
processes intended to identify the benefits
of energy efficiency and to develop
strategies to drive action. Unfortunately,
few of these processes have delivered
anything much in terms of real outcomes.
My column in issue 82 (2003) flagged the
beginning of what became known as the
National Strategy on Energy Efficiency,
which sank without trace a few years later.
Australia’s energy policy makers have
traditionally been heavily influenced
by neo-classical economics. This was
illustrated by the NSW Government’s
2004 Green Paper (issue 91, 2005),
which dismissed energy efficiency in
a couple of paragraphs, and the 2005
Productivity Commission inquiry into
energy efficiency, which suggested the
benefits may have been overstated and
the adoption costs underestimated.
After participating in the public hearings,
I made more observations in issue 93
(2005) and commented on the final report
in issue 94 (2006). This process was a
serious attack on energy efficiency and it
energised opponents to try even harder
to block and delay policy progress, even
though it exposed the superficiality of
anti-efficiency arguments. Interestingly,
the Australian Government carefully
distanced itself from the report and its
recommendations.
By 2005 we had begun to see significant
state government programs appearing
(issue 92). Both Victoria and New South
Wales introduced mandatory schemes
to drive industrial and business energy
efficiency. While the Victorian scheme was
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o Among the first in the world to do so, Victoria and
New South Wales introduced a mandatory energy
rating labelling scheme in the mid-80s. While it
took another 15 years for all Australian states and
territories to fully legislate a national scheme, this
was a critical step in public education and also
manufacturing industry accountability. Australia’s
easy-to-understand label set the global standard
for energy labels, and many countries have
adopted similar designs.
later cut by a conservative government,
the NSW scheme has continued to deliver
some strong results.
In issue 111 (2010) I noted that energy
efficiency programs introduced as post-
GFC stimulation measures had been
very poorly implemented and that this
seriously undermined public confidence
in energy efficiency. It was frustrating
that insulation was blamed for house
fires when the real problem was hot
and inefficient halogen lamps (issue 112,
2010). Evidence was also mounting that
building energy regulations were being
poorly enforced. On the other hand, we
had seen dramatic improvements in the
energy efficiency of TVs, coinciding with
introduction of TV energy labelling. More
broadly, energy labelling was losing profile
due to lack of promotion and confusion
over rating scales. It seemed that energy
efficiency was just not a high priority for
our governments.
My frustration with the ongoing lack of
focus on energy efficiency emerged again
in issue 113 (2010). Extensive studies by
groups like ClimateWorks were showing
that energy efficiency policy should be
our top priority, but policy weakness
continued. In 2009, we had seen yet
another policy development process—the
National Framework for Energy Efficiency,
approved by CoAG (Council of Australian
Governments). This led to little progress.
It was followed, in 2010, by the Prime
Minister’s Energy Efficiency Task Group
(issues 112, 113). It produced a very good
report, but the government didn’t even
make a formal response.
My despair about energy efficiency
policy increased in issue 116 (2011), when
I reported that Australia was the worst
performer in an International Energy
Agency comparison of public investment
in energy efficiency. Watching a TV panel
discussion provoked yet another outburst
from me on our failure to recognise energy
efficiency (issue 120, 2012): I discussed
some of the possible reasons for this blank
spot. I continued this commentary in
issue 124 (2013), pointing out the failure
of the Australian Energy Market Operator
(AEMO) to factor aggressive energy
efficiency into its 100% renewables
scenario and noting CoAG’s ‘behind
closed doors’ review of energy efficiency
programs that had led to many cuts.
I still don’t know how to address this
deep cultural barrier!
The Energy Efficiency Opportunities
program was introduced by the Howard
government, and was really Australia’s
first serious industrial energy efficiency
program. In issue 115 (2011) I reported
on the scheme’s mid-term results. The
scheme was delivering millions of tonnes
of abatement at an internal rate of return
on investment of better than 50% per
annum, while also driving significant
productivity-improving cultural change.
The program was attracting worldwide
interest, as industrial energy efficiency
had been a difficult area. However, in
2014, the Abbott government shut down
the program, despite ongoing impressive
results and an independent review
that recommended it continue. Soon
after, the United Kingdom introduced a
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similar scheme! To my surprise, I haven’t
discussed this appalling decision in my
columns: I must have thought I had talked
about it enough in my many submissions
to government.
In issue 126 (2014) I turned to my own
practical experience, as I replaced my old
TV and fridge with new energy-efficient
options. I was impressed with the product
improvements over time, but frustrated
that I couldn’t buy a fridge that was as
efficient as the best available overseas.
I must be getting philosophical in my
old age. In issue 127 (2014) I mused on
the need for ‘enoughness’ combined with
efficiency, when shaping our responses
to future energy infrastructure solutions.
The challenge is to meet our energy
service needs to a high standard while not
behaving as though we are ‘entitled’ and
becoming wasteful. I think we are now
close to being able to do this.
We are seeing another flurry of energy
efficiency policy development, now
incorporated under the language of
‘energy productivity’. This is an attempt to
focus the attention of policy makers—after
all, they love labour productivity, capital
productivity and productivity in general.
Maybe they will actually support some
action to improve energy productivity!
Key drivers of this new framework have
been major reports by the Australian
Alliance to Save Energy (A2SE) and
ClimateWorks.
The federal government foreshadowed
release of a National Energy Productivity
Plan in its 2015 Energy White Paper, and
this occurred in December 2015. At the
same time, states and territories were
stepping up (issue 133, 2015). For example,
Victoria announced an ‘energy efficiency
and productivity strategy’, while New
South Wales had already released an
energy efficiency strategy and the ACT
was cranking up energy efficiency
programs.
Innovation and energy efficiency
In issue 91 (2005) I reported on my
analysis of several Australian Government
innovation publications. These
described exciting research across a
range of sectors, and made no mention
of energy efficiency. Yet many of the
projects—such as nanotechnology, optical
fibres, microfiltration and many more—
contributed to energy savings. This
was a classic example of how invisible
energy efficiency has been to policy
makers. It is pleasing to see that, in 2016,
energy efficiency (and other aspects of
clean energy) is now seen as a potential
outcome of innovation policy. The recent
focus on ‘energy productivity’—getting
more economic output from less energy—
is also helping to focus policy attention on
energy efficiency.
One exciting effect of improving
technology is that it can change our reality.
In issue 98 (2007) I reflected on how
improved high-efficiency air conditioners
in high-performance homes could achieve
amazing results. For example, it was
now possible to cool a bedroom using
less energy than a ceiling fan or to heat
using grid electricity while producing
lower greenhouse gas emissions than
gas heating. And, of course, rooftop
solar or GreenPower could eliminate the
emissions.
By the time of issue 110 (2010), we
had significant experience of the cost
effectiveness of energy efficiency savings
for industries resulting from several state
and national programs. These clearly
showed large savings with very high
rates of return on investment—that is, the
emissions reductions were profitable. Yet,
economic modellers seemed reluctant
to incorporate such evidence into their
models. And, of course, that old chestnut
of the rebound effect was regularly raised.
More recently, in issue 134 (2016), I wrote a
full article about this, with the intention of
putting it into context as a minor factor.
Energy efficiency trading schemes
Given the success of the Renewable
Energy Target (RET), energy efficiency
advocates began campaigning for a
similar target and trading scheme for
energy efficiency, as I discussed in issue
79 (2002). Interest increased over time
and, in issue 87 (2004), I discussed some
of the challenges involved in developing
effective schemes. More recently, these
were called ‘white certificate’ schemes,
and several states have introduced them.
In 2009 (issue 106) there was a Senate
inquiry, driven by then Democrat senator
Lynne Allison, into integration of the
energy efficiency certificate schemes
recently established in several states into
a national one. The antagonism among
economic policy makers to this proposal
was truly remarkable. They claimed that
they were too busy with developing the
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme
(CPRS), but there was an underlying
scepticism about the worth of driving
energy efficiency. I suppose I should have
been used to this bias by then.
The state schemes in NSW, Victoria,
South Australia and the ACT have evolved
over time (issue 117, 2011), despite some
implementation issues.
In 2013 a major report on a possible
national energy efficiency scheme was
published. In issue 125 of that year,
I summarised the history of these
schemes in Australia, then noted that
this latest report showed substantial
economic benefits from integrating the
state schemes into a national one. Many
questions still remain about how, when or
if national integration will occur. S
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ALTHOUGH Victoria, followed by some
other states, introduced residential
building energy regulations from 1991, the
momentum for national regulation only
grew after Prime Minister Howard’s 1997
pre-Kyoto commitment to work with the
building industry to implement voluntary
standards and, if that failed, introduce
mandatory measures. Not surprisingly,
the building industry could not reach
consensus on an approach. My column
in issue 76 (2001) outlined the issues
that had to be confronted after a formal
agreement was reached in July 2000 to
develop building energy regulations under
the Building Code of Australia. There were
deep tensions: community support for
regulation was strong, but many in the
building industry were (and, even in 2016,
remain) opposed to effective mandatory
measures. This process led to a first round
of national residential regulations in
2003 (issue 82, 2003; 87, 2004), despite
many technical and process challenges. A
second round of regulations was flagged
in 2005 (issue 91) and implemented in
late-2006.
A key feature of Australian building
regulation is that the national building
code (now called the National
Construction Code) is only a model code:
each state must adopt the code and is
responsible for its administration. This
leads to variations from state to state.
In 2002 (issue 81) the Victorian
Government’s economic analysis of
its proposed 5 Star regulations broke
new ground. It used detailed economic
modelling to consider the multiple
benefits of building energy efficiency and
this significantly increased the estimated
economic benefits of more stringent
regulation. Unsurprisingly, in 2003 the
Housing Industry Association called for
delays in implementation (issue 82), and
won some compromises (issue 85).
A serious tension in building policy
is the gap between design intent and
delivered performance. My column in
issue 85 (2003) provided an example
of the power of ratings based on real
data. It explained how the Australian
Building and energy policy:
the push for effective regulation
A serious tension in building policy is the
gap between design intent and delivered
performance.
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o Building energy efficiency started becoming
a serious consideration in the early-to-mid
2000s, with governments looking at codes and
regulations, and creating energy Star ratings for
new home construction. Thermal performance,
siting and orientation and fitting of energy-
efficient appliances started becoming integral to
the building process despite weak enforcement.
Photo:EvaMatthews
One of the main arguments against
building energy standards has been
that they adversely impact on housing
affordability. In issue 102 (2008) I
argued that this was a flawed view of
the situation. The reality is that, even if
standards do increase sticker prices of
homes (which is far from proven), higher
energy standards deliver many cost
savings, including lower running costs,
lower peak energy demand, improved
resilience of performance and health
benefits. In 2016 we are just beginning to
consider these multiple benefits. Change
is certainly slow!
In issue 115 (2011) I discussed the
introduction of the next round of national
building energy regulations, which meant
homes in most states would have to meet
a 6 Star rating instead of the previous
5 Star level. I pointed out that the new
regulations also introduced requirements
for efficient lighting and water heating,
which are typically provided by the
builder. I had some reservations about the
approach taken for hot water.
Recent research I discussed in issue
130 (2015) has opened up discussion
about future building energy policy. The
field results show that 6 Star homes are
working well in winter, but have similar
or higher cooling energy use in summer. I
looked at a number of possible reasons for
this, and some paths forward. S
Building Greenhouse Rating Scheme (now
NABERS) led to identification of serious
energy waste in a building that was
designed to be efficient and which had
been assessed by energy auditors as being
efficient.
Recognition of the gap between
design intent and actual performance,
as well as increasing consumer interest
in information on building energy
performance at time of sale or lease of
existing buildings, drove action on energy
disclosure (issue 90, 2005). The ACT
introduced a scheme for homes in 1999
and CoAG’s Ministerial Council on Energy
agreed to explore it in 2004. As is usual in
energy efficiency, progress has been slow
(issue 97, 2006).
December 2005 was the crunch time
for building energy regulation (issue
95), when the Building Codes Board
released its proposals for mandatory 5 Star
home ratings and our first-ever energy
regulations for non-residential buildings.
Some industry groups even managed to
convince three Commonwealth ministers
to issue a press release criticising the
proposals and declaring them to be
disastrous for the building industry!
Luckily, state governments stuck to
their positions and the proposals were
adopted, despite opposition from the
Commonwealth and some industry
groups.
In this column (issue 95), I also
questioned the view that high-rise
buildings were necessarily energy
inefficient. Historically, this had been the
case but, with appropriate regulation and
good design, it did not have to continue to
be.
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Efficient appliances:
Stars, schemes and standards
performance. This could automatically
alert users to faults and poor management,
as well as providing early maintenance
warnings. It would also potentially save
a lot of energy, inconvenience and costs
associated with failures. Many cars now
have this feature and some building
diagnostic systems are heading in this
direction. I will keep pushing this one!
In issue 128 (2014), I was pleased to
be able to comment on a government
report about the progress of our appliance
efficiency program. From a base year
of 2000, it was delivering 13.5 million
tonnes of abatement annually (about
2.5% reduction of total Australian
emissions) at a cost of minus $119 per
tonne of emissions avoided, or about $300
reduction on annual household energy
bills. If analysis of emissions trading had
factored in such successes, the economics
would have looked a lot better. And, as
noted in issue 133 (2015), the appliance
efficiency scheme has survived a major
government review with flying colours.
Phew!
Australian appliance energy policy has
traditionally focused on appliance labels
and mandatory performance standards.
We need a much more comprehensive
approach. So, in issue 132 (2015), I mapped
out an agenda to take appliance efficiency
policy into the next decade. There’s plenty
to do! S
MANDATORY appliance energy labelling,
initially for refrigerators, was introduced
in New South Wales and Victoria in
1986–87, and progressively spread across
other states and types of appliances. To
complement labelling, proposals were
made in the early-1990s to introduce
Mandatory Energy Performance
Standards (MEPS) to remove the worst-
performing products from the market.
MEPS introduction was delayed until
1999, due to the power of economic
fundamentalists in state governments,
particularly Victoria. In issues 76 and 77
(2001), I reported on the exciting results of
research that showed appliance efficiency
improvement was costing minus $31
per tonne of emissions avoided. Further
research suggested that standby power
use consumed almost 12% of household
electricity and was growing at 8%
annually. This eventually led to action
aimed at reducing standby power.
My column in issue 88 (2004)
explored some of the emerging issues
for appliances, particularly the ‘sleeper’
issue of clothes drying and the failure of
appliance energy policy to act quickly
on the explosive growth of large, energy-
guzzling flat-screen TVs. Indeed, TV
energy labelling was only introduced in
late-2009, well after the horse had bolted
from 2004. I also explored the question
of whether it was a crime to try to stay
cool in hot weather. I pointed out that
using a high-efficiency air conditioner
in an energy-efficient house would use
very little energy relative to the benefits
it offered. The refusal of the electricity
industry and governments to promote
such efficient solutions highlighted the
failure of energy market reform and,
since then, has cost Australians billions
of dollars in unnecessary investment in
electricity supply infrastructure.
In issue 93 (2005), I explored some of
the limitations of our appliance energy
labelling scheme. I suggested that web-
based calculators could help. In 2015, the
Australian Government released a mobile
phone app along the lines I suggested
back in 2005.
Energy-efficient lighting has provided
an interesting example of the interplay
between technology improvement,
expansion of industry capacity to provide
efficient solutions, and the desire of
politicians to be seen as green (issue 96,
2006). This was reflected in the early
discussions about the case for regulating
lighting efficiency improvement and the
dilemmas created as people tried to frame
practical policy.
In issue 102 (2008), I began raising
the idea that we needed to build into
appliances and buildings the capacity
to track their own actual performance
against benchmarks and design
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Energy market reform: a case study
of power and delusion
(issue 65, 1998) that action to help rural
communities to adopt clean energy
solutions would reduce energy subsidies
and offer ‘win–win’ outcomes: 18 years
later, this finally seems to be happening!
While economists generally argue that
markets deliver lowest cost outcomes, by
2001 (issues 77, 81) electricity prices were
beginning to increase. This is an example
of businesses charging the price the
market will pay, which may not be low.
The explosive growth of inefficient
air conditioning in thermally disastrous
buildings (issue 88, 2004) was another
example of the failure of energy market
reform. As I pointed out, a high-efficiency
air conditioner in a well-insulated and
shaded building would use little energy
and contribute little to peak demand.
Instead of promoting efficient buildings
and equipment, we spent tens of billions
of dollars unnecessarily expanding energy
supply infrastructure. As concerns about
possible blackouts increased, I wondered
(issue 90, 2005) where the community
education and policies were that might
have avoided the crisis and the wasted
investment.
By 2007, energy reform was beginning
to fray around the edges (issue 101, 2007).
Prices had begun to increase, while
MY FIRST ReNew column (issue 59, 1997)
summarised the evolution of energy
market reform from the early-1990s to
1997. It was a bleak story, with staggering
contrasts between the promises and
the realities. It was a story of powerful
energy organisations and aggressive
economic fundamentalists putting
simplistic ideology, profit and their own
interests ahead of the public good, and
governments allowing this to happen.
They undermined growth of renewable
energy and energy efficiency, increased
fixed charges and exploited the weakness
of the ‘light-handed’ energy regulators.
I foreshadowed a ‘bumpy ride’, ongoing
market distortions and regulatory failure.
Unfortunately, it turned out I was right.
I did manage to find one glimmer of
light: the creation of the Sustainable
Energy Development Authority (SEDA)
by the NSW Government. This tiny
organisation played a vital role in
development and implementation of
some excellent programs, including what
is now NABERS (originally the Australian
Building Greenhouse Rating scheme) and
GreenPower.
In 1998 (issue 62), the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC) had published a long list of issues
with the design and operation of the
National Electricity Code that needed
to be addressed. Eighteen years later,
many of these issues have still not been
dealt with. I pointed out that, while the
early stages of energy market reform
had focused on environmental and
social benefits, key policy makers simply
ignored them and governments chose
not to pull them back into line. Important
infrastructure supporting energy
efficiency and renewable energy had been
dismantled. I finished the column by
listing ways that energy companies could
be expected to manipulate markets to
discourage sustainable energy solutions
and, indeed, they have done so.
In 2002 (issue 80), a major review of
market reform was conducted by former
Energy Minister Warwick Parer: it similarly
found serious problems (issue 83, 2003).
Its proposals were limited but, even so,
most have still not been implemented. My
comments criticised its focus on stop-gap
measures and lack of consideration of
social justice, environment and emerging
clean energy options.
The need for a Renewable Energy Target
was another example of the failure of
market reform; in this case, a failure to
encourage renewable energy. I suggested
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o While powerful interests vested in the fossil fuel
industry ensured that dirty power has remained
the primary energy source for many decades,
smarter energy solutions—a greater focus on
energy efficiency (and technologies such as smart
meters that allow consumers to monitor and
adjust their energy use) and renewable energy
sources such as solar—started entering the market
after the turn of this century.
Photo:www.istock.com/acilo
forward—such as managing peak demand;
more creative, consumer-friendly pricing
structures, and providing vulnerable
households with efficient equipment and
rooftop solar.
I continued the exploration of smart
consumer-side energy solutions in issue
122 (2013) and also discussed the Senate
Inquiry into electricity pricing established
by the Gillard government after pressure
from the Greens and others. The scale of
the mess, and the disconnect between
energy companies, regulators and energy
policy makers, and everyone else, was
visible for all to see in the Hansard
records, as well as in the main report and
‘additional comments’ from the Greens
and Nick Xenophon.
The Inquiry published its report and
I commented on it in issue 123 (2013).
It described the shambolic Australian
electricity market and policy framework,
and the deep cultural problems and
conflicts across the sector. The sector was
failing on the key criterion of protecting
the long-term interests of consumers. Of
course, the big question was: what would
government do to deal with the complex
problems exposed?
A major focus of this column (issue
123, 2013) was my thought experiment
risks of power blackouts (some due to
cooling water shortages for coal power
stations) and gas supply limits were
emerging. I advocated aggressive demand
management and smart pricing as an
alternative to investment in more supply
infrastructure. This suggestion fell on deaf
ears and the seeds of our present over-
capacity problem were sown.
At around the same time, there was
increasing scrutiny of how well retail
electricity markets were working (issue
103, 2008). Market advocates claimed
great success in Victoria, which led
deregulation. Others were worried
by aggressive and misleading sales
techniques and possible unreasonably
high profit margins. This was just the
beginning of a long-running debate and
more market failure.
By issue 117 (2011), the nature of the
‘energy war’ was becoming very apparent.
The incumbent energy industry was
investing heavily in new infrastructure,
while new, nimble competitors were
emerging from many directions. The
industry tried to use its political and
market power to block competition,
while others challenged them. In issue
121 (2012), I explored the ‘energy war’
and made a few suggestions about paths
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Unfortunately, in issue 133 (2015), I had
to provide yet another update on activity
in the energy war, as AEMO continued
to produce fantasy forecasts, and energy
companies exploited weaknesses in
energy market rules and governance,
while the Brotherhood of St Laurence
exposed outrageous inequity in the
Victorian retail electricity market. I wish it
was over.
Smart meters
A key element of energy market reform
was the introduction of improved
metering so that consumers could get
better feedback on their energy use
and energy suppliers could introduce
economically efficient time-of-use pricing.
My column in issue 90 (2005) discussed
some of the issues and assumptions
underlying modernisation of metering.
On reflection in 2016, smart metering
is another example of the failure of
energy market reform: only Victoria has
rolled out the technology, with limited
functions. The electricity industry is now
increasingly uncertain about the best
path forward, as their ‘economically and
technically rational’ approaches, which
involve charging people more for using
power when they need it most, provoke
consumer backlash. S
on what I would do if I ran an electricity
network. This provoked wide interest, and
it does seem that some network operators
are moving in the directions I suggested;
for example, building links with
consumers and welfare groups, selling
in-home smart and storage technologies,
and working with regional communities
to build alternative energy systems.
My column in issue 125 (2013)
outlined the findings of the Productivity
Commission’s 820-page report on
electricity networks. It could only be
described as scathing. But, it still clung to
some invalid assumptions; in particular,
the view that electricity networks are
‘natural monopolies’ that are entitled to
recover their costs, no matter how flawed
their investment decisions. I described
this as a welfare system for electricity
networks.
The extent of the disconnect between
energy policy makers and the rest
of the world, mentioned earlier, was
reinforced in an Australian Energy Market
Commission report I commented on
in issue 126 (2014). On a more practical
level, in that column I also discussed
the potential benefits of a ‘thin pipe’ (a
small-capacity cable that trickle-charges
local storage approach to electricity
network design. The Standing Council on
Energy and Resources (issue 127, 2014)
also illustrated the pervasive nature
of the problem by, yet again, deferring
introduction of demand-side bidding into
the electricity market—something that
was seen as essential in the 2002 Parer
Review. The only winners from this are
the incumbent electricity businesses,
some of which are owned by state
governments.
In the same column (issue 127), I mused
about the potential role of micro-storage
and smart management, built into major
appliances to manage their peak loads and
reduce the cost of wiring and electrician
labour within homes. When people
discuss the economics of innovations
like storage, they usually fail to recognise
subtle cost issues like this, yet they could
make the difference between consumer
acceptance and failure.
In an attempt to look beyond the bleak
events of recent times, in issue 128
(2014) I looked at some of the exciting
organisational models being explored
by communities, local governments
and others as we move beyond the
unsustainable framework we have
struggled with for so long. I continued
this train of thought and, in issue 131
(2015), I made an attempt to reframe
thinking about electricity. I pointed
out that a lot of the capital invested in
delivery of electricity services is actually
on the consumer side of the meter, in
wiring and appliances, and that there is
much more scope for profit in the retail
end of the electricity market, especially
with household and commercial sector
consumers. There are big opportunities
for those who can bring new perspectives
to energy. These may include appliance
manufacturers, builders, IT businesses
and many more.
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Climate policy: from ‘spoilt child’
of Kyoto to grudging action, then
(and cheapest to run) brown-coal power
stations capturing more market share,
while low prices encouraged higher
consumption. The conflict between
energy market reform and climate policy
was becoming increasingly obvious!
Also in that column, I made a radical
suggestion that governments could
drive down energy costs through strong
investment in sustainable energy
solutions (both renewable supply and
energy efficiency) to create a glut in the
electricity market and put pressure on
coal generators. I also proposed that a
small levy could be used to provide the
capital for this investment, which would
deliver a net reduction in energy costs for
consumers. It is interesting to see that,
since 2009, the combination of declining
demand and excess generation capacity
(partly driven by the RET and rooftop
solar) has indeed reduced wholesale
electricity prices and cut consumer costs
relative to what would have been, and the
outcome has included closure of some
coal power stations.
Through 2000 and 2001, a series
of discussion papers on options for
abatement action, including emissions
trading, were released to promote
discussion. Debate intensified, as
CLIMATE policy was the topic of my
second column (issue 60, 1997), in the
lead-up to the ground-breaking Kyoto
Conference. I highlighted the challenges
of managing change, especially in a
context where Australian business was
actively playing a ‘victim’ role, supported
by conservative governments and dubious
economic modelling.
I seriously misjudged the extent of
opposition, naively suggesting that
the climate change science debate was
largely over. I highlighted the emerging,
but largely ignored, views that we
could manage climate change without
undermining our economy. We even
had some real experience of businesses
profiting from climate action under the
voluntary Greenhouse Challenge program.
I did, however, issue a cautionary note,
suggesting there were no guarantees
for growth of renewables, that the ailing
nuclear industry saw global warming as
its big opportunity, and that the ‘economy
versus environment’ debate was still very
much alive.
My column in issue 63 (1998) reviewed
activity leading up to and following the
Kyoto Conference and the Kyoto Protocol,
which created the global framework for
climate response that is still a key element
of 21st century climate policy. I tried
to be positive, despite acknowledging
Australia’s embarrassing ‘spoilt child’ role
at Kyoto and the powerful forces blocking
effective action. For example, I pointed
out that the then-Labor opposition was
committed to stabilising emissions
at the 1990 level. And the Howard
government had made some significant
commitments, including measures that
led to the introduction of the RET, and
appliance and building energy standards.
But I misjudged the trends towards splits
within traditional political alliances. For
example, at that time the gas industry
supported climate action, as they believed
they would benefit at the expense of coal.
Such splits turned out to be short-lived, as
the fossil-fuel industry rebuilt common
ground to oppose climate response.
I discussed the merry-go-round
of greenhouse policy again in issue
72 (2000). In particular, a very
comprehensive Senate Inquiry report
The Heat is On applied more pressure for
action.
In issue 73 (2000), I reported on the
latest greenhouse inventory data (for
1998), which showed emissions from
electricity generation had risen by 10%, as
energy market reform led to our dirtiest
active blocking ... and now?
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o 2015 is so far the hottest year on record, but as
the graph shows, decades of above-average and
increasing global temperatures have come before
it. Unless we want them to keep climbing to the
point where life is no longer sustainable, strong
and comprehensive climate action is needed now.
Our inaction has already locked-in serious climate
impacts.
Image:www.ncdc.noaa.gov
interests played heavily on this argument
and used dubious economic modelling
to support it. We now see the reality that
a lot of climate response can be cheap
or even profitable and, compared with
the cost of allowing climate change to
continue, is very attractive. We are paying
a high price for the failure of policy
makers and business to see the economic
fundamentals of innovation.
As 2006 progressed, pressure on the
Australian Government to act more
effectively on climate change continued
to ramp up. In issue 95, I outlined various
government attempts to ‘be seen to
act’ and to use economic modelling to
undermine public support for action: very
sad.
Issue 97 (2006) saw me pointing out that
most analysis of the costs and benefits
of Australian climate action had actually
set the value of avoiding adverse climate
impacts to zero: that is, the costs of action
were being evaluated without comparison
to the benefits. Economic modelling using
this approach was misused by politicians
to scare people into inaction. Until the
mentioned in my columns in issues 75,
80, 81 and 82 (2001–02). This reflected
the increasing pressure on the Howard
government to take stronger climate
action. At the same time (issue 77, 2001),
confusion and concern was emerging
about the financial risks for businesses
of cutting emissions ‘too soon’ and
potentially missing out on possible future
incentives: the debate risked degenerating
into farce.
In a pattern that’s now familiar, climate
was kept as a minor issue by the major
parties in the election (issue 78, 2002),
despite the determined efforts of the
Greens and Democrats.
By 2004 (issue 86), the tensions in
climate policy were becoming visible.
While energy-related emissions had
increased by 29% since 1990, the ‘free
kick’ from inclusion of land clearing in
Australia’s Kyoto baseline meant that
we were on track to meet our (weak)
Kyoto target. Our apparent ‘success’
allowed government to avoid the tough
decisions on energy. At the same time,
the increasingly obvious gap between
government policy and climate science
meant business was beginning to see risks:
when reality was finally accepted, there
could be very rapid policy changes, which
could make life difficult for business. It
has taken a while for this to play out, but
the recent rapid divestment from fossil
fuels and the impacts of the explosive
growth of renewable energy on traditional
energy businesses are now reflecting this
discontinuity.
This column (issue 86, 2004) also
touched on another key failure of
Australian climate policy: the deeply
held belief that acting to cut emissions
would be costly. Governments and vested
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due to conservative assumptions about
the impact of innovation and the cost of
abatement measures! The Garnaut Review
also emphasised, for the first time in a
major Australian policy document, the
significant long-term economic benefits
of climate action and the conservatism
of most economic modelling of these
benefits.
In my next column (issue 107, 2009),
I explored some of the implications of
the GFC for climate policy. I saw some
upsides; for example, from closure of
old and inefficient industrial plant.
Locally, the government flagged some
‘green jobs’ programs among the other
stimulus measures. On the other hand,
the proposed CPRS included multi-billion
dollar subsidies to energy-intensive
industries and coal power stations.
In my 50th column (issue 109, 2009),
I focused on the Copenhagen Climate
Conference. This led me to review the
lack of progress in climate policy over the
preceding two decades. A key issue was
that Australian energy policy, which was
our dominant source of emissions, had
been pursued in isolation from climate
policy. Indeed, energy policy had been
the biggest barrier to delivery of effective
advent of the Abbott government, this was
a low point in climate politics.
Climate politics was becoming
increasingly tricky (issue 99, 2007) as the
Howard government tried to push nuclear
power and protect fossil fuel industries
with a ‘measured approach’ to emissions
trading. Meanwhile, the Coalition
government was trying to label the
stronger climate policies of the Greens and
Democrats as wrecking the economy, and
to split Labor on the nuclear issue. While
I didn’t mention it at the time, the Greens’
Re-energising Australia analysis, to which
I contributed, provided a comprehensive
vision of a successful, sustainable
Australian economy that is still relevant
today.
Increasing numbers of people and
progressive businesses were focusing on
shifting to ‘net zero emissions’ in response
to climate science and frustration at the
lack of leadership. In issue 99 (2007), I
supported this approach, but flagged a few
complications in defining the term and in
using offsets without adequate focus on
actually cutting total global emissions.
An important step on the path to
development of an emissions trading
scheme was the Garnaut Review, led by
prominent economist and policy maker,
Professor Ross Garnaut. My column in
issue 103 (2008) was written in the early
stages of this process. I had mixed feelings.
On one hand, it was clear that the process
would be thorough. On the other hand,
Prof Garnaut was on the public record
as saying “if the price [of emissions] is
established at the right level, there is no
need for other public policy measures.”
However, he also acknowledged that
market failures might require alternative
responses. Overall, I was nervous!
In 2008, the global financial crisis
(GFC) impacted heavily on development
of climate policy (issue 106, 2009). It
seriously constrained development of
emissions trading, now known as the
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme
(CPRS). At least the crisis raised questions
about the effectiveness of ‘free markets’
and the credibility of many economists!
However, the GFC also increased concerns
about the ‘costs’ and impacts of the CPRS
on the economy. The fearmongers had
fertile ground, despite evidence that we
were already benefitting from savings on
energy bills through energy efficiency,
and modelling that showed very small
economic impact—much of which was
“The Garnaut Review also emphasised ... the
significant long-term economic benefits of
climate action”
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justified) scepticism. In issue 126 (2014),
I tried to find some glimmers of hope
among the debris.
In issue 133 (2015), I discussed a range
of issues related to the government’s new
policy agenda, including the need for what
I called ‘indirect action’, where policies
that deliver widely valued benefits—such
as public transport—also cut emissions.
At least the shift of focus away from
carbon pricing was opening up serious
consideration of a more diverse range of
policy tools and measures. This may turn
out to be one good outcome within an
overwhelmingly negative picture.
Carbon pricing and trading
I first discussed carbon trading, which
I described as a ‘cargo cult’, in issue 65
(1998). I acknowledged that pricing carbon
fundamentally made good sense, but that
the rush to capture rights to abatement,
the convenience of buying offsets, and the
attraction of buying cheap international
permits of dubious quality meant more
attractive investments in local energy
efficiency and renewable energy were
being ignored. I concluded that “we need
to make sure sustainable energy options
will be fairly treated in emissions trading
schemes…Given the level of prejudice
and ignorance that exists, this won’t be
easy.” Prescient words, unfortunately, as
discussed later.
By late-1999 (issue 69), the debate
over carbon pricing was heating up as
large emitters began to evaluate the
scale of impacts on them. At the same
time, a study found that energy market
reform had increased emissions by 8
million tonnes of CO2 annually. Also,
energy companies were planning to build
many new fossil-fuel-fired generators.
I commented that “Australia is moving
climate policy. I referred to a report
by McLennan Magasanik for the Total
Environment Centre, which documented
the fiasco. I also reflected on reasons why
Australia had such a strong voluntary
abatement sector and why we were global
leaders in discussion about how voluntary
abatement action could be encouraged
while emissions trading was introduced.
The chronic failure of our leaders simply
meant people who accepted climate
science had to take action themselves!
I also explored the challenges of
responding to the tensions between
developed and developing countries
with regard to abatement action. I
suggested that one way of breaking
down the stereotypes was for developed
countries to pay developing countries
when they exported high-efficiency
appliances or renewable energy products
to developed countries. By rewarding
developing countries for manufacturing
and exporting low-emission products,
developed countries could fund the
payments through a small levy on
imports, while developing countries
would gain an incentive to produce lower-
emission products. The savings on energy
bills would be much larger than the cost
of the levy. Sadly, my proposal has never
been adopted. I still think it would be
transformative.
In issue 112 (2010), I tried to put myself
in the shoes of a CEO of a large, emissions-
intensive business—to try to imagine
how they might be thinking about the
possibility of stronger climate response
policy. It was a disturbing experience:
there seemed to be many incentives to
oppose action and few to support strong
climate response.
The Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI)
was a topic in issue 115 (2011). This was an
incentive scheme to encourage farming
and forestry carbon storage by allowing
projects to create carbon credits, with the
government cancelling Kyoto permits to
match the credits created. This approach
was intended to ensure the abatement/
storage activity was additional to
‘business as usual’. I pointed out that this
provided a model that could be applied to
other voluntary abatement action. More
recently, the CFI model has been adapted
to become the Emissions Reduction Fund,
the core of the Coalition government’s
climate response policy. Unfortunately,
in this role it is inadequate, as it doesn’t
send a broad signal for all emitters to cut
emissions.
Also in that column, I noted that funding
for a number of clean energy programs
had been cut to help fund recovery from
the summer’s extreme weather events.
How’s that for short-sighted thinking!
From late-2011, Australian climate policy
reached a new low (issue 117, 2011), led
by hysterical and ill-informed opposition
leader Tony Abbott. At the same time,
intensive negotiations between the Gillard
Labor government, the Greens and other
crossbenchers led to development of a
new Clean Energy Future package that
combined carbon pricing (see below)
with a range of other complementary
measures. With the benefit of hindsight,
setting a fixed carbon price at $25 per
tonne of CO2 for the first three years, at
a time when global carbon prices fell to
much lower levels, turned out to be its
Achilles’ heel. This allowed opponents to
attack it as a ‘tax on everything’.
After a change in government, Australian
climate policy was turned on its head
under Prime Minister Abbott. Instead
of ‘polluter pays’ we moved to a ‘pay
the polluter’ model amid much (mostly
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perilously close to a ‘lose–lose’ greenhouse
strategy”.
2003 was a watershed year for carbon
trading (issue 83): the NSW Government
introduced its Greenhouse Gas Abatement
Scheme, which required energy retailers
to surrender abatement certificates for
emissions above specified benchmarks.
NGACs could be created by projects
that included renewable energy, energy
efficiency, fuel switching, methane
emission reduction, etc. Many people,
including me, believe this was the world’s
first comprehensive emissions trading
scheme.
By 2006, several state governments
were showing their frustration with
national inaction on carbon trading and
began to develop state-based approaches
(issue 94). In this column, I also explored
how emissions from air travel were
seriously underestimated by the Kyoto
accounting method: more recent IPCC
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change) analysis suggests emissions from
air travel are two-to-five times higher than
estimated under Kyoto methods. This has
major implications for the tourism sector
that no one seems to want to discuss!
I followed up this problem in issue 119
(2012), where I referred to UK research
that suggested the problem of indirect
impacts of air travel could be dealt with by
flying lower, in warmer air (although this
has its own issues).
2006 also saw more visible splits
within Australian business over climate
policy (issue 96), as increasing numbers
of firms began to recognise the risks of—
and the opportunities from—action. An
outcome of all the debate, supported by
high-profile actions such as ex-US vice-
president Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth
presentations, was that both major parties
made election commitments to introduce
emissions trading. But, as I explained
(issue 101, 2007), there were many tricky
aspects to consider—as Kevin Rudd found
out when he tried to introduce his Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme a couple of
years later.
In my column in issue 102 (2008),
written as we awaited the outcome of
the election that would see Kevin Rudd
become Prime Minister, I expressed
my nervousness about some aspects
of emissions trading schemes (ETS). It
seemed likely that targets would be weak
and distant. Also, it had become clear that
powerful economic policy bureaucrats,
encouraged by industry lobbyists, saw
an ETS as an opportunity to get rid of
many existing (supposedly economically
inefficient and messy) energy efficiency
and renewable energy policies and
programs. Indeed, that is what happened.
By mid-2008 (issue 104), my concerns
about how emissions trading would
be implemented in practice were
crystallising. For example, the Wilkins
Review was set up within the Finance
Department, with little publicity, to
evaluate which existing climate policies
were ‘complementary’ to carbon pricing.
This rang loud alarm bells—for good
reason, as it turned out. I also wondered
how effective a price signal would be in
changing behaviour, given that it would be
small in comparison with factors such as
currency exchange rates, energy price rises
driven by other factors, and so on.
In the same column, and in issue 107
(2009), I also raised the question of
how voluntary abatement action by
individuals, progressive businesses and
local and state governments would be
affected by an ETS. It became clear that
motivation could be affected, and that
o Cutting carbon emissions also provides other
benefits such as reducing air pollution, but policy
makers failed to emphasise the multiple benefits
of climate action.
Photo:www.FreeImages.com/Mashiba
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production plants. Modernisation was also
driving closure of inefficient industrial
facilities. Australia could learn a few
lessons from the Chinese.
How climate statistics shape perceptions
My column in issue 114 (2011) explored
the design of the National Greenhouse
Gas Inventory and its influence on policy
priorities. The NGGI allocates direct
emissions from on-site combustion to
each sector and reports emissions from
electricity generation separately. So the
commercial sector, which uses mostly
electricity, shows up as a very small
component of Australian emissions—far
from the reality, when its electricity-
related emissions are also considered. So
policy makers who don’t understand the
subtleties of electricity focus on sectors
and activities with high emissions from
burning fossil fuels on-site. They miss
the enormous emissions reduction
benefits from reducing electricity use
in the electricity-intensive commercial
and residential sectors. There were other
problems, too. This reflects the broader
issue that how we present statistics can
heavily influence our perception of what
is important, and the focus of policy. S
voluntary action could subsidise emitters
unless the government cancelled permits
to match the level of voluntary abatement.
This became an issue of serious concern
for me, and led me to help to establish the
Voluntary Carbon Markets Association,
which campaigned (unsuccessfully) for
attention to be paid to this issue during
development of the ETS. This remains
both important and unresolved in 2016.
Through 2009, the nuts and bolts of the
proposed CPRS were negotiated. Affected
industries lobbied hard—and often
successfully—for generous treatment,
while government agencies and levels of
government argued about organisational
arrangements. By the time I was writing
my column for issue 107 (2009), the
Greens and other progressive groups had
decided the CPRS was too compromised
to deserve support. This was not an
auspicious situation.
I revisited the development of the
CPRS in issue 110 (2010) and found many
reasons for concern about its design.
A range of design features seemed to
mean that the most emissions-intensive
industries would be little affected by
carbon pricing, and that the carbon price
would be well below a level that would
significantly influence behaviour. This
provided support for the actions taken
by the Greens in opposing the CPRS in
parliament. At the same time, economic
modelling of the cost of climate action
seemed to overstate the cost of practical
emissions reduction, especially via energy
efficiency.
As noted earlier, my column in issue 117
(2011) looked at the Gillard government’s
revised proposal for a more balanced and
comprehensive package, negotiated with
the Greens and other crossbenchers, that
included carbon pricing. This ill-fated
package was far superior to the original
CPRS. However, the introduction of a
carbon price provided an excellent excuse
for conservative state governments to
dump state-level climate policies (issue
120, 2012). This confirmed the validity
of my criticism that a national carbon
trading scheme would disempower
state and local governments, progressive
businesses and individuals if it failed to
include mechanisms to formally recognise
and ensure the additionality of voluntary
action. The state governments justified
their cuts by saying climate response was
now a national issue and that state action
would make no difference to meeting the
national target.
In issue 121 (2012), I discussed the
assumption that, over time, carbon
prices would necessarily increase and
their impacts on the economy would
grow. These views were based on several
misconceptions and a failure to grasp the
significance of innovation in reducing
carbon costs. In issue 122 (2013), I briefly
looked at the challenges of setting targets,
and the need for flexible design to allow
for unforeseen change and innovation.
China and emissions reduction
In recent years, China has consistently
surprised commentators with its lower-
than-expected emissions. At COP 15 in
Copenhagen, I heard a few reasons behind
this change (issue 111, 2010). Annual sales
of electric bikes had reached 20 million:
so most Chinese were not buying cars.
They had introduced building energy
regulations and actually enforced them!
They were also shutting down small,
inefficient coal-fired power stations and
had shut down 53 million tonnes of
inefficient cement production capacity
and 20 million tonnes of inefficient steel
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Australian policy on renewables:
politics and surprises
deserved them because of their chronic
failure to listen to the community!
By 2008, GreenPower was well
established so I thought it was time to
suggest more sophisticated GreenPower
products (issue 102) that encouraged
the matching of times of generation and
use, to discourage off-peak coal-fired
generation. No one was interested.
Decentralised or distributed energy
solutions were slow to emerge in Australia
(issue 107, 2009). While gas-fired
cogeneration had been promoted since
the mid-1980s, the powerful electricity
sector, with occasional exceptions,
worked hard to block it. They didn’t want
anyone messing with their electricity
infrastructure and business models!
Similarly, the electricity industry was slow
to support demand-side management,
even where it helped to maintain
reliability and reduce costs. Reformers of
energy markets claimed that overcoming
this market distortion was a major driver
of energy market reform. Yet, after more
than a decade of reform, the power of
the big electricity industry had not been
broken. This failure became obvious in
the summer of 2009, when bushfires
led to the shut-down of powerlines
and the Basslink power conversion
RENEWABLE energy has been a recurring
theme in my columns. In my third
column (issue 61, 1997), I mapped out
what I considered to be a comprehensive
strategy towards mainstream renewable
energy, in a context where governments
(both Labor and Coalition) saw it as a
minor fringe player. It was clear that our
renewable energy resources dwarfed our
fossil fuel and uranium supply.
Of course, I couldn’t stop myself from
pointing out that renewable energy had
to grow with complementary energy
efficiency improvements—a partnership
that still attracts far too little attention in
Australia, as I discuss elsewhere.
Importantly, I looked at the roles of
renewable energy in provision of transport
and heat, as well as electricity. At that
time, renewable energy provided 9% of
Australia’s energy, with three-quarters of
this being heat supplied from wood and
bagasse (sugar cane waste). I mapped
out a range of options, many of which
are now being widely adopted. And I
pointed out that we should be investing
tens of billions of dollars each year on this
transformation.
In issue 64 (1998), my column focused
on two important emerging renewable
energy innovations: GreenPower and
modular grid-interactive inverters. I saw
these as game changers.
As mentioned earlier, NSW’s SEDA
drove the creation and implementation
of GreenPower. Indeed, in Victoria, it was
illegal until 2001 under the transitional
energy market rules! GreenPower
provided a simple mechanism for
electricity consumers to support the
growth of renewable electricity by paying
a surcharge to ensure their electricity was
sourced from new (post-1997) renewable
generators. It complemented the ‘2% 2010
Renewable Energy Target’ then under
development, as discussed in my column
in issue 75 (2001). I supported adoption of
GreenPower, although I noted that, if the
energy market was working properly, it
might not be needed.
I also saw the emergence of small
grid-interactive inverters as a way of
empowering electricity consumers to
take action when governments and
energy companies failed. I somewhat
optimistically foreshadowed the
possibility of “the $500 plug-in PV
module as a Christmas present for the
person who has everything”. I also noted
that widespread adoption of distributed
energy systems could cause problems
for the electricity industry, but that they
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o Renewables technologies, such as rooftop solar
and battery storage, which were just emerging
a decade ago are finally firmly on the radar, as
demand and awareness have increased and prices
decreased. Distributed energy infrastructure
is becoming not only more feasible, but also
desirable, from the perspective of consumers and
energy networks.
Image:StuderInnotec;www.studer-innotec.com
years after the initial announcement,
before the RET legislation was
placed before parliament, with actual
implementation from April 2001. Later
columns (issues 71, 74, 75; 2000–01)
described some of the machinations
behind the final design and detail of the
scheme and its associated regulations.
Strong support from progressives, such as
the Greens (and the ATA!), was critically
important. In particular, the Greens fought
hard to exclude native forest ‘waste’ from
inclusion in the definition of ‘renewable
energy’. This scheme, and its successors,
would prove to be the mainstay of
Australian renewable energy policy for
many years, despite a few ups and downs
discussed later.
Indeed, in issue 77 (2001), I pointed out
that RECs (Renewable Energy Certificates
created by registered renewable energy
generators, with one REC created per
megawatt-hour of renewable electricity,
and each surrendered REC generating
a credit) created a potentially useful
accounting system for renewable energy.
They could be used by state governments
and others to drive additional investment
in renewable energy in their jurisdictions
beyond the RET, simply by buying
and surrendering RECs from projects
in specified locations. Indeed, the
GreenPower scheme adopted this
approach.
On the other hand, in issue 79 (2002), I
pointed out that when people accepted
payment for RECs when buying solar
hot water or rooftop electricity systems,
they were effectively handing over the
‘greenness’ of their purchase—in terms
of 10 to 15 years of emissions reductions
and support for growth of the renewable
equipment couldn’t cope with the heat.
Angry consumers were not interested in
explanations that it was economically
inefficient to ensure 100% reliability.
I pointed out that emerging technologies
would soon allow consumers to take
control of their own situation by using
smart demand management, local energy
storage and distributed generation. The
seeds of our energy revolution had been
sown.
Much of the renewable energy policy
focus from 2009 to 2012 was on rooftop
solar PV and fine-tuning the 2020 RET, as
discussed below.
An important report that looked at
the bigger picture was published by
AEMO in 2013 (issue 124), after intense
pressure from the Greens and the
renewable energy industry prompted the
government to instruct AEMO to develop
a comprehensive 100% renewables
study. Their report showed that such an
outcome was technically achievable and
would have similar costs to conventional
electricity supply scenarios, even
though it used a demand scenario that
underplayed the potential of energy
efficiency.
Renewable Energy Targets
In issue 68 (1999), I reviewed progress
on development of the 2010 Mandatory
Renewable Energy Target. This policy was
announced in late-1997 in Prime Minister
Howard’s ‘Safeguarding the Future’ pre-
Kyoto statement. Over time, it became
clear that little thought had been given to
the detail of how the scheme would work
before it was announced. Intense lobbying
and debate was creating uncertainty and
confusion. It was December 2000, three
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the detail. That’s certainly how it played
out.
By 2010 (issue 111) it was becoming
clear that the changes made to the RET in
shifting to the ‘20 % by 2020’ goal had not
been very well thought through. Rooftop
PV systems were being allocated multiple
RECs for each unit of grid electricity
avoided and undermining investment
in large-scale renewables. This led to a
revised approach (issue 116, 2011) whereby
the RET was changed into two separate
schemes—one for rooftop PV, solar hot
water and other small renewables based
on Small Technology Certificates, and
a separate scheme for large renewable
generation using Large Generation
Certificates with a separate target.
Renewables and the environment
My columns in issues 70 and 72
(2000) briefly highlighted some of the
environmental and social problems facing
renewable energy, such as air pollution
from wood heating, aesthetics and land-
use conflicts. The Greens’ concern about
use of ‘waste’ from logging of native
forests (issue 74, 2001) for ‘renewable’
electricity generation reflected another
big issue. We need to remember that
all energy sources have environmental
and social impacts. We also need well-
designed and carefully implemented
engagement and consultation processes,
and to ensure high standards are achieved.
The alternative is more delays in delivery
of a clean energy future. My column in
issue 84 (2003) extended this discussion
to suggest encouragement of community-
driven energy strategy development.
In 2016 we are beginning to see this, as
communities begin to plan sustainable
energy futures for their regions. S
energy industry—to the electricity
retailers who bought, then surrendered,
the certificates to comply with their legal
liability. So accepting this subsidy meant
the household did not get credit for the
renewable electricity or greenhouse
abatement for the credits created,
although they did cut their energy bills.
This is a tricky area that relates to the
‘additionality’ of voluntary action relative
to what would have happened anyway.
This issue is discussed in more detail
elsewhere in the context of carbon trading.
Over the years, the RET has evolved,
both in terms of the level of the targets
and the structure of the scheme. For
example, in issue 79 (2002), I pointed out
that the legislation allowed only energy
retailers to surrender RECs, so individuals
could not surrender RECs to ensure they
counted as additional action beyond the
RET. This was eventually fixed.
The vulnerability of target-based
schemes like the RET was highlighted
(issue 87, 2004) by the recommendation
of the RET Review in 2004 to leave the
2010 target at its original level, even
though it was clear it would be met by
2007. The 2004 Energy White Paper (issue
89, 2004) locked in this short-sighted
approach. This led to a ‘boom and bust’
outcome—just the first of many politically
driven problems faced by the RET over
time.
A partial response to this problem was
that some states, such as Victoria, decided
to fill the policy gap by introducing their
own state-level renewable energy targets
to top-up the inadequate 2010 target.
Then, as explained in my column in
issue 108 (2009), RET rebates for rooftop
solar became a national election issue in
2007. After Labor was elected, this led to
a series of messy changes to the RET that
resulted in extremely generous PV rebates,
but also undermined development of
large-scale renewables. At the same time,
implementation of the new government’s
‘20 % renewables by 2020’ commitment
was poorly designed. In issue 116 (2011), I
summarised the PV policy saga and made
a few suggestions for future policy.
In parallel with the Commonwealth
mess, state governments decided to
win over voters by offering increasingly
generous feed-in tariffs (FiTs), discussed
below. We are still trying to sort out the
resulting mess.
The lead-up to the change of
government in 2013 led to serious
uncertainty for the renewable energy
industry. After the change, a major review
of the RET was carried out. In issue 128
(2014), I discussed the background and
issues associated with this process.
Investment in large-scale renewable
electricity generation projects crashed
and, as at mid-2016, has not recovered.
Feed-in tariffs
By 2007 the failure of national targets, as
well as technology developments and cost
reductions, had led state governments
to seek alternative or complementary
policies to encourage more renewable
energy. Feed-in tariffs, where the energy
retailer (possibly funded by government)
pays a generator of renewable electricity
for each kilowatt-hour of exports to the
grid, had worked well in Germany. In
Australia, state governments became
interested in offering FiTs for small
renewable energy generators such as
rooftop solar, to complement the RET—
and to allow them to gain credit from
voters for supporting renewables. In issue
99 (2007) I looked at the pros and cons of
FiTs and concluded that the devil was in
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Australian energy policy: papers,
politics and technology
despite extensive modelling and analysis.
As they say, if you repeat something often
enough and loudly enough, people take it
seriously.
2011 saw the federal Labor government
release its draft Energy White Paper
(issue 119, 2012). It largely reflected
the same misguided priorities of the
Howard government’s 2004 effort.
Outdated energy policy based on blind
faith in markets is not a party political
issue, but is really a deep-seated cultural
problem within the energy sector. In
issue 120 (2012) I noted that I had made
submissions on this draft paper, as well
as to the Victorian Competition and
Efficiency Commission’s inquiry into feed-
in tariffs and a consultation on a possible
National Energy Saving Initiative.
A fundamental contradiction that energy
policy faces (issue 122, 2013) is that if we
are to avoid serious climate change we
must leave most of our existing economic
fossil-fuel resources in the ground. This
makes ongoing exploration simply a waste
of money. Subsidies for such activities are
clearly money down the drain.
By issue 123 (2013), the Labor
government had published its final Energy
White Paper. I commented that it was a
significant improvement on the draft, but
THE traditional approach to major policy
involves preparing a Green Paper for
public discussion, followed by a White
Paper that presents the government’s
policies. This approach has been used
in the energy sector since the 1970s.
Reviewing the various Green and White
Papers and the process (or lack of process)
associated with them provides useful
insights into mainstream views of energy,
and the power of certain industry groups
and ideological agendas.
The Howard government’s 2004 White
Paper (issue 89, 2004) illustrated how
isolated energy policy was from broader
social, economic and environmental
policy. It essentially adopted the agenda of
Australia’s energy-intensive and fossil fuel
industries, to the detriment of emerging
options such as energy efficiency and
renewable energy. Indeed, some years
later, Guy Pearse (in High and Dry with
John Howard; Penguin, 2007) exposed
the process underlying preparation of this
document: those industries had actually
written parts of the policy!
The Victorian Government’s 2004
Greenhouse Challenge for Energy
highlighted the tensions confronting a
moderately progressive state government
(issue 91, 2005) as it tried to juggle
brown-coal interests and climate action.
In the same column, I reported on
my submission to a planning inquiry
into the future of the inefficient and
polluting Hazelwood brown-coal
power station: I concluded that energy
efficiency could cost-effectively provide
more than two Hazelwoods worth of
energy equivalent. I failed to influence
the decision (issue 92, 2005). In issue
94 (2006) I exposed the astounding
agreement between Hazelwood’s owners
and the Victorian Government that
required the government to advocate
on its behalf during development of
any future emissions trading schemes.
I also documented the Victorian Energy
Department’s pro-brown-coal agenda that
contrasted strongly with its government’s
broader climate policy. As usual, the
energy sector treated the rest of society
and the economy with disdain. The debate
about how to close our most polluting
brown-coal power stations continues
in 2016, despite ongoing efforts by
community groups (issue 112, 2010).
A major topic of debate over many years
has been the ‘need’ for base load power.
My strong view (issue 102, 2008) was that
this was a fallacious argument. But it has
been amazingly difficult to overcome,
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o Discovery of oil in the Bass Strait in the ‘60s
meant Australia was almost self-sufficient for this
fossil fuel by the mid-1980s. Great news for the
transport industry, which relies so heavily on the
stuff, but it delayed serious exploration of more
sustainable alternatives for the next two decades.
Photo:www.FreeImages.com/KaseyHouston
exciting journey.
The latest Energy White Paper, released
in 2015 (issue 132, 2015), will not provide
much help in adjusting to the rapid
changes in energy. My submission to the
Green Paper can be accessed via a link in
my column; it also applied to the White
Paper. The Paper was completely out of
touch with reality, although it had one
interesting element: a proposal to develop
a National Energy Productivity Plan—
which was actually released in December
2015 but received virtually no publicity.
This offers potential to frame measures
that provide more economic output per
unit of energy consumed. There will be
more on this in future columns.
Oil and transport policy
In many ways, it was the oil crises of
the 1970s that triggered modern energy
policy. Indeed, the OPEC (Organisation
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)
crisis triggered a shift in Australia towards
world price parity for oil. Australia’s first
national energy efficiency campaign was
a response to the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
Before the late-1960s, when the enormous
Bass Strait oil fields were discovered,
Australia was considered to have very
limited oil resources and, over the years,
was still a ‘fail’. The failure to frame energy
policy within a climate change context
meant that most of the document was
simply irrelevant.
After a change of government, an
Energy Issues Paper was released in
mid-December 2013 (issue 127, 2014), as
a precursor to a proposed Green Paper
and White Paper. Yet again, it missed the
target, although it did at least provide a
useful list of short-term issues that needed
to be addressed.
In 2014 I attended an APEC (Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation) workshop in
China, where I had to explain Australian
renewable energy policy to a bemused
audience. I then listened as they spoke
about the amazing levels of investment in
change that are transforming their energy
sectors and economies (issue 128, 2014).
It really highlighted for me the depths to
which Australian energy policy had sunk.
But, as I pointed out in issue 131 (2015), at
least some state and local governments
are taking more interest in energy issues.
Global factors are transforming our
economic structure, volatile energy prices
are complicating business planning and
climate change, and other factors are
redefining asset values. No one knows
where all this will lead, but it will be an
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Gas policy
Historically, the importance of effective
policy on gas has fallen under the radar
most of the time—it was cheap and had
lower climate impacts than coal-fired
electricity. It is only recently that conflict
over coal seam gas and the potential gas
shortages due to construction of large
liquefied natural gas export facilities in
Queensland have raised its profile with
policy makers.
In issue 66 (1999) I suggested that
the gas industry might soon face an
image crisis if it did not begin to shift
to renewable sources of gas. Seventeen
years later, it looks as though I was right—
eventually.
I pointed out that gas was losing its
climate advantage as advanced electric
technologies, including heat pumps
and microwave ovens, emerged. I also
pointed out that much gas use was
very inefficient. I made a few practical
suggestions, including that the gas
industry should introduce more efficient
appliances and offer a ‘GreenGas’ product
similar to GreenPower. Landfill gas and
biogas were obvious sources of GreenGas,
while solar reforming of gas (using high-
temperature solar heat to gases that,
when burnt, release more energy than
was in the original gas—solar boosting
of gas), wood gasification and hydrogen
also offered potential. And these could be
complemented by an offsets scheme that
promoted tree planting and other climate
actions such as subsidising bio-alcohol
and even producing oil from shale had
been pursued to limit our dependence on
imported oil. Bass Strait changed all that
and, by the mid-1980s, we were almost
self-sufficient for oil—for a while. After
the turn of the century, global discussion
about peak oil gained a higher profile.
My column in issue 97 (2006) looked at
this issue: I concluded that both sides of
this debate had some merit. But the key
challenge was to reduce our underlying
dependence on oil for many reasons, not
just peak oil.
In Australia, around three-quarters of
our oil consumption is for transport, and
we now import most of our oil. So oil
policy necessarily links to transport and
urban development policy (issue 105,
2008). This in turn begs the question:
why do we travel? A sustainable transport
future necessarily means minimising
the need to travel (and shift ‘stuff’
around) and using efficient transport
options. Urban structure and provision of
public transport, pedestrian and bicycle
infrastructure are fundamental. In this
column I discussed some of the issues and
suggested paths forward.
By 2011, interest in electric vehicles
was reaching fever pitch. In my column
in issue 114 I tried to encourage a more
realistic perspective on what is definitely
an exciting development. I also put
forward my ideal EV solution—a car with
reasonable range and a very small (15 – 20
kilowatt) booster engine. I’m still waiting
for someone to manufacture this.
In issue 119 (2012) I reported that most
fuel-guzzling vehicles were purchased by
business. I also noted that these vehicles
are typically resold, and used by private
owners for most of their lives: so new car
purchasers leave a legacy of fuel waste
and higher costs for future owners. In
this issue, I also flagged some ideas for
improved funding of sorely needed public
transport infrastructure. In issue 120
(2012) I highlighted the role of tradies
in increasing congestion, and suggested
that a shift to manufactured housing and
smarter appliances could reduce tradie
travel and bring other benefits.
In issue 127 (2014) I reported on a
fascinating survey of Sydney traffic.
The survey found that, in 2011, 22 %
of weekday car trips were to ‘serve
passenger’: that is, the driver was acting
as an unpaid taxi driver. The cost and
time involved in using cars for such trips
to replace better urban design, public
transport, walking and bikes must be
enormous. Yet I rarely see the need to
reduce car dependence by non-drivers
addressed in transport studies.
Continuing the theme of traffic, in issue
134 (2016) I published an analysis of car
air conditioner energy’s contribution to
vehicle fuel use in heavy traffic in tropical
climates: the air conditioner used as much
fuel as moving the car! This raises some
interesting technology and policy issues.
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Pears Report Collection: Insights from 20 years of energy and climate policy analysis

Pears Report Collection: Insights from 20 years of energy and climate policy analysis

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Pears Report Collection: Insights from 20 years of energy and climate policy analysis