Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition,TIGPC, Gordian knot Center, DIME-FIL, department of defense, dod, intlpol 340, joe felter, ms&e296, raj shah, stanford, Steve blank, AI, ML, AI/ML, china, unmanned, autonomy, c3i, command and control
Visit to a blind student's school🧑🦯🧑🦯(community medicine)
Team Drone - 2021 Technology, Innovation & Great Power Competition
1. Original Problem Statement
Chinese literatures have revealed how
drones can be used as an surprise
element in an amphibious assault to
overwhelm defenses. In a potential
Taiwan Strait Crisis, there is a need for a
low-cost and survivable counter-drone
system to defend Taiwan.
Final Problem Statement
Taiwan needs a robust and survivable
C2 system to effectively and quickly
bring the right asset to the right place
at the right time during an invasion.
Tom Liang
- MS Mechanical
Engineering ‘22
- BS Mechanical
Engineering
Josh Stelwagen
- MA East Asian
Studies (China
Concentration) ’21
Felipe Calero
- BS Computer
Science (AI Track)
‘23
Team Drone
Total interviews: 17
14. Geographical Space Defense Budget Overall Defense Concept
Smart Fortress Defense for Robust C2
Layered, decentralized
modular network of
sensors
Get right things to the
right place at the right
time
15. Taiwan is not allowed in many
international institutions with current
geopolitical constraints
GCTF is a platform for Taiwan to
share their expertise and strengthen
connections with international experts
Vigorously expand the scope of GCTF to include the sharing of information
about emerging threats in the Electromagnetic Environment (EME) as well
as best practices in defensive Electromagnetic Operations (EMO).
Recommendation
Expand GCTF to Share Defense Practices
16. Offer scholarships to Taiwan
high school students to pursue
undergraduate STEM education
at top colleges in the US
Students required to work for the
Taiwan government for six years
upon completion of their studies
Cultivate Domestic Taiwan EM Expertise
23. Uncertainty about where drone swarms would be utilized,
and if effective solutions even existed
At this point in the quarter, we began to feel more deeply the uncertainty about
where drone swarms would be utilized.
What exactly was the problem Taiwan should be most concerned about?
Additionally, many of the kinetic cUAS we looked into were either in very early
stages or impractical, and it did not seem like Taiwan would be able to know
where to deploy them during an invasion.
Should this problem not be framed in terms of kinetic defenses?
25. Key Insight - Importance of EW for China, and how
Taiwan’s current defense plan thinks about EW.
China wants to disrupt Taiwan’s command and control, and prevent it from using
the assets it has (e.g. surface-to-air missiles) effectively
Drone swarms may represent a unique threat to Taiwan’s C2, and may be an
attractive option for China.
Taiwan’s current defense plan neglects EW, and essentially assumes it will lose
access to any advanced communication systems.
Ryan Fedasiuk - CSET
26. Key Insight - Drone swarm encompasses not only
detecting and tracking drone swarms over land, but also
incoming ships
As small drones cannot cross Taiwan Strait, they would need to be deployed
from a ‘mothership’ or some other source nearby.
Problem is: Taiwan cannot effectively target vulnerabilities like the mothership
or command nodes for drones.
Zak Kallenborn - freelance analyst
27. Buoys network for detection & communication
Could provide improved operational awareness during
invasion, help find targets (e.g. mothership)
Decentralized, difficult to jam or spoof
Considered this as potential solution for the problem of
targeting vulnerabilities like motherships or command
nodes, but did not solve other aspects of the problem.
28. Final insight: Underlying problem is Command and Control (C2)
Detecting & tracking drone swarms, defending against EW, and being able to
target drone swarm vulnerabilities are all symptoms of the same problem - C2.
Drone swarms are concerning in large part because of the weaknesses of
Taiwan’s current C2 architecture.
In the longer term, Taiwan needs to learn to compete in EW and cyber
warfare, or it will not be able to use the assets it has accumulated.
The problem is: Taiwan cannot defend it’s C2 architecture from EW and
cyberattacks, and losing situational awareness would hamper its ability to
impose costs on an invading force.
Dr. Chen-Yi Tu - INDSR (Taiwan’s version of RAND)
29. What:
How:
Drones + AI
Amphibious Assault
Taiwan’s Overall Defence Concept + Geographical/Political/Economic Constraints
Potential
Solutions:
Taiwan Straits Crisis
UAV/UUV swarms
Finding, tracking
and neutralizing
drone swarms
Disrupt C2 networks
Robust & survivable C2
architecture
Electronic Warfare
(EW)
Buoys network for
detection &
communication
EW for cUAS
Search & destroy
drone mothership
33. Key Insight - Using the kill web concept to emphasize
importance of detection and tracking
Mrinal Menon (Anduril Industries) & DoD interviewees
Kill web process: Detection, Tracking, Classification, Mitigation
Current thinking in this space neglect the first links of the kill web,
and actually it is very difficult currently to detect and track incoming
drones
Problem is not just bring down drone swarms, but rather detecting
and having the situational awareness to know where to deploy
assets.
34. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) - Current Practice
In 2018, the Industrial Development Bureau of MOEA established a cybersecurity
integrated service platform called Security Platform as a Service (SecPaaS), in
which more than 51 domestic companies that independently develop
cybersecurity systems participate.
35. Indigenous EM Expertise
Current Practices:
● Supporting and recruiting high-caliber R&D talents to forge stronger science
and technology capacity and industry R&D capacity
○ Accelerate higher education reform and increase higher education funding to strengthen the
innovation and R&D capacity of higher education institutes
○ develop high-caliber talent databases to keep track of the whereabouts of PhD graduates and
the supply and demand for PhD graduates
○ provide scholarships to PhD graduates to motivate Taiwanese and foreign students to further
their study
● Cultivating and recruiting professionals to facilitate industrial transformation
○ industry-academia cooperation PhD talent cultivation systems
○ actively recruit high-profile talents from Taiwan and overseas
36. Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)
● Focus on academic research that caters to the needs of industry
○ Taiwan relies on science and technology innovation as a key driver of economic growth and
national progress.
● Three national science park - Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI),
National Applied Research Laboratories and Institute for Information Industry
○ ITRI - helped to set up TSMC & United Microelectronics
39. President Tsai Ing-Wen’s Five Plus Two Industrial Innovation
Program
● Smart Machinery Industry
○ Boost development of smart machineries
● National Defense Industry
○ Provide support to information security industry cluster in Taiwan
○ Promote dual-use technology
40. Current Schemes
National Taiwan University of Science and Technology (NTUST) Scholarship for
international graduate students [1 - 4yrs / tuition and stipend]
https://www.studyintaiwan.org/university/scholarship/136
Ministry of Education Taiwan-Caltech Scholarship
41. What:
How:
Drones + AI
Amphibious Assault
Taiwan’s Overall Defence Concept + Geographical/Political/Economic Constraints
Potential
Solutions:
Taiwan Straits Crisis
UAV/UUV swarms
Finding, tracking
and neutralizing
drone swarms
Disrupt C2 networks
Robust & survivable C2
architecture
Electronic Warfare
(EW)
Buoys network for
detection &
communication
EW for cUAS
Search & destroy
drone mothership
43. Smart Fortress
Who: Joint Taiwan NCSIST and US Defense
Industry venture.
What: The Smart Fortress complements
Taiwan’s existing “ODC” by establishing a
defense in-depth featuring layered,
decentralized constellations of sensors
capable of rapidly cueing electronic, cyber,
information, and directed energy capabilities. This
framework not only promotes shared awareness
but enables multi-domain targeting
synchronization across all echelons of
command, thereby presenting adversaries with
additional dilemmas and risks.
Where/How: Use Taiwan’s condensed
geography to its advantage: incorporate urban
terrain, mountains, outer islands, and harbors into
sensor network that is nested with Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield.
44. Sharing Best Practices
● Due to current geopolitical constraints, Taiwan is not allowed to participate in
many international institutions.
● Global Cooperation & Training Framework (GCTF) is a platform for Taiwan
to share their expertise and strengthen connections with international experts
on different topics via workshops and events.
● Vigorously expand the scope of GCTF program to include the sharing of
information about emerging threats in the Electromagnetic Environment
(EME) as well as best practices in defensive Electromagnetic Operations
(EMO).
45. Indigenous EM Expertise
● Taiwan should invest in education and aim to produce world-leading
electromagnetic scholars.
● Offer scholarships to Taiwan high school students to pursue
undergraduate STEM education at top universities in the US and UK. The
condition of the scholarship is for the students to return back to work for the
Taiwan government for six years upon completion of their studies.
46.
47.
48.
49. Tom Liang
- MS Mechanical
Engineering ‘22
- BS Mechanical
Engineering
Josh
Stelwagen
- MA East Asian
Studies (China
Concentration) ’21
Felipe Calero
- BS Computer
Science (AI Track)
‘23
Final Problem Statement
Taiwan’s Ministry of National
Defense needs robust and survivable
C2 architecture for decision-makers
to effectively visualize and
understand the operating
environment during a crisis, rapidly
deploy the right asset to the right
place at the right time, and efficiently
mass firepower across multiple
domains thus enhancing unit
lethality.
Original Problem Statement
In order to strengthen credible deterrence by
denial and protect against asymmetric People’s
Republic of China (PRC) AI and swarm
technologies in a potential Taiwan Strait crisis,
Group 5 analyzes the PRC’s joint service (联合
作战样式) operational concept for the future of
amphibious warfare (两栖登陆作战), as
described in open source official Chinese
publications, and develops low-cost, survivable,
and lethal solutions
Team Drone
Total interviews: 17
50. Indigenous EM Expertise
Offer scholarships to Taiwan high school
students to pursue undergraduate STEM
education at top universities in the US.
Students to return back to work for the
Taiwan government for six years upon
completion of their studies.
51. LOREM IPSUM
Proposed Solutions
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Smart Fortress
Memorandum of
Understanding
Promote Indigenous
Expertise
Notas do Editor
Drone swarms first direction, kinetic counter drone weapon systems
We did initially learn about several alternatives, but in one interview realized that this approach was wrong.
Key problem is not bringing down the drone in front of you, but detecting drone swarms in the first place
Current solutions neglect detection and tracking, so we began asking the question, what software and technology should taiwan implement to be able to detect and track incoming drone swarms?
Again, through expert interviews and research, we realized that this again was the wrong approach, because while it is an important problem, there is an underlying problem of
Electronic warfare. China will utilize drones and other assets to jam and disrupt communication during an invasion, and so even if the tech existed to detect drones, commanders might not receive the information. We began researching and brainstorming ways of defending against EW and fighting back even if communications are disrupted, but once again through expert interviews realized that this was insufficient.
To most effectively combat drones, Taiwan needs to have more information that what its current C2 architecture is capable of, and we began thinking about a potential network of sensors using buoys or modular nodes, as its current system is vulnerable to disruption by China, and its current Overall Defense Concept, the overarching framework for their defense, does not emphasize EW or maintaining communication systems.
It was here that we had our final a-ha moment. Just a symptom, c2 important for other threats
The underlying problem we had kept running into was that of maintaining effective C2 during an invasion. In one of our expert interviews, we realized that, like much of current thinking on Taiwan, we had been operating under the assumption that C2 would be lost during an invasion, and that Taiwan would not be able to compete in this area. We began to challenge this assumption - what if C2 didn’t fall? What if Taiwan began competing in this domain, in ways consistent with its overall defense concept, and taking into consideration the lessons we had learned so far about the necessary components of an effective C2 architecture?
It was here that we really began approaching our final solution - given Taiwan’s constraints, how can it invest in a war of tomorrow while still being prepared for the war of today?
What would a C2 architecture that complements the Overall Defense Concept and is looking ahead to emerging capabilities look like? Here we arrived at our proposed solution:
From the interview insights we got, our group has 3 recommendations for Taiwan.
The other two to ultimately support the smart fortress idea
Took into consideration Taiwan’s geographical space, defence budget and ODC and propose a layered decentralized modular network of sensors.
A lot of cheap sensors to create robust and survivable C2 network to allow commanders to get the right assets to the right place at the right time.
Address surprise element
Condensed geography
Taiwan defense spending
Reliance on US arms
Stakeholders: GCTF administered by Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, American Institute in Taiwan & Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association
Network security, government corruption, energy efficiency
USA / Japan / South Korea - “resist China and assist Taiwan”
Taiwan govt to attract and retain talent from young at the undergraduate level
Taiwan should invest in education and aim to produce world-leading electromagnetic scholars
The US should encourage and provide opportunities for Taiwan to engage in exchange programs with relevant, top US civilian institutions and military Centers of Excellence (CoEs).
Stakeholders:
Ministry of Science and Technology - Department of Engineering and Technologies
Ministry of Education - Department of Higher Education
So with that here is our journey from looking at the use of drones in Taiwan Straits Crisis to realising the need is for Taiwan to invest in a robust and survivable C2 architecture to not surrender the technological space to China during a conflict.
The problem is: Taiwan does not have effective ways of bringing down drone swarms.
Initially envisioned drone swarms being used by China for kinetic offense during the initial phase of an amphibious invasion.
What counter drone swarm weapons exist? What types of drone swarms could China use? What does Taiwan’s current defense plan look like?
-Leveraging Taiwan’s small size
- Applying ‘porcupine’ concept to EW. In the longer term, Taiwan does need to compete with China in this space
Anduril Industries develops autonomous, AI-enabled solutions for defense and national security issue
Address surprise element
Condensed geography
Taiwan defense spending
Reliance on US arms
Stakeholders: GCTF administered by Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, American Institute in Taiwan & Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association
Network security, government corruption, energy efficiency
USA / Japan / South Korea - “resist China and assist Taiwan”
The US should encourage and provide opportunities for Taiwan to engage in exchange programs with relevant, top US civilian institutions and military Centers of Excellence (CoEs).
Stakeholders:
Ministry of Science and Technology - Department of Engineering and Technologies
Ministry of Education - Department of Higher Education
Taiwan should invest in education and aim to produce world-leading electromagnetic scholars
The US should encourage and provide opportunities for Taiwan to engage in exchange programs with relevant, top US civilian institutions and military Centers of Excellence (CoEs).
Stakeholders:
Ministry of Science and Technology - Department of Engineering and Technologies
Ministry of Education - Department of Higher Education