Lecture 7 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition - Space

Technology, Innovation, and Great
Power Competition
INTLPOL 340; MS&E 296
Steve Blank, Joe Felter, Raj Shah
Lecture #7: Space
01 November 2021

Agenda
• Logistics
• Group Project - Pivoting to Solutions
• Great Power Competition in Space

Midterm Memo
• Reminder: Due Tomorrow (Tuesday @ Midnight PST)
• Follow the prompt PDF as uploaded on Canvas
Reach out to the Teaching team and TA’s with questions!

Group Project
• Problem Statement Review and Feedback
• 5 minutes per group
• Blunt and direct feedback
• “Socratic method with a stick” - Steve Blank
• We give feedback this way because it will help you move faster;
indirect feedback takes too long for the course

Timeframe: Now
Group Project: Narrow the Problem Definition
• By Now Your Team Has Lots of Data
• From the beneficiaries, stakeholders, etc.
• Your team may have come up with several potential problems to solve
• Time to narrow them down to one
• The problem you choose can be a template to solve bigger problems post class
• You can decide you want to further pursue the larger issues post-class in the GKC
• Teaching team happy to help adjudicate conflicting directions

Timeframe: Now
• What would a minimum viable
product look like?
• Physical, Software, white paper, policy,
change in regulation/law?
• Who would build and deliver the final
product/service?
• Existing contractor?
• New startup?….?
• How to you create an "Innovation
Insurgency" around the idea?
• Who is the senior champion?
• Who is the innovation program manager?
Group Project: Solution Definition
• Who would have to get excited
about the MVP to fund it?
• List all the beneficiaries,
stakeholders, etc.
• Who are the saboteurs?
• Existing contractors?
• Internal PEO's?
• …

Team 1 - AVCI
Andy / Josh / Leo / Sophia

The Evolution of the Problem Statement
In order to maintain military supremacy over China and other nations the U.S. needs to reevaluate and improve the DoDs faltering innovation, R&D,
and prototype funding of commercial technologies that have the potential to scale into vital military use technologies and hardware. Army Futures is
currently trying to understand and decide on which existing models to base Army Venture Capital off of and improve upon.
The gap between U.S. and Chinese military innovation and capabilities is rapidly closing and poses a threat to U.S. military dominance specifically in
the Indo-Pacific Region. In order to maintain our capability gap, the U.S. needs to reevaluate and improve its public venture capital economics and
organizations that can play a vital role in leading U.S. military innovation.
The gap between U.S. and Chinese military innovation is rapidly closing and poses a threat to U.S. military dominance in the Indo-Pacific Region. In
order to maintain our capability gap, the U.S. needs to reevaluate and improve its public venture capital and funding relationships with commercial
companies that have potential for dual-use technologies which can play a vital role in leading U.S. military innovation.
The gap between U.S. and Chinese military innovation is rapidly closing and poses a threat to U.S. military dominance in the Indo-Pacific Region. In
order to maintain our capability gap, the U.S. needs to reevaluate and improve its public venture capital and funding strategies regarding private
companies that have potential for dual-use technologies, which can play a vital role in catalyzing U.S. military innovation.
The gap between U.S. and Chinese military capabilities is rapidly closing and poses a threat to U.S. military
dominance in the Indo-Pacific Region. In order to maintain our capability gap, the DoD needs to reevaluate and
improve its funding strategies and partnerships with mid-stage private companies that have potential for dual-use
technologies, which will play a vital role in catalyzing U.S. military innovation.

Key Insights
● History of AVCI 1.0
● NDAA Authorities
○ 2002 Section 8150
○ 2018 Section 1711
○ 2019 Section 230
● Meeting with the future Manager of 501(c) 3
● Level of Funding (B&C Stage vs. Seed Stage)
● The cross section of DIU / NSIC / In-Q-Tel / Army Futures Command
● Insight from Private Venture Capital Firms
● Necessity of Senior Leader Education

Congress
Army Venture Capital
Investment Corp.
(VCIC)
“OnPoint Technologies”
MILCOM Venture
Partners / Arsenal
Venture Partners
Manager of 501(c)3
Key Interface, Contractual, Admin Support
Money and Authorities
Man, Train, Equip
Army Venture
Capital Initiative: 1.0
501(c)3
Board of Trustees
3xA
2xB
SECDEF
Secretary of the
Army
Asst. Sec. Army
Acquisition, Logistics
and Technology
ASA (ALT)
Steering Panel
Communications
Electronics Command
CECOM
Army Chief of
Staff

SECDEF
Asst. Sec. Army
Acquisition, Logistics
and Technology
ASA (ALT)
Secretary of the
Army
Army Chief of
Staff
Congress
Army Venture Capital
Investment Corp.
(VCIC)
Second Front
Systems, Inc.*
*certified B Corp.
Board of Trustees
3xA
2xB
Army Venture
Capital Initiative: 2.0
Manager of 501(c)3
501(c)3
Contracting / Admin Support
National VC Assoc.
501(c)3
= Recommended Org
Structure / Role Changes
Army Futures
Command
Army Combat
Capabilities
Development
Command
ATAC
Army Technology
Working Group
Steering Panel

Team 2 - Conflicted Capital
Angela / Connor / Megan / Zac

Week 7 - “Conflicted Capital” Status Report
Revised Problem Statement: Chinese adversarial venture capital investments in US dual-use startups continue to threaten US military
capabilities across critical technologies. Despite the passing of FIRRMA in 2018 and updates to CFIUS in 2020, American regulations controlling
foreign investment are still largely voluntary. Venture capitalist and startup founders indicate that American startups would shun known
sources of Chinese funding - the problem amounts to exposing undisclosed Chinese State connections to venture capital funding. Unfortunately,
current USG efforts to uncover Chinese capital in dual-use startups are informally organized across various departments and highly manual.
Week 6 Takeaways:
1. Adversarial capital continues to be a problem, despite current market condition - There is a glut of capital in the VC market,
making it easy for dual-use startups to seek the funding they need to get to the next stage. However, market conditions are cyclical and the
next contraction in the VC market will likely lead to more insidious adversarial capital challenges, as the Chinese state becomes increasingly
sophisticated with their capabilities to evade detection
2. Just within DIU, 10% of reviewed companies were found to have foreign ownership, control or influence and/or
adversarial capital concerns - additionally, roughly 5% of companies were not selected based on this business intelligence alone.
Despite the seemingly low percentages, this represents a significant challenge as DIU does not conduct BI DD until the last stage, just prior
to partnership. As such, adversarial capital concerns may be more widespread in the broader market.
3. Current due diligence efforts are highly manual and lack coordination - All DD is conducted by a two-person team at DIU, who
rely on very manual processes to get the job done. There is an informal working group of similar teams across USG (including at Trusted
Capital). There is significant potential for automation
Week 7 Look Ahead: Interview with Pavneet Singh, Fellow @ Brookings and co-author of Chinese VC report with Mike Brown; Interview with
Matt Turpin; Interview with Prof. Tai Ming Cheung (China military innovation specialist based out of UCSD), possible interviews with CFIUS, Matt
Shortal, and In-Q-Tel. Mid-term papers on unrelated subjects.
Potential Solution: Automation of current BI DD for DIU and other similar bodies - e.g. investor profiles, investor maps enabled by AI

Threat Analysis Framework
Chinese investors taking
direct minority stake in
company
Chinese LPs funding
through a VC
IP theft
Influence over JVs
Conflict in
serving USG
Investment as
situational awareness/
economic espionage
Threat scenario - near-term to long-term impact
Threat mechanism
Probability: High
Traceability: High
Risk to DOD: Low
Probability: High
Traceability: Low
Risk to DOD: Low
Probability: Medium
Traceability: Medium
Risk to DOD: High
Probability: Medium
Traceability: Medium
Risk to DOD: High
Probability: TBD
Traceability: Low
Risk to DOD: High
Probability: High
Traceability: Low
Risk to DOD: Medium
Probability: High
Traceability: Low
Risk to DOD: Medium
Note: Risk to DOD defined as risk that DOD will not be able to use critical AI/ML technology and/or that Chinese military will gain access to critical capabilities.
Other threat mechanisms and scenarios will be added as they are identified in upcoming interviews.
Other threat mechanisms
Other scenarios
Probability: TBD
Traceability: Low
Risk to DOD: High

Team 3 - Project Aurora
Jay / Fatima / Laura / Pierce

Updated Problem Statement [01 NOV 2021]
Hong Kong presents a unique opportunity to support activists currently attempting to maintain
democratic institutions inside the PRC.
The US should pursue opportunities to support pro-democracy activists, particularly when they
use protests, unsanctioned expression, or other mobilization activities to advocate for self-
determination.
Supporting activist activities through free access to information outside the CCP security
apparatus’ purview will amplify US soft power in this theater.
The US government should support this through (1) cyber and commerce policies that support
companies who resist CCP restrictions; (2) discrete security and technical support for activists;
and (3) the establishment of immigration policies that facilitate Hong Kong residents’ living and
working in America, free from PRC interference.

Original Problem Statement
How can the United States employ its cyber capabilities to provide the populace of Hong Kong
with unrestricted internet access? How can it use this access to bolster the resiliency of Hong
Kong’s civil society in the face of CCP crackdowns in order to pressure the PRC regime, spread
American liberal values, and uphold the United States’ freedom of action in the information
domain?

Hypotheses
The CCP’s Censorship Apparatus
The CCP’s censorship system operates on all-or-nothing blocking (response: (in HK) operates by making free info access
inconvenient, so citizens move on with their lives)
X
PRC citizens would broadly welcome and demand Western information, if able to access it (response: some would if it was
PROVIDED, few would seek it out on their own; perception of anti-China bias reduces this impulse.)
X
Hong Kong citizens would broadly welcome and demand Western information, if able to access it. ✓
PRC population is interested in general anti-censorship tech (response: dissident communities are most interested; general
pop. has no uptake)
X
Hong Kong
Strategic information operations against CCP leadership (e.g., denigrating their leaders and degrading their ability to
govern/repress HK) are feasible.
-
Large-scale mobilization in HK is still feasible in the wake of the National Security Law. (response: penalties are too severe, so
mobilization must be discreet)
X

Hypotheses
Corporate Cyber / Information Policy
Western democracies can influence tech corporations in their support for pro-democracy advocacy. (Companies must choose
between complying with local laws and abdicating given jurisdictions; western democracies do not have consensus on
protections for free speech).
✓
Large tech firms have leverage in interactions with autocratic govts. (some, but limited, and dependent on market size and
company’s internal values).
-
Large tech firms would prefer to maintain access to the Chinese / Hong Kong markets. ✓
Hong Kong Activist Pain Points
Activists’ access to VPNs and encrypted messaging services is limited by App Store interactions. (somewhat true, though Hong
Kong has greater access to these services than mainland China… could potentially become an issue.)
-
Activists outside of Hong Kong face pressure from CCP security apparatus. ✓
Activists would be wary of overt US support. (They welcome over diplomatic support, though anything that creates the
impression of IC-supported activity will make it easier for CCP security to crack down).
-
Activists struggle to identify the nature of Great Firewall encroachment on their internet access. ✓

Hypotheses
What should the US be doing?
The US can and should exert greater political pressure on China over Hong Kong. (response: yes; politicians are nominally
sympathetic but hesitant due to economic and political ties)
✓
The US should encourage activists to infiltrate governance apparatuses and sabotage enforcement efforts. (response: this incurs
significant risks for activists, and they have limited resources and not enough trusted people)
-
The US should continue to work through international institutions to build collective norms around the protection of
privileged communications and protections for free speech.
✓
The US should develop immigration policies that provide safe haven and support for Hong Kong activists forced to flee Hong
Kong. (some HK activists are determined not to leave, but there is historical value in this concept).
✓
The US should develop tools that highlight encroachment on existing Hong Kong governance and censorship by CCP security.
(effectiveness of this unknown, but information is lacking).
✓

Next Steps
● Continue to conduct interviews
○ Michael McFaul
○ Alexsandra Corwin (US DoS)
○ Wraith Zhong 钟瑞
○ Donald Clarke 郭丹青
○ Patricia M Thornton
○ Benedict Rogers 羅傑斯
○ Samuel Chu 朱牧民
○ Ray Wong
○ Sunny Cheung 張崑陽
○ HKDC - Hong Kong Democracy Council
○ Francis Lee and Clement So, Chinese University of Hong Kong
● Focus on a specific “silo” of the problem set
○ Produce in depth concept of support for that silo
○ Describe conditions in others to support concept

Team 4 - ShortCircuit
Abeer / Ankit / David / Mikk / Miku / Youngjun

Updated Problem Statement
To compete with the PRC’s semiconductor industry remain competitive in the global semiconductor
industry and How to maximize the impact of the estimated $1 billion allocated in the proposed CHIPS
Act to stimulate semiconductor education and innovation in hardware expertise?
The sponsors of the CHIPS Act need to surmount differing consensus among .
The policy makers crafting this bill need to be aware of the various positions of academia, industry, and
venture capital interested in this allocation, and informed of the risks and rewards associated with each
investment strategy.
More concise: where to most efficiently invest $1B to optimize US competitiveness to revitalize
semiconductor production in the US?

Bottom line: how does the USG most efficiently invest $1B to optimize US competitiveness and
revitalize semiconductor production in the US?
Expanded: How does the USG maximize the impact of the estimated $1 billion allocated in the
proposed CHIPS Act to stimulate semiconductor education and innovation in hardware expertise?
The policy makers crafting this bill need to be aware of the various positions of academia, industry, and
venture capital interested in this allocation, and informed of the risks and rewards associated with each
investment strategy.

Hypotheses
Geopolitics
PRC’s pressure on Taiwan will negatively impact the US’s semiconductor supply chain ? ✓
Preventing collaboration with Chinese firms could actually inhibit US competitiveness / innovation ✓
Manufacturing
Competing with China/Taiwan at the cutting edge is unfeasible given our disadvantaged starting point ? X
The US needs domestic fab capability to counter Chinese threats in the SC market ? ✓
The US needs to better use relationships with partners and allies to counter Chinese threats in the SC market ✓
The US must maintain the most cutting edge capability to succeed (vs. it is important to only succeed in reimagining
the old technology and/or combining new technologies with old)
? ✓
Education
Market incentives are such that emergent U.S. talent is attracted to software rather than hardware in both academic
study and in the job market
✓

Hypotheses
Investment
High net worth capital investor enthusiasm exists for hardware R&I, attributable to patriotism. ✓
What should the US be doing?
The US is doing something right, given that it still has a stronghold for R&D and chip design. ✓
The US strategy should be optimizing older microelectronics technology to increase SC supply chain resilience. ?
The US can gain a competitive advantage in the SC production process by applying interest and appeal in AI and
software towards solving hardware and SC manufacturing issues.
✓
The US has a chance to take leadership in revamping the industry, once a paradigm shift of 3D packaging is
underway.
✓
The US should revisit DoE, DHS, NSF funding streams, generate educational incentives for hardware design, and
invest heavily into hardware development; R&D should be collocated with production.
✓
The US needs to invest heavily in bringing cutting edge fabs back to the US. ? ✓

Jimmy Goodrich
- VP of Global Policy at Semiconductors Industry Association
- Key Takeaways:
- US only has 12% of semis manufacturing today, because the US does not offer enough incentives
and federal investment in this critical technology.
- US should invest in leading edge players like TSMC, Samsung, and Intel, as well as some startups.
However, it is not all about the smallest, most cutting-edge chips. It is also important to invest in
players in the “trailing edge”, such as Global Foundries.
- Senators have put forward the FABs Act, which would create an investment tax credit for
investments in semiconductor manufacturing.
- There are a significant amount of strategic investors, who are interested in investing in hardware
and building investment vehicles, such as In-Q-Tel. This is a place where there is large potential for
public-private partnerships.

Antun Domic
- Former CTO of Synopsys, Lecturer of EE at Stanford
- Key Takeaways:
- Companies don’t maintain a ‘second source’ supplier anymore, which leads to less resilience during
supply chain crises.
- The shortage is only for older chips, esp. for automotives. It shouldn’t be the government funding
building fabs for older chips, but rather the companies who need them, like Ford, etc.
- The overall problem is the lack of capital flow - we need to get big companies to use the cash
they’re sitting on. Currently avoiding it because of taxes.
- It’s not the salaries distorting the market, but rather the illusion that software companies can keep
generating money forever. On the opposite, we need to inject students with assurance that
hardware related jobs are the ones that don’t disappear.
- Part of the problem is that high end computing is stuck. Individual units at supercomputers have
been stuck at 5GHz speed for the past years. Needs reimagining and possibly use of new materials.

Eric Sayers
- Nonresident Fellow at American Enterprise Institute
- Key Takeaways:
- To secure the supply chain, we need to also bring in/ diversify other parts of ecosystem, other than
manufacturing in fabs, such as testing and packaging.
- May be worth exploring potential for a semiconductor Quad with SK, Taiwan, and Japan. This
should be not only focused on semiconductor manufacturing, but also design and security issues,
and should be both offensive (e.g. investment) but also defensive.
- The argument in the Commerce Department is that “if you build it, they will come”. By increasing
manufacturing capacity through the CHIPS Act, and the FABS Act, the hope is that other parts
such as packaging will also want to co-locate geographically.

Tadahiro Kuroda
- Professor, Director, Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo
- Key Takeaways:
- Japan is very eager to innovate new technology anticipating the paradigm shift- many of the things
he talked about such as democratization of chips, making the design and production of chips easier
for students to access (like the “desktop fab”) and updating textbooks were things we had also
discussed.
- Japan is not eager to decide on a position between US and China as China is a huge market, and
from Japan’s perspective, the US is still the leader in R&D, and is expected to be the leader in the
upcoming paradigm shift.

Nerissa Draeger
- Director of Global University Engagements at Lam Research
- Key Points:
- Material shortages might be a bigger culprit than disruptions with actual fabrication processes (e.g.
Helium shortage in Japan, regional availability is highly volatile).
- It’s difficult to centralize the different aspects of resource collection and processing, only China has
that ecosystem down on scale.
- Over 50% of Lam’s hires have advanced degrees, and Lam sponsors research like NSF or NIH.

Matt Turpin
- Visiting fellow Hoover Institution
- Key Takeaways:
- Auto chip shortage wasn’t about fabrication issues - it was about larger supply chain disruptions
- Solve the “our number 1 customer is our number 1 competitor” problem - interdependency with
PRC SOIs
- Military supply chains are secure- for now, specialized/hardened older chipsets
- Need to ask “What kind of chips do we need?” - no one is using sub 10nm chips in mil tech and its
not economically viable to fabricate at the cutting edge
- Need to ask “What is our goal?” - be industry leaders? In what? Alot of variance in problem
definition in the USG
- Need to visualize SC’s not as their own industry but as inputs for multiple sectors - how can the
USG visualize these flows to determine which levers to pull?
- No one can answer if subsidizing R&D is going to fix the problem - don’t want to look back 10y
from now and conclude the CHIPS Act was incomplete or ineffective...start from the post-mortem
and work backwards.

Edlyn Levine
- Chief Technologist at MITRE Accelerator, Research Associate at Harvard
- Key Takeaways:
- Outsourcing is thus largely a positive phenomenon from an economics perspective, but when it
comes to high tech, we need to maintain onshore manufacturing capability, even without great
power competition. These skills are not grown overnight and if you lose those skills, you also lose
skills to innovate the next big thing.
- Next big thing won’t come from the top portion of the computing stack (Moore’s law). If you want
to innovate, need to make a breakthrough at the lower end of the compute stack - on the physics,
electronics, material side.
- Root causes of poor manufacturing capability are tax and regulatory environments that are not
favorable to build asset heavy infrastructure. We also have immigration barriers and export control
laws prohibitive for US companies to compete in a global landscape.
- We need to create an innovation ecosystem so that winners can emerge, requires public-private
partnership
- Contacts
- TBD - she is reaching out to her contacts and will be in touch

Heather Richman v2
- Founder, Defense Investment Network
- Key Takeaways:
- Clarified that the proposal she is putting together is in collaboration with MITRE on how to direct
$1B from Chips Act to set up a mechanism to better leverage private capital to enhance
semiconductor R&D.
- This proposal will compete with that of IBM, who is likely proposing to give the money to them.
- From now to January, Heather's goal is to raise about 10 million to support putting together the
proposal.
- January is when they expect to start the work on drafting the proposal.
- Contacts:
- Anita Biddappa, Operating Partner at BVA

Next Steps
- Brainstorm and validate possible solutions to our PS
- Create a visualization our problem statement and possible solutions
- Confirmed upcoming interviews:
- 11/2: Sahar Hafeez, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Industry and Security, Dept. of Commerce
- 11/3: Jeff Rittener, Chief Trade Officer at Intel, former Chief Government Affairs Officer
- 11/3: Drew Oetting & Philip Clark, Partner & Chief of Staff at 8VC
- 11/4: Matt Johnson, CEO of QC Ware Corporation
- 11/4: Gene Irisari, Vice President for Public Affairs and Head of Semiconductor Policy at Samsung
- TBD: Anita Biddappa, Operating Partner at BVA

Team 5 - Team Drones
Josh / Felipe / Tom

Problem Statement (Background)
Context: Taiwan’s terrain has long provided it with a defensive advantage in warfare, but military applications made possible by rapid
advances in technology and emerging operational concepts implicitly seek to bring Taiwan’s human and physical geography closer to the
mainland thereby reducing the political risk of an invasion.
Bottom Line: Taiwan’s existing Overall Defense Concept (ODC) and 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is rooted in fighting today’s
war based on lessons from the past, but also needs to simultaneously plan for fighting tomorrow’s war. In any future conflict, time will more
critical than ever. One of the largest issues Taiwan faces is thus not only the ability to detect asymmetric PRC technologies that will be
utilized in the initial phase of conflict, like drone swarms, but to effectively and holistically share threat based information with C2 nodes so
decision-makers can rapidly ensure the right assets are mobilized to the right place at the right time.
Dilemma: Taiwan assumes it will fight in a electronically denied environment. Moreover, due to political-economic constraints, there is little
democratic consensus over what systems such be purchased and whether they should be built indigenously or acquired from the US via the
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).
Why this matters: US is obligated to sell defense article to Taiwan under the TRA. Moreover, due to policy of strategic ambiguity, enhancing
Taiwan’s resilience is crucial to providing US decision-makers with options during a crisis.

Running Problem Statement
Week 6:
To enhance the command and control capabilities of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) and protect
friendly forces, team Drone identifies low cost, survivable Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft System (C-sUAS)
solutions aimed at dynamically detecting, tracking, and engaging emerging aerial, swarm based platforms likely to
be used by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the initial phase of cross Taiwan Strait crisis.
Week 7:
China’s potential use of drone swarms during the initial phase of a cross-Taiwan Strait conflict will disrupt Taiwan’s
command and control networks, preventing Taiwan’s leadership from making rapid, informed decisions necessary to
mobilize forces. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense needs assets to defend against the drone swarm and ensure
C2 nodes maintain the ability to understand the developing operating environment to immediately send the right
assets to the right place at the right time.

Hypotheses/Assumptions
China’s Imagining of Future Amphibious Invasions
PRC views drone swarms as an important way to seize the initiative and achieve surprise in a cross-strait scenario ? ✓
Drone Swarms will be used to disrupt C2 ✓
Taiwan’s Defenses
Taiwan needs cheap, asymmetric capabilities to counter the threat ? X
EW is undesirable because it may deny Taiwan’s own ability to use air, including their F-16s ? X
Kinetic surface to air solutions do not fit Taiwan’s defense environment to the 360 orientation of the threat ? X
Effective C2 in a crisis will be key to mounting an integrated, cohesive defense ✓
The Role of US Tech
Many existing, commercial solutions are ill-fitted to counter drones based on Taiwan’s constraints and China’s
operational concepts
? ✓

This Week’s Interviews:
- Ambassador Michael Mcfaul
- Russ Corwin (US Army Foreign Area Officer)
- John Castillo (US Air Force EC-130 and MQ-9 Pilot
- Zak Kallenborn (Policy Fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a Research
Affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism-START
- Ryan Fedusiak: research analyst at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology
(CSET)
- Singaporean Drone Pilot

Next Steps and Priorities
- Validate solutions with Taiwan Stakeholders for feasibility
- Integrate further with more US commercial stakeholders representing not only c-UAS,
but potentially other sensors as well that can create a layered, technologically based
defense in depth by overlapping sensors with EW/IW/Cyber/kinetic capabilities to
create a “smart fortress”
- Confirmed upcoming interviews:
- Dr. Chen Yi-Tu, INDSR’s chief of science and technology
- Dr. Jim Timbey
- Professor Chris Twomey
- Professor Kharis Templeman
- Professor Amy Zegart
- Coordinating through Teaching Team for Epirus and JCO
- 12 additional emails sent; awaiting replies to begin scheduling

Team 6 - Apollo
Arden / Donovan / Francesca / Mi Jin / Omar

As the U.S. faces the prospect of an cross-strait invasion of Taiwan, the US Space Force must develop
redundancy of its assets by proactively partnering with the commercial space sector.
The Civil Reserve Space Fleet lacks the comprehensive set of assets, capabilities, and incentive mechanisms it
needs to be a valuable contingency. The US Space Force needs to identify key priorities and strengthen
mechanisms as it leverages the commercial space sector to augment its capabilities.
The United States Space Force lacks the necessary frameworks and incentive mechanisms it needs to best
leverage the American commercial space industry as a valuable redundancy layer in case of emergency.

The United States Space Force lacks the necessary frameworks and incentive
mechanisms it needs to best leverage the American commercial space industry as a
valuable redundancy layer in case of emergency.

Key Takeaways
● The private sector is less concerned about assuming risk and/or getting caught in
the middle of a conflict than initially thought
○ Bigger concerns: IP rights, immigration restraints, clearance requirements
● Given the speed and cost efficiencies of the commercial sector, the US should
maximize its use of commercial systems to maintain preeminence in space
○ What is the mechanism to best integrate defense and national security objectives?
○ → Augment systems utilizing a process analogous to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Hypotheses
Public-Private Partnerships
Working with the DoD nontrivially increases risk for private companies ? X
Space Force acquisition processes are cumbersome and slow ✓
Launch capacity is a bottleneck ✓
Coordination with the private sector can withstand a wartime scenario ?
The US Gov’t is adequately funding innovation in the commercial sector ?
Personnel
Clearance requirements hinders private sector innovation ? ✓
Talent utilization is hindered by overly prescriptive processes ✓
Overclassification of information precludes innovation ✓

Next Steps
- Continue conducting interviews
- Evaluate analog (Civil Reserve Air Fleet)
- Understand commercial interests/concerns
- Identify key technologies that should be prioritized
- Shutter control already being explored for ISR
- Tier I Encryption
- Understand policy processes/mechanisms for implementation

Team 7 - Catena
Akshay / Bill / Katie / Theo

The CCP’s increasingly common use of coercive diplomacy in
the form of trade sanctions makes Southeast Asian countries
dependent on the Chinese economy, and therefore vulnerable
to the party’s political will. The U.S. cannot afford for these
countries, especially Australia, to align themselves
economically and politically with China. The U.S. must
analyze which Australian industries rely on trade with China
and formulate alternative trading partners to eliminate
China's leverage.

Dr. Thomas Fingar - FSI Stanford
• There’s a lot of hand ringing, a lot of “this could happen,” but there isn’t a lot of
persistent effects because the nimbleness of private sector firms allows the exclusive
dependence on China to be less than was previously thought, when put to the test.
• We need to figure out what the consequences of China actually “going for the throat”
would be, and how to react or prevent them.
• Things get politically charged or radioactive and no one wants to move forward
because bureaucrats aren’t known for courage. This can be as important as the
economic coercion itself.
• The lettuce and honeymooners example

Dr. Martijn Rasser - CNAS
• Examples of economic impact include Australian wine, Taiwanese pineapples,
Baltic Republic exports, a lot of this is signaling from Beijing
• This isn’t as threatening as what they could do, though:
• Rare earths, critical raw materials, lithium, magnesium
• They could really weaponize trade sanctions if pushed to do it
• Another thing to look into - China has some important vulnerabilities as well
• China has an energy crunch
• Coal imports are going up - big long term contracts - investigate
dependencies
• Possible triggers
• Internal instability - deflect attention from problems at home by creating a
foreign enemy
• If the U.S. or allies take steps that Beijing then interprets as an existential
threat, territorial: south China sea, Taiwan

Larry Diamond - FSI Stanford
• Stressed the importance of transparency when it comes to China’s sharp power and
coercion in Belt and Road
• When they play the card with developed democracies, they don’t like it
• A lot of it depends on whether the coercion is on a national public level or whether
it is more micro targeted on a business level which then get co-opted into being
instruments of CHinese will because they want to get into the Chinese market
• A lot of these companies feel like they have to lobby for policies in Washington, or
make certain edits in films because they want their movie or business to do well in
China
• The larger the Chinese economy relative to the US, (may pass GDP in 5 years), the more
that the Chinese can make power move
• If there is a broader financial collapse in China, it may become more absorbed on
internal economic and financial woes and their power will at least be slowed

Next Steps
• Use Australia’s trade and economic relations with China
to determine what areas it would be vulnerable in (Iron
Ore) and what a response from the U.S. would look like if
China imposed trade sanctions.
• Look for trade alternatives, as Dr. Fingar said, what can
we do to make China the last resort for a trade partner?
• Interviews
• Matthew P. Goodman
• Jean Oi
• Glenn Tiffert

Questions?
We are here to support!

General John Raymond
Chief of Space Operations
• First Chief of Space Operations, U.S.
Space Force
• Led re-establishment of U.S. Space
Command as 11th U.S. combatant
command
• Notable staff assignments include:
• Office of Force Transformation,
OSD
• Director of Plans, Programs and
Analyses at Air Force Space
Command
• Director of Plans and Policy (J5),
U.S. Strategic Command
• Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, USAF HQ

Next Week
• Class 8 Topic: Cyber
• Updated readings will be
on Canvas shortly
• TA Team will post Week 8
Reading Reflection prompt
once readings are updated
• Updated problem statements
and interview trackers due
Mondays @ 11:59 PM PST

Lecture 7 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition - Space

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