Presented at the Houston OWASP meeting - 2/21/2013.

1. Cloud Application Security: Lessons Learned
Houston OWASP – 2/21/2013
Jason Chan - chan@netflix.com

2. Netflix, Inc.
“Netflix is the world’s leading Internet television
network with more than 33 million members in
40 countries enjoying more than one billion
hours of TV shows and movies per month,
including original series . . .”
Source: http://ir.netflix.com

3. Me
 Director of Engineering @ Netflix
 Responsible for:
 Cloud app, product, infrastructure, ops security
 Previously:
 Led security team @ VMware
 Earlier, primarily security consulting at @stake, iSEC Partners

4. AppSec Challenges

5. Lots of Good Advice
 BSIMM
 Microsoft SDL
 SAFECode

6. But, what works?
Forrester Consulting, 12/10

7. Especially, given phenomena such as DevOps,
cloud, agile, and the unique characteristics of an
organization?

8. Engineering @ Netflix

9. Availability and the Move to Streaming

10. “Undifferentiated Heavy Lifting”

11. Netflix Culture
“may well be the most important document ever to come out of the Valley.”
Sheryl Sandberg, Facebook COO

12. Scale and Usage Curve

13. Netflix is now ~99% in the cloud

14. On the way to the cloud . . . (architecture)

15. On the way to the cloud . . . (organization)
(or NoOps, depending on definitions)

16. Some As-Is #s
 33m+ subscribers
 10,000s of systems
 100s of engineers, apps
 ~250 test deployments/day **
 ~70 production deployments/day **
** Sample based on one week‟s activities

17. Deploying Code at Netflix

18. A common graph @ Netflix
Weekend afternoon ramp-up
Lots of watching in prime time Not as much in early morning
Old way - pay and provision for peak, 24/7/365
Multiply this pattern across the dozens of apps that comprise the
Netflix streaming service

19. Solution: Load-Based Autoscaling

20. Autoscaling
 Goals:
 # of systems matches load requirements
 Load per server is constant
 Happens without intervention (the „auto‟ in autoscaling)
 Results:
 Clusters continuously add & remove nodes
 New nodes must mirror existing

21. Every change requires a new cluster push
(not an incremental change to existing systems)

22. Deploying code must be easy
(it is)

23. Netflix Deployment Pipeline
RPM with
app-specific VM template
bits ready to launch
YUM AMI
Perforce/Git Bakery ASG
Code change Base image + Cluster config
Config change RPM Running systems

24. Operational Impact
 No changes to running systems
 No systems mgmt infrastructure (Puppet, Chef, etc.)
 Fewer logins to prod
 No snowflakes
 Trivial “rollback”

25. Security Impact
 Need to think differently on:
 Vulnerability management
 Patch management
 User activity monitoring
 File integrity monitoring
 Forensic investigations

26. Architecture, organization, deployment
are all different.
What about security?

27. We‟ve adapted too.
Some principles we‟ve found useful.

28. Cloud Application Security: What We Emphasize

29. Points of Emphasis
 Integrate  Two contexts:
1. Integration with your
 Make the right way easy engineering ecosystem
 Self-service, with 2. Integration of your security
exceptions controls
 Organization
 Trust, but verify
 SCM, build and release
 Monitoring and alerting
29

30. Integration: Base AMI Testing
 Base AMI – VM/instance template used for all cloud systems
 Average instance age = ~24 days (one-time sample)
 The base AMI is managed like other packages, via P4, Jenkins, etc.
 We watch the SCM directory & kick off testing when it changes
 Launch an instance of the AMI, perform vuln scan and other checks
SCAN COMPLETED ALERT
Site name: AMI1
Stopped by: N/A
Total Scan Time: 4 minutes 46 seconds
Critical Vulnerabilities: 5
Severe Vulnerabilities: 4
Moderate Vulnerabilities: 4

31. Integration: Control Packaging and Installation
 From the RPM spec file of a webserver:
Requires: ossec cloudpassage nflx-base-harden hyperguard-enforcer
 Pulls in the following RPMs:
 HIDS agent
 Config assessment/firewall agent
 Host hardening package
 WAF

32. Integration: Timeline (Chronos)
 What IP addresses have been blacklisted by the WAF in
the last few weeks?
 GET /api/v1/event?timelines=type:blacklist&start=20130125000000000
 Which security groups have changed today?
 GET /api/v1/event?timelines=type:securitygroup&start=20130206000000000

33. Integration: Static Analysis
 Available self-service through build environment
 FindBugs, PMD
 Jenkins plugin to display graphs and support drill
through to results

34. Integration: Static Analysis

35. Integration: Alerting (Central Alerting Gateway)
 Single place to generate and deliver alerts
 Python, Java libraries (or JSON post)
 Ties in to PagerDuty notification/escalation system
 Permits stateful alerting and some response
 A prerequisite that our security tools will leverage

36. CAG Example
import CORE.Gateway
gw = CORE.Gateway.Gateway()
# testcluster is a defined app with associated escalation
# schedule in PagerDuty
gw.send("testcluster", "normal", "Something went wrong")

37. Points of Emphasis
 Integrate  Developers are lazy
 Make the right way easy
 Self-service, with
exceptions
 Trust, but verify

38. Making it Easy: Cryptex
 Crypto: DDIY (“Don‟t Do It Yourself”)
 Many uses of crypto in web/distributed systems:
 Encrypt/decrypt (cookies, data, etc.)
 Sign/verify (URLs, data, etc.)
 Netflix also uses heavily for device activation, DRM
playback, etc.

39. Making it Easy: Cryptex
 Multi-layer crypto system (HSM basis, scale out layer)
 Easy to use
 Key management handled transparently
 Access control and auditable operations

40. Making it Easy: Cloud-Based SSO
 In the AWS cloud, access to data center services is
problematic
 Examples: AD, LDAP, DNS
 But, many cloud-based systems require authN, authZ
 Examples: Dashboards, admin UIs
 Asking developers to securely handle/accept credentials
is also problematic

41. Making it Easy: Cloud-Based SSO
 Solution: Leverage OneLogin SaaS SSO (SAML) used
by IT for enterprise apps (e.g. Workday, Google Apps)
 Uses Active Directory credentials
 Provides a single & centralized login page
 Developers don‟t accept username & password directly
 Built filter for our base server to make SSO/authN trivial

42. Points of Emphasis
 Integrate  Self-service is perhaps the
most transformative cloud
 Make the right way easy characteristic
 Self-service, with  Failing to adopt this for security
exceptions controls will lead to friction
 Trust, but verify

43. Self-Service: Security Groups
 Asgard cloud orchestration tool allows developers to
configure their own firewall rules
 Limited to same AWS account, no IP-based rules

44. Points of Emphasis
 Integrate  Culture precludes traditional
“command and control”
 Make the right way easy approach
 Self-service, with  Organizational desire for agile,
exceptions DevOps, CI/CD blur traditional
security engagement
 Trust, but verify touchpoints

45. Trust but Verify: Security Monkey
 Cloud APIs make verification  Includes:
and analysis of configuration  Certificate checking
and running state simpler  Firewall analysis
 Security Monkey created as  IAM entity analysis
the framework for this analysis  Limit warnings
 Resource policy analysis

46. Trust but Verify: Security Monkey
From: Security Monkey
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2012 17:08:18 +0000
To: Security Alerts
Subject: prod Changes Detected
Table of Contents:
Security Groups
Changed Security Group
<sgname> (eu-west-1 / prod)
<#Security Group/<sgname> (eu-west-1 / prod)>

47. Trust but Verify: Exploit Monkey
 AWS Autoscaling group is unit of deployment, so
changes signal a good time to rerun dynamic scans
On 10/23/12 12:35 PM, Exploit Monkey wrote:
I noticed that testapp-live has changed current ASG name from testapp-
live-v001 to testapp-live-v002.
I'm starting a vulnerability scan against test app from these
private/public IPs:
10.29.24.174

48. Trust but Verify: ELB Checker (gauntlt)
 AWS Elastic Load Balancer (ELB) provides cross-
datacenter traffic balancing, but no security controls
 If your cluster is attached to an ELB, it is available to the Internet
 Engineers may misunderstand:
 ELB use cases (and alternatives)
 Security features
 Other measures used to protect ELB-fronted clusters

49. Trust but Verify: ELB Checker (gauntlt)
1. Launch gauntlt test runner instance,
loaded with “master list” of ELBs and
expected state
2. Determine “target list” of current ELBs
to evaluate
3. Generate per-ELB listener gauntlt
attack files
4. Execute attacks
5. Alert on failures and new ELBs
6. Triage findings and update master list

50. Takeaways
 Netflix runs a large, dynamic service in AWS
 Newer concepts like cloud & DevOps need an
updated approach to application security
 Specific context can help jumpstart a pragmatic
and effective security program
 Don‟t swim upstream - integrate and collaborate
with your engineering partners

51. Netflix References
 http://netflix.github.com
 http://techblog.netflix.com
 http://slideshare.net/netflix

52. Other References
 http://www.webpronews.com/netflix-outage-angers-customers-2008-
08
 http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2395372,00.asp
 http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/etech_amazon_cto_aws.php
 http://bsimm.com/online/
 http://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/download/confirmation.aspx?id=29884
 http://www.slideshare.net/reed2001/culture-1798664
 http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/31/read-what-facebooks-sandberg-
calls-maybe-the-most-important-document-ever-to-come-out-of-the-
valley/
 http://www.gauntlt.org

53. Questions?
chan@netflix.com