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Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic
and Legal Thinking
Presented by:
Augusto B. Agosto
MA in Economics
University of San Carlos
William E. Kovacic and Carl Shapiro
William Kovacic
William Evan Kovacic was the
Commissioner of the United States
Federal Trade Commission from January
4, 2006 to October 3, 2011. President
George W. Bush designated him to serve
as FTC Chairman on March 30, 2008
Global Competition Professor of Law and
Policy; Professor of Law; Director,
Competition Law Center
Address:
2000 H Street, NW
Washington, District Of Columbia 20052
Phone: 202-994-8123
Email: wkovacic@law.gwu.edu
Carl Shapiro is Professor of Economics and
the Transamerica Professor of Business
Strategy at the Haas School of Business. He
also is Director of the Institute of Business and
Economic Research. He earned his Ph.D. in
Economics at M.I.T. in 1981, taught at
Princeton University during the 1980s, and has
been at Berkeley since 1990. He has been
Editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives
and a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study
in the Behavioral Sciences, among other
honors. Professor Shapiro served as Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for Economics in
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice during 1995-1996.
Sherman Act of 1890
 set the stage for a century of
jurisprudence regarding
monopoly, cartels, and
oligopoly
 outlawed “every contract,
combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade” and
“monopolization” and treated
violations as crimes
 draw lines between
acceptable cooperation and
illegal collusion, between
vigorous competition and
unlawful monopolization
Role of Economist
• economists a
singular opportunity to
shape competition
policy
• vital terms directly
implicated economic
concepts, their
interpretation
inevitably would invite
contributions from
economists
Three core areas of antitrust:
1. cartels, cooperation, or other
interactions among independent firms;
2. abusive conduct by dominant firms;
3. mergers.
1890–1914 1915–1936 1936–1972 Since 19921973–1991
The Early Days
of the Sherman
Act
Ascent of the Rule
of Reason
Emphasis on
Market
Structure and
Per Se Rules
The Ascent of
the Chicago
School
Towards a
Post-Chicago
Synthesis
• Two important developments were:
– Technological breakthrough that lead to a
larger optimal plant size in manufacturing
– The rise of the railroad from 9,000 miles of
track in 1850 to 167,000 miles by 1890
• Economies of scale and cheaper transport costs
extended the geographical size of markets, so
firms grew larger to serve this bigger market.
Origins of Antitrust PolicyOrigins of Antitrust Policy
The Early Days of the Sherman Act: 1890-1914
• Sherman Act’s first two decades featured
no whirlwind of antitrust enforcement, the
courts began shaping the law’s vague
terms.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States (221 U.S. 1 [1911])
• First, the Court treated Standard’s 90 percent share of
refinery output as proof of monopoly. Future cases
commonly would use high market shares as proxies for
monopoly power.
• Second, the Court established the “rule of reason” as the
basic method of antitrust analysis. By this standard,
judges would assess conduct on a case-by-case basis,
although especially harmful behavior still might be
condemned by bright line, per se rules.
• Third, the Court began classifying some behavior as
unreasonably exclusionary. It ruled that Standard Oil’s
selective, below-cost price cuts and buyouts of rivals
illegally created and maintained the firm’s dominance.
• Finally, despite Standard’s dire (and unfulfilled)
predictions of industrial apocalypse, the Court broke the
firm into 34 parts.
Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking
sherman.mp4
The Clayton Act reduced judicial
discretion by specifically
prohibiting certain tying
arrangements, exclusive dealing
agreements, interlocking
directorates, and mergers
achieved by purchasing stock.
The FTC Act also ended the
executive branch’s monopoly on
public enforcement of antitrust
laws by forming an administrative
body to make antitrust policy.
Ascent of the Rule of Reason: 1915–1936
• In Maple Flooring Manufacturers’ Association v. United
States (268 U.S. 563 [1925]), the Court also took a
benign view of arrangements for sharing price and
output data among rivals. Maple Flooring holds special
interest for economists today because it featured the
Supreme Court’s first citation to an economist’s work in
an antitrust decision—in this instance, to underscore
how access to information might enable producers to
make efficient output and pricing decisions. Maple
Flooring’s author was Harlan Fiske Stone, a former dean
of Columbia Law School, who favored using social
science literature to resolve legal issues.
What is the
Rule of Reason?
The antitrust doctrine that
the existence of monopoly
alone is not illegal unless
the monopoly engages in
illegal business practices
• When the Supreme Court confronted cases involving
market power measurement, it tended to accept broad
market definitions that made a finding of dominance less
likely.
• In Standard Oil Co.v.United States (283U.S.163,1931), the
Court upheld a patent pool by which several major refiners
set the royalties to be paid for exploiting catalytic cracking
technology. Key to the decision was the definition of the
relevant market. If cracking technology were the relevant
product, the refiners’ market share would exceed 60
percent. Alternatively, if the relevant product encompassed
all refining capacity, including older distillation technology,
the defendants’ share would be only 26 percent.
• The Court embraced the second alternative and concluded
that the refiners probably lacked power to raise prices.
• Along with loose rules on cooperation
between rivals,the 1915–1936 era marks
the longest lapse for the enforcement of
antitrust controls on dominant firm
behavior.
• It is difficult during this period to detect signifi
cant direct effects of economic thinking and
research on judicial antitrust decisions.
• The courts emphasized market share as an
indicator of market power, while economists
focused more upon the beauty of scale
economies and their implications for prices and
market structure. While Pigou’s writings on price
discrimination have proven durable, they
provided no basis for the prohibitions on price
discrimination in the Robinson Patman Act of
1936.
Emphasis on Market Structure and Per Se
Rules: 1936–1972
Franklin Roosevelt
turned his ear toward
advisors who believed
that competition was
the key to economic
restoration
What is the Per se Rule?
The antitrust doctrine that
the existence of monopoly
alone is illegal, regardless
of whether or not the
monopoly engages in
illegal business practices
Socony and in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States (306 U.S. 208 [1939])
found an illegal horizontal conspiracy based
on circumstantial evidence, the Supreme
Court showed that unlawful agreements
could be proven without direct evidence
such as a participant’s testimony and that
such arrangements, if detected, could be
punished severely.
• In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (370
U.S. 294 [1962]), perhaps the most famous
case under the 1950 Act, the Supreme
Court invalidated a merger that would have
yielded a horizontal market share of 5
percent and generated a vertical
foreclosure of under 2 percent. Brown
Shoe ruled that the parties’ market share,
though low overall, could be deemed
excessive in certain “submarkets.” The
Court also held that non-efficiency goals,
such as preserving small firms, were
relevant to applying the statute.
The merger of two shoe firms (becoming the second largest retailer in the
nation) was challenged by the DOJ and the challenge was upheld by the
Court, citing Congressional desire to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses, despite the potential
for higher costs and prices.
• In this era, the Supreme Court used per se rules to ban tying
arrangements that conditioned the sale of one product upon the
buyer’s agreement to purchase a second product. In Northern Pacific
Ry. Co. v. United States (356 U.S. 1 [1958]) and International Salt Co.
v. United States (332 U.S. 392 [1947]);
• nonprice vertical restraints by which a manufacturer limited its
retailers to specific geographic areas in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co. (388 U.S. 365 [1967]); group boycotts by which a full-
service retailer threatened not to deal with manufacturers who sold to
discounters In Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. (359 U.S.
207 [1959]);
• horizontal agreements to allocate markets or customers in Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States (341 U.S. 593 [1951]).
• The Court also characterized the adoption of exclusive sales
territories by participants in a marketing joint venture as per se
unlawful, in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. (405 U.S. 596
[1972]).
• In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank (374 U.S.
321 [1963]), the Court allowed the government to
establish a prima facie case of illegality by proving an
untoward increase in concentration. The Court cautioned
that market share data alone was not decisive and the
government’s prima facie case was rebuttable. In
practice, however, market shares routinely determined
outcomes.
• Later cases such as United States v. Von’s Grocery Co.
(384 U.S. 270 [1966]) and United States v. Pabst
BrewingCo.(384U.S.546[1966]) placed horizontal
mergers creating market shares as low as 4.5 percent at
risk.Rebuttal efforts usually failed. Among other
arguments, the Supreme Court held efficiency claims to
be, at best, irrelevant and possibly a factor weighing
against approval of the merger; for example, see Federal
Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co. (386 U.S.
568 [1967]).
• Even as courts strove to deal with the many tight-knit
industrial oligopolies of the day, economists came to
realize that departures from the perfect competition
model are normal, indeed inevitable, even in
“competitive” industries. This view led economists to
articulate vague criteria for whether a market was
“workably” competitive (Clark, 1940; Markham, 1950).
• As judges grappled with how to treat parallel conduct in
tight oligopolies without explicit evidence of collusion,
economists were exploring the pricing behavior of
oligopolists, including “price leadership,” where a single
large firm initiates price changes and others typically
follow (Stigler, 1947; Fellner, 1949; Markham, 1951).
• This work showed how price leadership could explain
pricing patterns observed in tight-knit oligopolies, but it
gave judges no simple formula for setting clear rules to
distinguish illegal agreements from mere conscious
parallelism that could yield similar outcomes.
• As courts in this era were emphasizing measures of
market structure and concentration, industrial
organization thinking focused on articulating and
developing the “structure, conduct, performance”
paradigm often associated with the work of Joe Bain
(1956; see also Mason, 1939). This framework
encouraged empirical researchers to seek relationships
between market concentration and performance
measures such as price/cost margins.
• Despite an emphasis on market concentration in making
this assessment, economists of this time recognized that
an industry’s long-run performance is likely to hinge
more on its level of innovation than on the four-firm
concentration ratio or departures of prices from marginal
cost. Finally, both the courts and economists of this time
tended to downplay efficiencies associated with large-
scale enterprises.
The Ascent of the Chicago School:
1973–1991
• In the 1930s, Chicago-based theorists
such as Henry Simons played a key role in
attacking central planning and promoting
deconcentration policies
• The new Chicago School continued the
earlier Chicago tradition by abhorring
comprehensive regulation of entry and
prices.
• the new Chicago scholars emphasized
effeciency explanations for many
phenomena, including industrial
concentration, mergers, and contractual
restraints, that antitrust law acutely
disfavored in the 1950s and 1960s.
• vertical restraints, was so often benign or
pro-competitive that courts should uphold
it with rules of per se legality
• By the mid-1970s, the perspectives of these and
like-minded commentators increasingly gained
judicial approval. At least two key factors
accounted for this receptivity. The first was a
change in judicial appointments. Many of
Richard Nixon’s appointees to the Supreme
Court (most notably on antitrust issues, Lewis
Powell) and the lower courts had comparatively
narrow preferences for antitrust intervention. The
second factor was a sense that U.S. firms were
losing ground in international markets and
surrendering market share at home. This
perception increased sensitivity to efficiency
arguments.
• Supreme Court’s decision in Continental T.V. Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc. (433 U.S.36[1977]), which held that
all non price vertical restrictions—like the location
clauses challenged in this case—warrant rule of reason
analysis.
• The Court prominently cited Chicago School
commentary and emphasized that the analysis of
economic effects provided the proper basis for
evaluating conduct under the antitrust laws. Minimum
retail price maintenance agreements remained illegal per
se, but later decisions toughened evidentiary tests for
proving the existence of such arrangements, as in
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. (465 U.S. 752
[1984]) and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp. (485 U.S. 717 [1988]).
• During this era, it is clear that the courts,
under the Chicago School’s influence,
were trimming back antitrust doctrine. Yet
the same analytical tools that economists
used to challenge interventionist antitrust
doctrines of the 1950s and 1960s, by
showing that certain practices often could
increase efficiency and boost
competitiveness, were simultaneously
offering new methods for arguing that
many business practices sometimes could
harm competition
• One prominent example of this dynamic
occurred in the area of “predatory pricing,” in
which a firm temporarily sells below cost to
subdue rivals and then collects monopoly rents.
While economists for decades had criticized
many predatory pricing cases, government
enforcers remained keen on these matters
through the 1970s. But the courts in the 1970s
paid careful attention to the economic literature,
to the extent that the term “average variable cost”
now commonly appears in predatory pricing
decisions
• Supreme Court was saying that predatory
pricing rarely made business sense, because
the predator had little probability of sustaining a
future monopoly long enough to recoup losses
incurred through below-cost sales.
• Yet at the same time, game theorists were
showing how predation could rationally occur in
a world with imperfect information and signaling,
if potential entrants had long memories and
declined to challenge a deep-pocket incumbent
who had displayed a willingness to respond to
entry by selling below cost.
• Game-theoretic methods dominated industrial
organization theory in the 1970s and 1980s. The
flexibility of game theory allowed economic theorists to
generate equilibrium predictions in settings involving a
wide range of conduct, from R&D decisions to
advertising to product positioning, as well as the classic
problem of oligopolistic pricing.
• However, the same flexibility made general predictions
hard to come by. Some types of conduct,such as long-
term contracts with key customers or preemptive
capacity expansion, could deter entry and entrench
dominance, but they also could generate efficiencies.
The only way to tell in a given case appeared to be for
the antitrust agencies and the courts to conduct a full-
scale rule of reason inquiry.
Towards a Post-Chicago Synthesis:
Since 1992
• Antitrust decisions and government
enforcement policy since the mid-1990s
have begun to reflect the flexibility of
recent analytical perspectives (Baker, 1999).
• The most noteworthy feature of recent
cases concerning collusion or cooperation
between firms is the search for
manageable analytical techniques that
avoid the complexity of the traditional
rule of reason yet supply a richer
factual analysis than per se tests.
• Government efforts to combat collusion in the 1990s have applied
game theory in two notable ways.
• First, the Justice Department adopted a policy that gives criminal
immunity to the first cartel member to reveal the cartel’s existence.
Recent criminal enforcement results indicate that the strategy elicits
valuable information. In1999,using data supplied by a cartel member
under the new policy, the Justice Department obtained guilty pleas
from BASF and Hoffman-La Roche to pay a total of $750 million in
criminal fines (an amount surpassing the sum of all Sherman Act
criminal fines since 1890) for fixing vitamin prices.
• Second, the government has prosecuted behavior that facilitates
coordination, not just the coordination itself. For example, in the
early 1990s, the government obtained a settlement from several
airlines to bar the use of computer reservation systems to coordinate
prices.As the Internet emerges as a key conduit for commerce,we
will see more enforcement actions and judicial decisions on how fi
rms may interact in cyberspace (Baker, 1996).
• most important modern judicial use of game theory,
the economics of information, and transaction cost
economics.
• Kodak was accused of monopolizing a market
consisting of parts and service for its own
photocopiers. A lower court granted summary
judgment for Kodak, which argued that its 20 percent
share of sales of new copiers made it irrational to
impose unreasonable after-market restraints on its
installed base.
• The court of appeals overturned the grant of
summary judgment, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court extensively cited game theoretic
commentary, much as it had quoted Chicago School
scholars in the 1977 Sylvania case. Relying heavily
on notions such as imperfect information and
lock-in as sources of market power, the Court
said a trial was necessary to assess Kodak’s ability
to exploit its installed base and evaluate its business
justifications
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc. (504 U.S. 451 [1992])
• Antitrust enforcement has increasingly focused on
innovation issues, as suggested by the release in 1995
of federal guidelines for licensing intellectual property.
• The recent concern with innovation may seem a slow
reaction to Schumpeter’s (1942) observation decades
ago that innovation is the prime determinant of economic
performance and growth. But modern policy reflects
more recent work by economists showing how
technology spurs growth, the role of patents in promoting
or perhaps retarding innovation, and the impact of
licensing.
• The FTC’s recent suit against Intel for withdrawing
cooperation from its microchip customers involved a
highly innovative industry that relies heavily on cross
licensing.In the Justice Department’s battle against
Microsoft, both parties depict themselves as champions
of innovation.The government’s theory in the Microsoft
case draws extensively from game theory involving
strategic entry deterrence and raising the costs of
rivals
kovacic.mp4
Conclusions
The Sherman Act and its offshoots, as applied
through the twists and turns of doctrine and
enforcement in the 20th century, have attained
almost constitutional stature in America.
Economists two major contributions to the
U.S. antitrust regime.
First, is to make the case for competition as the superior mechanism
for governing the economy. Throughout the 20th century, America’s
antitrust laws have coexisted uneasily with policies that favor extensive
government intervention in the economy through planning, ownership, or
sweeping controls overprices and entry. Economists have informed the
debate about the relative merits of competition by illuminating the costs of
measures that suppress rivalry with the ostensible aim of serving the
public interest.
Second, significant contribution of economists has been to guide
the formation of antitrust policy. Economic learning has exerted an
increasing impact on antitrust enforcement. In the first half of the 20th
century, one finds little direct impact of economic research on the major
court cases. The influence increases in the century’s second half, but
usually with a lag.
Into the 21st century.
 links between economics and law have been
institutionalized with increasing presence of an
economic perspective in law schools, extensive
and explicit judicial reliance on economic theory,
and with the substantial presence of economists
in the government antitrust agencies.
 availability of new data sources like electronic
point-of-purchase data, the refinement of flexible
game-theoretic models, and the new emphasis
on innovation assures that robust arguments
over the proper content of competition policy will
flourish
"antitrust laws are meant to protect
competition, not competitors"
• Thank you.

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Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking

  • 1. Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking Presented by: Augusto B. Agosto MA in Economics University of San Carlos William E. Kovacic and Carl Shapiro
  • 2. William Kovacic William Evan Kovacic was the Commissioner of the United States Federal Trade Commission from January 4, 2006 to October 3, 2011. President George W. Bush designated him to serve as FTC Chairman on March 30, 2008 Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy; Professor of Law; Director, Competition Law Center Address: 2000 H Street, NW Washington, District Of Columbia 20052 Phone: 202-994-8123 Email: wkovacic@law.gwu.edu
  • 3. Carl Shapiro is Professor of Economics and the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business. He also is Director of the Institute of Business and Economic Research. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics at M.I.T. in 1981, taught at Princeton University during the 1980s, and has been at Berkeley since 1990. He has been Editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives and a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, among other honors. Professor Shapiro served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice during 1995-1996.
  • 4. Sherman Act of 1890  set the stage for a century of jurisprudence regarding monopoly, cartels, and oligopoly  outlawed “every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade” and “monopolization” and treated violations as crimes  draw lines between acceptable cooperation and illegal collusion, between vigorous competition and unlawful monopolization
  • 5. Role of Economist • economists a singular opportunity to shape competition policy • vital terms directly implicated economic concepts, their interpretation inevitably would invite contributions from economists
  • 6. Three core areas of antitrust: 1. cartels, cooperation, or other interactions among independent firms; 2. abusive conduct by dominant firms; 3. mergers. 1890–1914 1915–1936 1936–1972 Since 19921973–1991 The Early Days of the Sherman Act Ascent of the Rule of Reason Emphasis on Market Structure and Per Se Rules The Ascent of the Chicago School Towards a Post-Chicago Synthesis
  • 7. • Two important developments were: – Technological breakthrough that lead to a larger optimal plant size in manufacturing – The rise of the railroad from 9,000 miles of track in 1850 to 167,000 miles by 1890 • Economies of scale and cheaper transport costs extended the geographical size of markets, so firms grew larger to serve this bigger market. Origins of Antitrust PolicyOrigins of Antitrust Policy
  • 8. The Early Days of the Sherman Act: 1890-1914 • Sherman Act’s first two decades featured no whirlwind of antitrust enforcement, the courts began shaping the law’s vague terms.
  • 9. Standard Oil Co. v. United States (221 U.S. 1 [1911]) • First, the Court treated Standard’s 90 percent share of refinery output as proof of monopoly. Future cases commonly would use high market shares as proxies for monopoly power. • Second, the Court established the “rule of reason” as the basic method of antitrust analysis. By this standard, judges would assess conduct on a case-by-case basis, although especially harmful behavior still might be condemned by bright line, per se rules. • Third, the Court began classifying some behavior as unreasonably exclusionary. It ruled that Standard Oil’s selective, below-cost price cuts and buyouts of rivals illegally created and maintained the firm’s dominance. • Finally, despite Standard’s dire (and unfulfilled) predictions of industrial apocalypse, the Court broke the firm into 34 parts.
  • 12. The Clayton Act reduced judicial discretion by specifically prohibiting certain tying arrangements, exclusive dealing agreements, interlocking directorates, and mergers achieved by purchasing stock. The FTC Act also ended the executive branch’s monopoly on public enforcement of antitrust laws by forming an administrative body to make antitrust policy.
  • 13. Ascent of the Rule of Reason: 1915–1936 • In Maple Flooring Manufacturers’ Association v. United States (268 U.S. 563 [1925]), the Court also took a benign view of arrangements for sharing price and output data among rivals. Maple Flooring holds special interest for economists today because it featured the Supreme Court’s first citation to an economist’s work in an antitrust decision—in this instance, to underscore how access to information might enable producers to make efficient output and pricing decisions. Maple Flooring’s author was Harlan Fiske Stone, a former dean of Columbia Law School, who favored using social science literature to resolve legal issues.
  • 14. What is the Rule of Reason? The antitrust doctrine that the existence of monopoly alone is not illegal unless the monopoly engages in illegal business practices
  • 15. • When the Supreme Court confronted cases involving market power measurement, it tended to accept broad market definitions that made a finding of dominance less likely. • In Standard Oil Co.v.United States (283U.S.163,1931), the Court upheld a patent pool by which several major refiners set the royalties to be paid for exploiting catalytic cracking technology. Key to the decision was the definition of the relevant market. If cracking technology were the relevant product, the refiners’ market share would exceed 60 percent. Alternatively, if the relevant product encompassed all refining capacity, including older distillation technology, the defendants’ share would be only 26 percent. • The Court embraced the second alternative and concluded that the refiners probably lacked power to raise prices.
  • 16. • Along with loose rules on cooperation between rivals,the 1915–1936 era marks the longest lapse for the enforcement of antitrust controls on dominant firm behavior.
  • 17. • It is difficult during this period to detect signifi cant direct effects of economic thinking and research on judicial antitrust decisions. • The courts emphasized market share as an indicator of market power, while economists focused more upon the beauty of scale economies and their implications for prices and market structure. While Pigou’s writings on price discrimination have proven durable, they provided no basis for the prohibitions on price discrimination in the Robinson Patman Act of 1936.
  • 18. Emphasis on Market Structure and Per Se Rules: 1936–1972 Franklin Roosevelt turned his ear toward advisors who believed that competition was the key to economic restoration
  • 19. What is the Per se Rule? The antitrust doctrine that the existence of monopoly alone is illegal, regardless of whether or not the monopoly engages in illegal business practices
  • 20. Socony and in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States (306 U.S. 208 [1939]) found an illegal horizontal conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court showed that unlawful agreements could be proven without direct evidence such as a participant’s testimony and that such arrangements, if detected, could be punished severely.
  • 21. • In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (370 U.S. 294 [1962]), perhaps the most famous case under the 1950 Act, the Supreme Court invalidated a merger that would have yielded a horizontal market share of 5 percent and generated a vertical foreclosure of under 2 percent. Brown Shoe ruled that the parties’ market share, though low overall, could be deemed excessive in certain “submarkets.” The Court also held that non-efficiency goals, such as preserving small firms, were relevant to applying the statute. The merger of two shoe firms (becoming the second largest retailer in the nation) was challenged by the DOJ and the challenge was upheld by the Court, citing Congressional desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses, despite the potential for higher costs and prices.
  • 22. • In this era, the Supreme Court used per se rules to ban tying arrangements that conditioned the sale of one product upon the buyer’s agreement to purchase a second product. In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States (356 U.S. 1 [1958]) and International Salt Co. v. United States (332 U.S. 392 [1947]); • nonprice vertical restraints by which a manufacturer limited its retailers to specific geographic areas in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. (388 U.S. 365 [1967]); group boycotts by which a full- service retailer threatened not to deal with manufacturers who sold to discounters In Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. (359 U.S. 207 [1959]); • horizontal agreements to allocate markets or customers in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States (341 U.S. 593 [1951]). • The Court also characterized the adoption of exclusive sales territories by participants in a marketing joint venture as per se unlawful, in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. (405 U.S. 596 [1972]).
  • 23. • In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank (374 U.S. 321 [1963]), the Court allowed the government to establish a prima facie case of illegality by proving an untoward increase in concentration. The Court cautioned that market share data alone was not decisive and the government’s prima facie case was rebuttable. In practice, however, market shares routinely determined outcomes. • Later cases such as United States v. Von’s Grocery Co. (384 U.S. 270 [1966]) and United States v. Pabst BrewingCo.(384U.S.546[1966]) placed horizontal mergers creating market shares as low as 4.5 percent at risk.Rebuttal efforts usually failed. Among other arguments, the Supreme Court held efficiency claims to be, at best, irrelevant and possibly a factor weighing against approval of the merger; for example, see Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co. (386 U.S. 568 [1967]).
  • 24. • Even as courts strove to deal with the many tight-knit industrial oligopolies of the day, economists came to realize that departures from the perfect competition model are normal, indeed inevitable, even in “competitive” industries. This view led economists to articulate vague criteria for whether a market was “workably” competitive (Clark, 1940; Markham, 1950). • As judges grappled with how to treat parallel conduct in tight oligopolies without explicit evidence of collusion, economists were exploring the pricing behavior of oligopolists, including “price leadership,” where a single large firm initiates price changes and others typically follow (Stigler, 1947; Fellner, 1949; Markham, 1951). • This work showed how price leadership could explain pricing patterns observed in tight-knit oligopolies, but it gave judges no simple formula for setting clear rules to distinguish illegal agreements from mere conscious parallelism that could yield similar outcomes.
  • 25. • As courts in this era were emphasizing measures of market structure and concentration, industrial organization thinking focused on articulating and developing the “structure, conduct, performance” paradigm often associated with the work of Joe Bain (1956; see also Mason, 1939). This framework encouraged empirical researchers to seek relationships between market concentration and performance measures such as price/cost margins. • Despite an emphasis on market concentration in making this assessment, economists of this time recognized that an industry’s long-run performance is likely to hinge more on its level of innovation than on the four-firm concentration ratio or departures of prices from marginal cost. Finally, both the courts and economists of this time tended to downplay efficiencies associated with large- scale enterprises.
  • 26. The Ascent of the Chicago School: 1973–1991 • In the 1930s, Chicago-based theorists such as Henry Simons played a key role in attacking central planning and promoting deconcentration policies • The new Chicago School continued the earlier Chicago tradition by abhorring comprehensive regulation of entry and prices.
  • 27. • the new Chicago scholars emphasized effeciency explanations for many phenomena, including industrial concentration, mergers, and contractual restraints, that antitrust law acutely disfavored in the 1950s and 1960s. • vertical restraints, was so often benign or pro-competitive that courts should uphold it with rules of per se legality
  • 28. • By the mid-1970s, the perspectives of these and like-minded commentators increasingly gained judicial approval. At least two key factors accounted for this receptivity. The first was a change in judicial appointments. Many of Richard Nixon’s appointees to the Supreme Court (most notably on antitrust issues, Lewis Powell) and the lower courts had comparatively narrow preferences for antitrust intervention. The second factor was a sense that U.S. firms were losing ground in international markets and surrendering market share at home. This perception increased sensitivity to efficiency arguments.
  • 29. • Supreme Court’s decision in Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. (433 U.S.36[1977]), which held that all non price vertical restrictions—like the location clauses challenged in this case—warrant rule of reason analysis. • The Court prominently cited Chicago School commentary and emphasized that the analysis of economic effects provided the proper basis for evaluating conduct under the antitrust laws. Minimum retail price maintenance agreements remained illegal per se, but later decisions toughened evidentiary tests for proving the existence of such arrangements, as in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. (465 U.S. 752 [1984]) and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. (485 U.S. 717 [1988]).
  • 30. • During this era, it is clear that the courts, under the Chicago School’s influence, were trimming back antitrust doctrine. Yet the same analytical tools that economists used to challenge interventionist antitrust doctrines of the 1950s and 1960s, by showing that certain practices often could increase efficiency and boost competitiveness, were simultaneously offering new methods for arguing that many business practices sometimes could harm competition
  • 31. • One prominent example of this dynamic occurred in the area of “predatory pricing,” in which a firm temporarily sells below cost to subdue rivals and then collects monopoly rents. While economists for decades had criticized many predatory pricing cases, government enforcers remained keen on these matters through the 1970s. But the courts in the 1970s paid careful attention to the economic literature, to the extent that the term “average variable cost” now commonly appears in predatory pricing decisions
  • 32. • Supreme Court was saying that predatory pricing rarely made business sense, because the predator had little probability of sustaining a future monopoly long enough to recoup losses incurred through below-cost sales. • Yet at the same time, game theorists were showing how predation could rationally occur in a world with imperfect information and signaling, if potential entrants had long memories and declined to challenge a deep-pocket incumbent who had displayed a willingness to respond to entry by selling below cost.
  • 33. • Game-theoretic methods dominated industrial organization theory in the 1970s and 1980s. The flexibility of game theory allowed economic theorists to generate equilibrium predictions in settings involving a wide range of conduct, from R&D decisions to advertising to product positioning, as well as the classic problem of oligopolistic pricing. • However, the same flexibility made general predictions hard to come by. Some types of conduct,such as long- term contracts with key customers or preemptive capacity expansion, could deter entry and entrench dominance, but they also could generate efficiencies. The only way to tell in a given case appeared to be for the antitrust agencies and the courts to conduct a full- scale rule of reason inquiry.
  • 34. Towards a Post-Chicago Synthesis: Since 1992 • Antitrust decisions and government enforcement policy since the mid-1990s have begun to reflect the flexibility of recent analytical perspectives (Baker, 1999). • The most noteworthy feature of recent cases concerning collusion or cooperation between firms is the search for manageable analytical techniques that avoid the complexity of the traditional rule of reason yet supply a richer factual analysis than per se tests.
  • 35. • Government efforts to combat collusion in the 1990s have applied game theory in two notable ways. • First, the Justice Department adopted a policy that gives criminal immunity to the first cartel member to reveal the cartel’s existence. Recent criminal enforcement results indicate that the strategy elicits valuable information. In1999,using data supplied by a cartel member under the new policy, the Justice Department obtained guilty pleas from BASF and Hoffman-La Roche to pay a total of $750 million in criminal fines (an amount surpassing the sum of all Sherman Act criminal fines since 1890) for fixing vitamin prices. • Second, the government has prosecuted behavior that facilitates coordination, not just the coordination itself. For example, in the early 1990s, the government obtained a settlement from several airlines to bar the use of computer reservation systems to coordinate prices.As the Internet emerges as a key conduit for commerce,we will see more enforcement actions and judicial decisions on how fi rms may interact in cyberspace (Baker, 1996).
  • 36. • most important modern judicial use of game theory, the economics of information, and transaction cost economics. • Kodak was accused of monopolizing a market consisting of parts and service for its own photocopiers. A lower court granted summary judgment for Kodak, which argued that its 20 percent share of sales of new copiers made it irrational to impose unreasonable after-market restraints on its installed base. • The court of appeals overturned the grant of summary judgment, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court extensively cited game theoretic commentary, much as it had quoted Chicago School scholars in the 1977 Sylvania case. Relying heavily on notions such as imperfect information and lock-in as sources of market power, the Court said a trial was necessary to assess Kodak’s ability to exploit its installed base and evaluate its business justifications Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. (504 U.S. 451 [1992])
  • 37. • Antitrust enforcement has increasingly focused on innovation issues, as suggested by the release in 1995 of federal guidelines for licensing intellectual property. • The recent concern with innovation may seem a slow reaction to Schumpeter’s (1942) observation decades ago that innovation is the prime determinant of economic performance and growth. But modern policy reflects more recent work by economists showing how technology spurs growth, the role of patents in promoting or perhaps retarding innovation, and the impact of licensing. • The FTC’s recent suit against Intel for withdrawing cooperation from its microchip customers involved a highly innovative industry that relies heavily on cross licensing.In the Justice Department’s battle against Microsoft, both parties depict themselves as champions of innovation.The government’s theory in the Microsoft case draws extensively from game theory involving strategic entry deterrence and raising the costs of rivals
  • 39. Conclusions The Sherman Act and its offshoots, as applied through the twists and turns of doctrine and enforcement in the 20th century, have attained almost constitutional stature in America.
  • 40. Economists two major contributions to the U.S. antitrust regime. First, is to make the case for competition as the superior mechanism for governing the economy. Throughout the 20th century, America’s antitrust laws have coexisted uneasily with policies that favor extensive government intervention in the economy through planning, ownership, or sweeping controls overprices and entry. Economists have informed the debate about the relative merits of competition by illuminating the costs of measures that suppress rivalry with the ostensible aim of serving the public interest. Second, significant contribution of economists has been to guide the formation of antitrust policy. Economic learning has exerted an increasing impact on antitrust enforcement. In the first half of the 20th century, one finds little direct impact of economic research on the major court cases. The influence increases in the century’s second half, but usually with a lag.
  • 41. Into the 21st century.  links between economics and law have been institutionalized with increasing presence of an economic perspective in law schools, extensive and explicit judicial reliance on economic theory, and with the substantial presence of economists in the government antitrust agencies.  availability of new data sources like electronic point-of-purchase data, the refinement of flexible game-theoretic models, and the new emphasis on innovation assures that robust arguments over the proper content of competition policy will flourish
  • 42. "antitrust laws are meant to protect competition, not competitors"